Table of Contents

PART 1: WHAT DEFLATIONISM IS1. Framing the General Approach1.1 Deflationism vs. Inflationism1.2 The Dimensions of Deflationism1.3 On the Instability of "Partial Deflationism"1.4 Motivations and Methodological Disputes2. Early and Proto-Deflationary Accounts2.1 Frege on Truth2.2 Ramsey and the Redundancy Theory2.3 Ayer on 'True'2.4 Wittgenstein on Truth-Talk2.5 Strawson on What We Do with Truth-Talk2.6 Tarski and the (T)-Schema3. The Species of Deflationism3.1 Prosententialism3.1.1 Prior's Adverbial Prosententialism3.1.2 Williams's Substitutional Prosententialism3.1.3 Grover, Camp, and Belnap's Atomic Prosententialism3.1.4 Brandom's Operator Prosententialism3.2 Disquotationalism3.2.1 Quine's Disquotationalism3.2.2 Leeds's Recursive Disquotationalism3.2.3 Field's Pure Disquotational Truth3.3 Minimalism3.3.1 Horwich's Minimalism3.3.2 Hill's Substitutional MinimalismPART 2. CHALLENGES TO DEFLATIONISM4. Challenges to Linguistic Deflationism4.1 Immanence and Limitations on Truth-Ascriptions4.1.1 Immanence and Deflationism4.1.2 Immanence, Foreign Sentences, Sentences Speakers Do Not Understand4.2 The Formulation and Generalization Problems4.2.1 The Formulation Problem4.2.2 Understanding the Generalization Problem4.2.3 Justifying Generalizations vs. Proving Generalizations4.2.4 Field and Hill on Proving Generalizations5. Challenges to Metaphysical Deflationism5.1 The Causal-Explanatory Role Challenge5.1.1 Explaining the Success of Science5.1.2 Explaining Behavioral Success5.2 The Conservativeness Argument5.2.1 Explaining the Conservativeness Argument5.2.2 Responses to the Conservativeness Argument5.2.3 Consequences of the Conservativeness Argument5.3 The Correspondence Intuition, Truthmaking, and the Truth Property Thesis5.3.1 From the Correspondence Intuition to Truth-Maker Theory5.3.2 The Truth-Property Thesis5.4 The Challenge from Normativity6. Challenges to Conceptual Deflationism6.1 "Truth-Involving" Accounts That Deflationists Can Accept6.2 "Truth-Involving" Accounts That Deflationists Must Replace6.3 Deflationism and Theories of Meaning/Content7. Formal Challenges and Paradox Treatment Deflationism7.1 Constraints on an Adequate Resolution of the Liar Paradox7.1.1 General Constraints on Adequate Paradox Treatment7.1.2 Constraints for Paradox Treatment Deflationism7.2 Tarski's Replacement Theory and the Liar Paradox7.3 Kripke and Ungroundedness7.4 Field on the 'Determinately' Operator7.5 Grover and Semantic Inheritors7.6 Horwich's Semantic Epistemicism7.7 Deflationary Dialetheism7.8 Deflationism, the Paradoxes, and Concluding RemarksAppendix: New Directions via Sentential-Variable Deflationism and Alethic FictionalismA.1 ASVD and the "How-Talk" NLI ApproachA.2 The Merits of ASVDA.2.1 Avoiding the Formulation and Generalization ProblemsA.2.2 Emergence and Resolution of the Liar ParadoxA.2.3 ASVD and the Conservativeness ArgumentA.2.4 Why Have a Truth Predicate?A.3 From ASVD to Alethic FictionalismA.4 Conclusions: Accommodating Broad Four-Dimensional DeflationismBibliographyindex