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This British Army of the Rhine

Turning Nazi Enemies into Cold War Partners

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS PRESS

Britain, the Cold War, and the BAOR

Policy Makers, Strategy, and Organization

We have never doubted that many of the bad old nationalistic elements in the community have survived. [...] However, it is not in Parliament that [they] do harm. It is on the street corners and in public meeting places that they work upon the humiliated pride and dormant brutality of the German people.

— United Kingdom Delegation Brief, The London Conference, May 1950

It was doubts about the reemergence of German nationalism among the British administration at the highest levels, as expressed in the brief cited above, that led to the consideration of using the BAOR as a force to foster democratic elements in Germany. However, these doubts also provide fascinating insights into the mind-sets of British policy makers. It is therefore important to shed light on some of the revealing attitudes of the highest-ranking staff of the Foreign Office in London and the British High Commission in Germany before progressing on to the armed services themselves and the initiatives introduced by the civilian administration in Germany to improve relations with the Germans. After all, it was these attitudes that helped to shape and implement British policy toward West Germany. Many members of the British civilian and military administration stationed in Germany at the time of the creation of the Federal Republic had had firsthand experiences with Nazi Germany before and during the war, and their approach toward the Bonn republic was heavily influenced by these experiences. It is important to consider the attitudes of some of the senior British personnel in Germany before moving on to mass public opinion and its impact on the British military in the next chapter. The antipathy toward German nationalism, combined with the determination to pursue a pro-German policy, influenced the British administration's view of the BAOR as both a factor and a potential problem for Anglo-German relations.

The second theme that emerges is that of the nature and development of the British troop commitment in Germany. British military strategy in the broader context of the Cold War, the organizational structure of the British military presence in Germany, and the adaption of the BAOR to political change in the context of Anglo-German relations are crucial elements to the understanding of how the armed services could be utilized as a tool for improved Anglo-German relations. After a brief outline of the wider strategic and military context of the Cold War, this chapter establishes the structure and responsibilities of the British civilian administration in Germany before addressing the question of what Foreign Office expectations of the BAOR's role in Anglo-German relations were prior to 1949. The analysis of the British administration and its relations with the BAOR and the Germans also considers the significant changes in the relation between occupiers and occupied resulting from the establishment of the Federal Republic. Finally, in order to understand the value of the BAOR as a tool for better relations between Britons and Germans, the political functions of the BAOR require analysis. This also entails an exploration of political controversies over the size of Britain's troop commitment as well as friction caused between different government departments over policy direction with regard to the BAOR.

Nazi Germany, the British Administration, and the Federal Republic

Despite the consistently pro-German policy Britain pursued in order to integrate Germany into the western alliance system, it is evident that many Foreign Office officials harbored the same fears, resulting from two world wars, of a return of German militarism that were common among the upper echelons of British society. The Labour Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin "hated the Germans and refused to visit Germany," whereas in 1949 the British high commissioner Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick commented on the German "truculence and arrogance which makes him impossible to deal with." Anthony Eden had described the Germans as "brutish monsters beneath a veneer of civilisation" as early as 1919. Ten years after the war, the British ambassador Sir Frederick Hoyer-Millar warned that "the German political consciousness is beginning to re-awaken," the sense of guilt for the war was faint, and the German character had not fundamentally changed. "The spirit of national egoism has, for a second time, survived defeat and occupation." Furthermore, the German character was "volatile and basically unstable." Suspicions of the German character among the highest circles in London were certainly widespread and lasted well into the mid-1950s.

Kirkpatrick was aware of the difficult position of the British military in Germany. And he saw himself as someone who was uniquely well placed to understand the context in which the BAOR would operate. At this point it is worth considering his long-standing relationship with Germany and its people. During the First World War Kirkpatrick was wounded in action but then, at the age of only nineteen, found himself heading a ring of British spies in the Netherlands. Having been employed by the Foreign Office since 1919, Kirkpatrick gained detailed knowledge of and insight into the workings of the fascist states of Italy and Germany during the interwar period. He served first in Rome and then in Berlin from 1933 to 1938. Moreover, he accompanied then prime minister Neville Chamberlain to the infamous meetings with Hitler during the 1938 Munich crisis. These meetings had filled him "with such a physical repugnance" that he unsuccessfully asked to be excused from having to attend any more sessions of the negotiations.

Whatever his attitudes toward the Federal Republic were, they were undoubtedly influenced by his experience with Nazi Germany, as "this time proved the most formative part of his career." According to his memoirs, in 1937 Kirkpatrick "was told with some truth that I must be prejudiced by dislike of Germany." In his view, "This was scarcely odd because the spectacle of a nation preparing ruthlessly to impose its will must be alarming and distasteful." When war broke out again in 1939, Kirkpatrick initially resumed work in the field of intelligence and propaganda, which he had carried out in the Great War. His role in the European services of the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) led him to interview Adolf Hitler's deputy Rudolf Hess after the latter's misguided attempt at diplomacy had ended with a plane crash in Scotland in 1941. From 1944 on he became one of the most experienced and distinguished members of the Foreign Office. He formed the British Element of the Allied Control Council, tasked with governing Germany after the war; served as political advisor to General Eisenhower; and in 1949 became head of the German section of the Foreign Office. This impressive rise through the ranks then culminated in the post of British high commissioner in Germany from 1950 to 1953 and head of the Foreign Office thereafter.

The Allied High Commission in the Federal Republic, which Kirkpatrick headed, was based in the very hotel where Neville Chamberlain had stayed during the 1938 meetings with Hitler. A constant reminder of the past was that Kirkpatrick's office was in the same apartment where Chamberlain had stayed. His views of the Federal Republic were just as much influenced by the past as by the present. On the one hand, his relationship with German chancellor Konrad Adenauer was very cordial, and, according to his memoirs, in 1953 Kirkpatrick found it "a wrench to leave Germany, where I had made many friends and [...] had been so intimately connected with every phase of the national life." On the other hand, as mentioned above, in 1949 he had also commented on the "truculence and arrogance" that he considered part of the German character. Furthermore, as late as 1959 Kirkpatrick believed "it would be folly to suppose that in no circumstances can Nazism, even if in a different form, ever raise its head in modern Germany." It has to be noted that not all leading members of the British administration in Germany were as reluctant as Kirkpatrick to leave the past behind when dealing with the Germans. Particularly Sir Brian Robertson, the military governor and Kirkpatrick's predecessor as UK high commissioner, was instrumental in "guiding the social and democratic advancement of a future ally." Despite his experiences of two world wars, he formed a genuine friendship with Adenauer and tirelessly worked toward closer Anglo-German relations. According to Lord Langford, "Adenauer was not a man who readily showed his emotions. But there was a break in his voice when he told me how much he would miss Brian Robertson. ... He had found him a true friend of Germany."

It is not surprising that many key members of the British administration tasked with fostering Anglo-German relations were themselves often doubtful whether the "German character" could ever be changed for the better. In many cases their personal contacts with Germans both before and during the war influenced their views in the postwar period. Naturally this had an impact on both the perception of the need for a tool such as the BAOR and the envisaged likeliness of its success.

British Military Strategy, the Cold War, and the Transformation of the BAOR

The dramatic events of the early Cold War period in Europe and the accompanying deterioration of relations between the two emerging blocs had a significant impact on British defense policy and therefore also led to changes in the size and role of the BAOR in Germany. The initial task of the BAOR in 1945, as in 1919, was to act as an army of occupation. Prior to the First World War the British army had been accustomed to "garrison the Empire, and only went onto the continent of Europe in wartime as expeditionary forces." As a consequence, the army was a relatively small force that, in contrast to many of its European counterparts, did not regularly make use of conscription and fought many of its campaigns in far-flung parts of the empire rather than on the Continent. As Colin Mclnnes points out, "The two World Wars had proved the exception to the rule for both the Army's experience of war and its place in British defence policy" by forcing the British to engage "with well-armed, well trained, well-equipped and highly organised armies" in Europe, "fighting in mass campaigns involving hundreds of thousands of men." When war ended, the army normally demobilized and returned to the task of policing the empire, and this desire to end conscription and disengage from Europe was certainly still evident after the Second World War. However, this is not what happened after 1945. Although the postwar period eventually did see the end of conscription and renewed involvement in Africa and Asia, the "focus was increasingly drawn towards Europe," and "the conflict that came to dominate defence policy and Army planning was that of a large-scale, high intensity war against the Soviet Union in Europe." The nature of this new threat demanded that the army was in a constant state of readiness to strike at very short notice, and in order to guarantee this level of preparedness, Britain introduced peacetime conscription in 1948. During this period British defense policy was forced to adapt to the advent of nuclear weapons and to extend its commitment in the increasingly unstable Middle East. Of course large-scale demobilization of British soldiers in Germany did take place after 1945, due to strong pressure from the British Treasury to cut defense spending as quickly as possible. However, the occupation of Germany that was agreed on at the 1945 Potsdam Conference and, soon thereafter, the emergence of the Cold War prevented the disbanding of the British Expeditionary Force in Germany. The 21st Army Group instead became the British Army of the Rhine in August 1945.

In 1945 the BAOR consisted of "three corps districts with several divisions." Each corps was made up of up to 450,000 men and each division numbered up to 150,000 men. However, after the end of the war most British units were demobilized, and "by January 1947, the British troop presence was reduced to three divisions." Only thereafter was the BAOR increasingly expanded and turned into a permanent military force in Germany. The 1947 National Service Act, introducing universal conscription in peacetime for an indefinite period for the first time in British history, meant that the ranks of the BAOR were now also filled with National Servicemen. These young Britons made up for the shortfall in recruitment among regular soldiers after 1945.

By May 1947, Whitehall, the British civil service, was convinced that the Soviet Union was "the potential enemy." It was the task of Clement Attlee's Labour government to develop political and military strategies to counter this threat. Whereas military considerations involved "questions of strategy, bases and force levels," the political response focused on the creation of defensive alliances. In a European context the first step in this process was the 1947 Anglo-French Treaty of Dunkirk. This treaty was extended in 1948, when Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin created the Western Union, bringing together Britain, France, and the Benelux countries in the Brussels Pact. The alliance was given a more military character with the establishment of the Western Union Defence Organisation. However, it was US involvement and the creation of NATO in 1949 that constituted the most important deterrent against communist aggression on the Continent.

As David French points out, the "Attlee government never seriously considered that they might be able to roll back the tide of communism." However, since British expectations were that the Soviet Union would be unable to launch a military attack on the West before 1957 due to the severe losses sustained in the Second World War and US superiority in nuclear weapons, the Soviet threat in Europe was perceived to be of a political and economic nature rather than a military one. As a consequence, until 1950, "Britain continued to give the Middle East the highest strategic priority, while Europe was only part of our overall strategy." This overall defense strategy, with its main focus on the defense of the British Isles, "the maintenance of sea lines of communications and the defence of the Middle East," was reflected in a stagnation of troop numbers in Germany. In 1947 the Imperial General Staff, the minister of defense, the secretary of state for war, and the secretary of state for air along with the military governor of the British Zone of Occupation therefore agreed that "the figure of about 55,000 should be regarded as the absolute minimum size of the Army which should be maintained in Germany in the foreseeable future." However, even in 1947 this figure had been accepted by the military governor only "under great pressure. The need is really for larger forces." Britain's containment policy in Europe during this period aimed at increasing the political strength of Western Europe rather than troop numbers.

Events such as the 1948 Czech coup and the Berlin blockade increasingly challenged the British perception of the Soviet threat in Europe not being primarily of a military nature. The Soviet Union successfully tested its first atomic bomb in 1949, and communism appeared to be spreading on a global scale. In June 1948 a communist-inspired insurgency erupted in Malaya, in December 1949 the Chinese civil war ended in communist victory, and in February 1950 the new Chinese government signed a treaty with Moscow. These developments in Asia had a direct impact on the BAOR and British strategic thought as to the defense of Europe. In March 1950 the chiefs of staff raised concerns over French morale in case of a Soviet attack and suggested a guarantee to the French that two British divisions would be sent to the Continent immediately should war break out. Soon thereafter they argued that "the defence of the UK required holding the enemy on a line as far east in Europe as possible." This was a clear break from the earlier plan to counter the Soviet forces in Europe with only "about two divisions and a tactical air force of some 141 aircraft," and partly in response to pressure from Britain's allies, London agreed to increase its armed forces in Germany. As a consequence, the number of troops in Germany would now be determined by two factors. The first was to "support the prestige and authority of Military Government in the British Zone of Germany." The second was "to act as part of the covering force behind which the military resources of the Western Union can be mobilised in the event of war with Soviet Russia." Although the importance of nuclear weapons for military planning increased considerably during this period, the Labour government nonetheless assumed that conventional ground troops would continue to play the decisive role in a European conflict in the foreseeable future. The main responsibility for a counterattack against the Soviet Union therefore rested on the British army and the RAF.

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Excerpted from This British Army of the Rhine by Peter Speiser. Copyright © 2016 Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois. Excerpted by permission of UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS PRESS.
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