The Strategy of Conflict: With a New Preface by the Author
A series of closely interrelated essays on game theory, this book deals with an area in which progress has been least satisfactory—the situations where there is a common interest as well as conflict between adversaries: negotiations, war and threats of war, criminal deterrence, extortion, tacit bargaining. It proposes enlightening similarities between, for instance, maneuvering in limited war and in a traffic jam; deterring the Russians and one’s own children; the modern strategy of terror and the ancient institution of hostages.
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The Strategy of Conflict: With a New Preface by the Author
A series of closely interrelated essays on game theory, this book deals with an area in which progress has been least satisfactory—the situations where there is a common interest as well as conflict between adversaries: negotiations, war and threats of war, criminal deterrence, extortion, tacit bargaining. It proposes enlightening similarities between, for instance, maneuvering in limited war and in a traffic jam; deterring the Russians and one’s own children; the modern strategy of terror and the ancient institution of hostages.
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The Strategy of Conflict: With a New Preface by the Author

The Strategy of Conflict: With a New Preface by the Author

by Thomas C. Schelling
The Strategy of Conflict: With a New Preface by the Author
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The Strategy of Conflict: With a New Preface by the Author

The Strategy of Conflict: With a New Preface by the Author

by Thomas C. Schelling

Overview

A series of closely interrelated essays on game theory, this book deals with an area in which progress has been least satisfactory—the situations where there is a common interest as well as conflict between adversaries: negotiations, war and threats of war, criminal deterrence, extortion, tacit bargaining. It proposes enlightening similarities between, for instance, maneuvering in limited war and in a traffic jam; deterring the Russians and one’s own children; the modern strategy of terror and the ancient institution of hostages.

Product Details

ISBN-13: 9780674840317
Publisher: Harvard University Press
Publication date: 05/15/1981
Edition description: Reprint
Pages: 328
Product dimensions: 5.50(w) x 8.25(h) x 0.70(d)

About the Author

Thomas C. Schelling was Distinguished University Professor in the Department of Economics and School of Public Affairs at the University of Maryland and Lucius N. Littauer Professor of Political Economy, Emeritus, at Harvard University. He was co-recipient of the 2005 Nobel Prize in Economics.

Table of Contents

  • I. Elements of a Theory of Strategy

    • 1. The Retarded Science of International Strategy
    • 2. An Essay on Bargaining
    • 3. Bargaining, Communication, and Limited War


  • II. A Reorientation of Game Theory

    • 4. Toward a Theory of Interdependent Decision
    • 5. Enforcement, Communication, and Strategic Moves
    • 6. Game Theory and Experimental Research


  • III. Strategy with a Random Ingredient

    • 7. Randomization of Promises and Threats
    • 8. The Threat That Leaves Something to Chance


  • IV. Surprise Attack: A Study in Mutual Distrust

    • 9. The Reciprocal Fear of Surprise Attack
    • 10. Surprise Attack and Disarmament


  • Appendices

    • A. Nuclear Weapons and Limited War
    • B. For the Abandonment of Symmetry in Game Theory
    • C. Re-interpretation of a Solution Concept for “Noncooperative” Games


  • Index

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