| 1 | Introduction | 3 |
| 1. | Free Will Subjectivism and Metaphilosophy | 3 |
| 2. | An Example of the Importance of Metaphilosophy | 8 |
| 3. | A Provisional Definition of Free Choice | 10 |
| 4. | Overview of the Book | 12 |
| I | The Free Will Problem as a Problem in Metaphilosophy | |
| 2 | Metaphilosophies | 17 |
| 1. | What Is Philosophy For? | 17 |
| 2. | Desires-for-Philosophy and Conceptions of Philosophy | 19 |
| 3. | Four Metaphilosophies | 22 |
| 4. | The Importance of Having a Metaphilosophy | 32 |
| 5. | The Unprovability of Metaphilosophy: Two Reasons | 33 |
| 6. | Three Objections to the Relativity of Metaphilosophies | 37 |
| 7. | Conclusion | 39 |
| 3 | Intermediate-Level Philosophical Principles | 40 |
| 1. | Five Pairs of Intermediate Principles | 40 |
| 2. | The Unprovability of Intermediate-Level Principles | 47 |
| 3. | The Interplay of Metaphilosophies, Intermediate Principles, and Lower-Level Theories | 49 |
| 4. | Why Adopt Philosophy as Continuous with Science? | 53 |
| 5. | Conclusion | 55 |
| 4 | How the Free Will Debate Depends on Metaphilosophy (I) | 56 |
| 1. | Reasons for Believing in Free Will | 56 |
| 2. | The Burden-of-Proof Issue | 60 |
| 3. | How Far May Philosophers 'Go' to Accommodate Free Will? | 62 |
| 4. | Strawson's Subjectivist Account of Blame | 63 |
| 5. | The Debate over Dual Rationality | 69 |
| 5 | How the Free Will Debate Depends on Metaphilosophy (II) | 77 |
| 1. | The Analogy between the Metaphysics of Ethics and the Metaphysics of Free Will | 78 |
| 2. | Van Inwagen's Consequence Argument | 82 |
| 3. | Frankfurt's Principle of Alternative Possibilities | 86 |
| 4. | Is Equal Proof Needed in All Areas of Philosophy? | 90 |
| 5. | Standard and Non-Standard Views of Moral Responsibility | 93 |
| 6. | Conclusion | 96 |
| II | Free Will from the Perspective of Philosophy as Continuous With Science | |
| 6 | How to Frame the Free Will Problem | 99 |
| 1. | A Radical Approach to Free Will | 100 |
| 2. | Four Free Will Theories | 101 |
| 3. | Another Theory | 103 |
| 4. | Conclusion | 108 |
| 7 | The Fragmentation of Free Will | 109 |
| 1. | The Unity Objection | 110 |
| 2. | The Fragmentation-Is-No-Problem Objection | 111 |
| 3. | Two Preliminary Reasons to Reject Both Types of the Fragmentation-Is-No-Problem Objection | 112 |
| 4. | Reasons to Reject the Bald Example | 114 |
| 5. | Reasons to Reject Cockburn's Move | 119 |
| 6. | Mele's Objection | 122 |
| 7. | Conclusion | 124 |
| 8 | Free Will Is a Moral Concept | 126 |
| 1. | What Does It Mean to Call Free Choice a Moral Term? | 127 |
| 2. | A Preliminary Reason for Thinking That Free Choice Is Moral | 128 |
| 3. | The Open-Question Argument: Goodness and Freeness | 130 |
| 4. | The Analogy with Moral Facts: Freeness Facts Have No Explanatory Power | 132 |
| 5. | The Goodness of Ultimacy | 134 |
| 6. | The Dispute over Magnanimity | 138 |
| 7. | Conclusion | 142 |
| 9 | Hume's Principle: The Subjectivity of Moral Responsibility and Free Will | 143 |
| 1. | Defining the Key Terms | 144 |
| 2. | Why Hume's Principle Implies That Ascriptions of Moral Responsibility Cannot Be True | 147 |
| 3. | Why Hume's Principle Implies That Free Choice Is a Moral Concept | 151 |
| 4. | Conclusion | 154 |
| 10 | Conclusion | 156 |
| 1. | Where We Are | 156 |
| 2. | Philosophical Consequences | 158 |
| 3. | Consequences for Persons | 161 |
| References | 167 |
| Index | 173 |
