Against Coherence: Truth, Probability, and Justification

Against Coherence: Truth, Probability, and Justification

by Erik J. Olsson
ISBN-10:
0199279993
ISBN-13:
9780199279999
Pub. Date:
06/23/2005
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
ISBN-10:
0199279993
ISBN-13:
9780199279999
Pub. Date:
06/23/2005
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
Against Coherence: Truth, Probability, and Justification

Against Coherence: Truth, Probability, and Justification

by Erik J. Olsson
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Overview

It is tempting to think that, if a person's beliefs are coherent, they are also likely to be true. This truth conduciveness claim is the cornerstone of the popular coherence theory of knowledge and justification. Erik Olsson's new book is the most extensive and detailed study of coherence and probable truth to date. Setting new standards of precision and clarity, Olsson argues that the value of coherence has been widely overestimated. Provocative and readable, Against Coherence will make stimulating reading for epistemologists and anyone with a serious interest in truth.

Product Details

ISBN-13: 9780199279999
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Publication date: 06/23/2005
Pages: 246
Product dimensions: 9.30(w) x 5.90(h) x 0.90(d)

About the Author

Erik J. Olsson is Professor and Chair in Theoretical Philosophy at Lund University, Sweden

Table of Contents

1. IntroductionPart I: Does coherence imply truth?2. Coherence, truth, and testimony3. C. I. Lewis's radical justification of memory4. Laurence BonJour's radical justification of belief5. C. A. J. Coady's radical justification of natural testimonyPart II: Does more coherence imply higher likelihood of truth?6. Making the question precise7. A negative answerPart III: Other views8. How not the regain the truth connection: a reply to Bovens and Hartmann9. Other coherence theoriesPart IV: Scepticism and incoherence10. Pragmatism, doubt, and the role of incoherenceAppendix A: Counterexample to the Doxastic Extension PrincipleAppendix B: Proof of the Impossibility TheoremAppendix C: Proofs of Observations
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