Table of Contents

1. Public choice in perspective Dennis C. Mueller; Part I. The Need for and Forms of Cooperation: 2. Economic theories of the state Russell Hardin; 3. Neither markets nor states: linking transformation processes in collective-action arenas Elinor Ostrom and James Walker; 4. The political economy of Federalism Robert P. Inman and Daniel L. Rubinfeld; 5. The public choice of international organizations Bruno S. Frey; 6. Constitutional public choice Dennis C. Mueller; Part II. Voting Rules and Preference Aggregation: 7. Cycling and majority rule James M. Enelow; 8. Majority rule Douglas W. Rae and Eric Schickler; 9. Group choice and individual judgments H. Peyton Young; 10. Some paradoxes of preference aggregation Prasanta K. Pattanaik; 11. Voting and the revelation of preferences for public activities T. Nicolaus Tideman; Part III. Electoral Politics: 12. The spatial analysis of elections and committees: four decades of research Peter C. Ordeshook; 13. Multiparty electoral politics Norman Schofield; 14. Interest groups: money, information and influence David Austen Smith; 15. Logrolling Thomas Stratmann; 16. Political business cycles Martin Paldam; Part IV. Individual Behavior and Collective Action: 17. When is it rational to vote? John H. Aldrich; 18. Voting behavior Morris P. Fiorina; 19. Public Choice Experiments Elizabeth Hoffman; Part V. Public Choice in Action: 20. Modern bureaucratic theory Ronald Wintrobe; 21. The positive theory of public bureaucracy Terry Moe; 22. The political economy of taxation Walter Hettich and Stanley L. Winer; 23. Rent seeking Robert D. Tollison; 24. Endogenous protection: a survey Stephen P. Magee; 25. Why does government's share of national income grow? An assessment of the recent literature on the US experience Cheryl M. Holsey and Thomas Borchering.