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Ethical Life in South Asia

Indiana University Press

The Subhasita as an Artifact of Ethical Life in Medieval India

Daud Ali

Every day in the evening, after we had taken our meal and finished our excursions, we passed time by reciting subhasitas and asking each other questions and counter questions. — Cirañjivin, Pañcatantra

Though early India has left a copious legacy of didactic, proverbial, and wisdom literature in various forms and genres which has been deemed widely influential and important, rarely has this literature been analyzed with the seriousness it deserves. The focus in this essay is a certain species of didactic literature that has particular significance in rethinking the history of ethical practices in the South Asian cultural world during what may be broadly termed its "middle period." That the original contexts of this literature were courtly is clear enough from their content, and provide general clues as to the place of virtue and aesthetics in the ethical world of elite society. More to the point, however, I suggest here that the preserved textual forms and literary contexts of these verses actually tell us as much about the ethical dynamics of the societies in which they were current as their positive topical content. While didactic literature in early India embodied distinctive moral values, its formal aspects help us understand the ways in which these values were assimilated, experienced, and transmitted in different contexts.

A clear focus here is on what Foucault called ethical "subjectivation" — the ways in which individuals cultivated moral sensibilities and developed the capacity to act as ethical subjects. Approaches to ethics in early India have focused on a number of key themes: philosophical discourses on ethical action, concepts of moral duty, and cosmologically sanctioned social values. Despite the obvious contributions of such work, the tendency has been to regard the field of the ethical as an already formed and static entity simply imbibed, imposed, or embodied by the individual or society. Often less clear, and what the didactic literary corpus illuminates, is how ethical subjectivity was formed and experienced. The context for this ethical world was decidedly restricted, to be sure. Early didactic literature suggests a strong courtly and urbane backdrop, a context that has been rather obscured by the dulling paradigm of "classical India" as the predominant interpretive framework for these sources. Yet a substantial amount of didactic material that has survived from the Gupta period and after (c. 350 CE –) was produced in courtly environments. Other types of ethical practice and pedagogy were, of course, current in different social milieus: bodily and mental discipline in monasteries, the esoteric practices in initiated religious lineages, transformative rituals among the twice-born, and the exemplary narratives in Puranic recitations, to name the most important. But the didactic literature from the outset reveals a certain porosity with other social locales and a remarkable ability to move across social boundaries over the centuries, both horizontally and vertically, reverberating in "folk," rural, and even modern pedagogic contexts.

Of specific concern here are short, stand-alone verses, generally known in Sanskrit as subhasita or sukti — meaning 'well-uttered' or 'beautifully said'. These verses, preserved in collections and embedded in narrative literature, are a distinctive feature of precolonial "literary culture" in South Asia which have, until recently, received scant scholarly attention. The breadth of Sanskrit literature echoes with such verses; they seem to have formed part of nearly every conceivable genre of classical Sanskrit literature. Large numbers of such verses are found in the Mahabharata, and some later dharma and particularly courtly didactic texts on niti or policy were composed entirely in these sententious and extractable verses. Indeed, the stanzaic verse as a self-complete whole became a key feature of poetic literature in general, even in its narrative mode, as it developed in the first centuries of the Common Era. What distinguishes the subhasita from this larger and ubiquitous phenomena is not so much their distinct formal attributes or subject matter but their particular "life-histories," the fact that subhasitas circulated individually and were extracted, quoted, and collected by others.

The subhasita as a distinct and recognized literary form, then, presupposed its circulation and collection — and both these processes were in turn linked to new institutional arenas and novel forms of sociability. To wit, the subhasita anthology presupposed not only the existence of both written and orally exchanged sayings and verses of different kinds but a redactor (and patron) who sought to preserve them and an audience to receive, value, and transmit this knowledge. The turning point seems to have occurred during the social and ideological transformations associated with early historic India (c. 600 BCE–300 CE). The growth of cities, kingdoms, and empires led to the development of institutions such as monasteries, guilds, royal and propertied households, and "associations" (gosthis), all of which would soon take on the character of urban salons and become the spheres of new social being and interaction. These institutions, and the practices they gave rise to, were significant departures from the forms of association typical of the later Vedic world such as the ritual arena or the famed disputational assembly (brahmodya), where highly contestual modes of verbal disputation evolved in relation to sacrificial and ritual esoteria. Institutions like the royal assembly and Buddhist monastery were relatively open, both in terms of social access and the types of knowledge and discourse available to their members. The considerable emphasis on values of friendship and enmity in both early political thinking and Buddhist ethics is testament alone to such new forms of sociability, not to mention the phenomenon of conversational speech, which I have more to say about below. These new institutions thus formed a fertile ground not only for new ethical values and orientations, but they also supported the proliferation of a variety of new forms of speech-utterance such as verses (subhasitas), aphorisms (sutras), and maxims (nyayas). Among these, the most important from the viewpoint of individual ethical self-fashioning, was the subhasita.

Subhasitas are first mentioned in Buddhist teachings, and the earliest extant collections of such poems seem to have been assembled within the early Buddhist samgha. Anthologies known as the Theragatha (Poems of the early Buddhist monks) and Therigatha (Poems of the early Buddhist nuns) preserve short musical poems (gatha) that were recited publicly on formal occasions and collected by the monastic community. Single verses and clusters of verses celebrate the spiritual attainment of particular monks, admonish against vices, and exhort adherence to monastic vows. The first courtly anthology of subhasitas, a collection of Maharastri Prakrit gathas known as the Sattasai or Gahakoso and attributed to a Satavahana king, bears certain similarities to the Buddhist collections, though its verses are finely wrought love poems with bucolic themes.

Though the "well-spoken" verse utterance as a didactic-aesthetic form seems to have circulated in both religious/monastic and royal environments from early times, the collection and circulation of subhasitas became increasingly linked to the articulation of a specifically courtly ethical culture. Classified within the confines of art poetry, or kavya, the rise of didactic genres as a whole forms one dimension of the larger growth of Sanskrit literary culture in the subcontinent from the fourth century ce. The courtly orientation of surviving didactic literature from this period is explicit. The famous Pañcatantra, for example, is said to have been narrated to edify the slow-witted sons of a royal patron. Its moral tales, however, seem to be directed as much to courtiers and the wider community of men aspiring for success at the royal assembly as they are to royal princes. The focus is on niti, a term in Sanskrit denoting 'policy' or prudent and wise behavior in the context of public life. Subhasita anthologies treat not only the theme of niti but also a vast variety of subjects whose relevance for an educated service class is clear enough.

Ethics in the Courtly Milieu

Three features of ethical practice as it evolved in the courtly scenario provides some context for the subhasita as a social practice: first, the general emphasis on what might be termed a "virtue-based" ethics in courtly circles; second, the close relationship between moral practice and notions of beauty and aesthetics; and, finally, the associational and "public" underpinnings of ethical life at court. Individually these features were not exclusive to royal courts and urbane assemblies, but together they created a distinctive ethical configuration.

If we are to be guided by courtly sources themselves, we may immediately recognize a significant disjuncture with the assumptions of much modern moral thinking. The prescriptive discourses of the court were concerned neither with identifying a universal moral faculty nor making moral judgments in relation to principles as the sine qua non of ethical life. Instead, it was the acquisition of moral qualities encapsulated in the Sanskrit term guna or sampad, literally 'quality', 'virtue', or 'excellence', which was the overweening emphasis of courtly literature and formed the goal of a noble life. This perhaps explains the preponderance in both eulogistic and didactic literature of the enumeration of virtues appropriate to men of different classes, ranks, and functions both within and beyond the nobility. The sources tend to assume that moral qualities (both good and bad) were to some extent inborn and differentiated across the social spectrum. At the same time, however, they emphasize that men could acquire and exhibit these virtues as badges of moral eminence. Though the inclination toward certain qualities was determined by birth, their actualization was owing to individual effort. Courtly discourses stress repeatedly that neither birth nor cultivation was enough. The common metaphor used was that of a gem or precious stone, which, unpolished and unrefined, could hardly shine with virtue. Moreover, even though some moral qualities were thought to be inherent or appropriate to certain classes or both, many overlapped and were to be cultivated by all members at court. Land-grant eulogies present a stock set of virtues to describe a wide range of elites. They included prudent policy (naya), humility (vinaya), compassion (daya), generosity (dana), politeness (daksinya), valor (saurya), magnanimity (audarya), and truthfulness (satya).

The key concerns of courtly ethics — and a preponderant focus of ethical practice — were the acquisition and disposition of these moral qualities in the noble person. Equally important was the avoidance of vices, faults, and errors. Numerous subhasitas and didactic tales dwell on the identification, acquisition, and deployment of different virtues within one's character, as well as guarding against vices or "enemy" qualities. Moral introspection tended to occur over how best to avoid errors and assemble virtues correctly within oneself. Certain virtues were to be linked with others, and many qualities could become vices if cultivated or deployed improperly. Valor, for example, was to be tempered with kindness, and all virtues by that all-important summit of moral attainments, humility. Numerous sources emphasize the skilled deployment of virtues. A seventh-century Panduvarnsin inscription describes the king Tivaradeva as "greedy" for fame but not other people's wealth, and charming in well-spoken verses (subhasita) but not in the dalliances of desirous women. A verse from Bhartrhari's "Centad on Policy" (nitisataka) exemplifies the tenor of such thinking:

daksinyam svajane daya parajane sathyam sada durjane pritih sadhujane nayo nrpajane vidvaj jane carjavam / sauryam satrujane ksama gurujane kantajane dhrstata ye caivam purusah kalasu kusalas tesveva lokasthitih //

Kindness toward one's own people, generosity to others, deception toward the wicked, affection to the honorable, prudent policy toward kings, sincerity toward the learned, valor toward enemies, patience toward elders, and boldness toward women — men skilled in these arts are the stability of the world.

The aesthetic dimension of this virtue ethics, as of life more generally at court, was extraordinarily complex and operated at a number of levels. Physical, gestural, and verbal beauty had long been deemed outer signs of inner accomplishment since at least the last centuries before the Common Era, but with the rise of elaborate court cultures from Gupta times, they became themselves imbued with a new moral character. In courtly circles personal beauty was at once a mark of moral attainment as well as an attainment in and of itself. The effect of this long sedimentary association and repeated cross-pollination of beauty and virtue was to give forms of moral activity a strong aesthetic dimension. It is thus not surprising that the most common manner in which people of the court imagined the acquisition of virtues was as a "decoration" (alamkara) of the "soul." Virtues were "excellences" to be accumulated and, in keeping with the features of virtue-based ethics noted above, arranged in oneself in a judicious and pleasing manner like resplendent ornaments.

Aesthetic activity, on the other hand, often carried a strong ethical valence. All forms of art poetry, or kavya, from the very first theorizations, were seen to be at least partially instructive and edifying for their audiences. Brahma, for example, in announcing the birth of drama (natya) to the Daityas in the Natyasastra, promises that it would, among other things, demonstrate righteousness to the wicked and provide the world with instruction (lokopadesa). Beyond such generalities, particular genres of literature, most notably stories and single verses (subhasitas), often had explicitly didactic overtones, particularly in the field of "political policy" (niti). These instructive dimensions made aesthetic enjoyment a morally valued activity itself. Aesthetic sophistication and moral sensitivity were isomorphic, perhaps nowhere more evident than in the idea of the connoisseur, or sahrdaya, a man whose heart empathized with the world.

A final feature of ethics at court important for our discussion here was its public or associative dimension. Two aspects of this element of ethics merit our consideration: the connection of virtue with worldly success and the exterior or collective nature of ethical life. Any review of the evidence from inscriptions and literature suggests immediately that virtues and qualities in this world shaded over into the realm of "skills" or "competencies," and indeed were explicitly conceived as such. Virtues caused a man to prosper in the world. Damanaka, the wily jackal-minister of the Pañcatantra, utters a verse (subhasita) which was to travel widely throughout the medieval world, informing his companion that

kalpayati yena vrttim sadasi ca sadbhih prasasyate yena / sa gunas tena gmavata vivardhaniyas ca raksyas ca //

That virtue (gund), which helps one earn a livelihood and is praised in the assembly, should be guarded and cultivated by its possessor.

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Excerpted from Ethical Life in South Asia by Anand Pandian, Daud Ali. Copyright © 2010 Indiana University Press. Excerpted by permission of Indiana University Press.
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