Read an Excerpt

(Sacrifices) Left at the Altar

Reading Tractate Zevachim of the Babylonian Talmud

ROWMAN & LITTLEFIELD

All Sacrifices

ZEVACHIM 2

The Mishnah that kicks things off introduces an important concern right off the bat. Any sacrifice slaughtered not for its own sake (shelo lishmah)—such as a sin offering slaughtered for a guilt offering—is nonetheless legitimate (meaning that no transgression has been committed), except that it does nothing to alleviate the owner's liability (that is, for why he was obliged in the first place to bring the offering). When the Mishnah here and the ensuing discussion of the Gemara refer to slaughter (for its own sake or not), they are using this as a stand in for all four of the steps involved in a sacrificial service (avodah): shechitah (slaughter), kabalah (collection or reception of its blood in a sacred service vessel), holachah (bearing the blood to the Altar), and zerikah (throwing or applying the blood upon the Temple Altar in the prescribed manner). So, a sacrifice has to be offered for its own sake (lishmah), but if it isn't the sacrifice counts as a sacrifice but not for the man who brought it. This may seem a bit like a conundrum, but we need be patient and see how the Mishnah and Gemara will deal with this complex issue. A further restriction is that, in the cases of the pesach (paschal) and chatat (sin) sacrifices, slaughtering shelo lishmah completely delegitimizes the offering. The pesach sacrifice must be offered precisely on the fourteenth of Nissan, between noon and sunset, and a chatat sacrifice will be invalid at any time that it is offered shelo lishmah.

No sooner has our first Mishnah issued this ruling than it proceeds to recount several opposing views. R. Eliezer agrees that the pesach sacrifice loses all validity if offered shelo lishmah in its special time, but he would add the asham (guilt offering) to the chatat as invalidated when offered shelo lishmah at any point in time. Why? Like the chatat, the asham is brought to atone for a sin; the circumstances eviscerating the validity of the chatat then, he argues, apply similarly to the asham. This is a style of Talmudic hermeneutics known as binyan av, arguing by analogy: if X and Y share one important aspect, one may presume other aspects of X and Y are similarly shared, barring major dissimilarities that may be brought to our attention.

Yose ben Choni then chimes in that any sacrifice other than the pesach or chatat slaughtered for a pesach or chatat is invalid. There are specific rules for designating a pesach animal which must be followed. This point of view is basically the flip side of the Mishnah's earlier ruling about pesach and chatat sacrifices being offered shelo lishmah.

The third and final dissenting view to this Mishnah is that of Shimon brother of Azaryah. He argues that, aside from the pesach and chatat, if one made an offering shelo lishmah that was of greater holiness than his own, it is valid. If of lesser holiness, it is invalid. For example, if one slaughtered kodshei kodashim (most holy offerings, which include chatat, asham, olah, and the communal shelamim) for the sake of kodashim kalim (offerings of lesser holiness, which include shelamim, todah, bechor, ma'aser, and pesach, among others), these would be disqualified, but the reverse would result in a valid offering. (These different offerings will all be described below.) By the same token, a bechor (firstborn) or ma'aser (tithe) offering brought for the sake of a shelamim (peace) offering would be valid, but the reverse would result in an offering being disqualified.

Lots of food for thought here—no pun intended—let the games begin. The Gemara starts, thankfully, by asking what at first reading seems a bit difficult to understand in the Mishnah's initial ruling when it stated that an offering shelo lishmah is valid, "except" (elah) that the owner's obligation is in no way alleviated—it doesn't count. Actually, it turns out, the question is why the text used the word elah when it could simply have used "but" (ve-). There being no simple superfluities in the Bible or the Mishnah, there has to be a reason, and the Gemara explains that the point was both to teach that the owners of such animals are still obliged to fulfill an offering, but the animals lose none of their holiness and must still continue in the process of the offering according to the rituals incumbent upon the original kind of offering.

The foregoing explanation, we learn after the fact, follows Rava's understanding. How do we know this? Because Rava offered the example of an olah that had been slaughtered shelo lishmah; it was still an olah in his view, and as such it is forbidden to throw its blood on the Altar shelo lishmah as an olah. This position is supported by both a scriptural verse and by logic, the two principal ways by which the Talmud sustains arguments. Logically, the one mistake of slaughtering the olah not for its own sake does not mean that we may perform zerikah also shelo lishmah—two wrongs, in effect, do not make a right.

[a->b]

The verse marshaled here (Deuteronomy 23:24) concerns one's "vow" (neder) to make a "donation" or "gift" (nedavah) to God concerning the offering. There is, of course, a difference between a vowed offering and a donated offering, but inasmuch as both terms are used in this verse, the Gemara explains that (in their different ways) both apply here. If you performed as you vowed (lishmah), the offering is accepted as a neder; if you did not (shelo lishmah), it is treated as a nedavah, a donation offered above and beyond your neder. But, you can't change horses midstream—so to speak—and perform another of the steps in the avodah not for the sake of that offering.

We move now to another approach to the Mishnah. Ravina tells Rav Pappa about Rava's analysis of an issue involving "outstanding contradictions," but it will take awhile before he comes to the quoted phrase. Some background: The reason an offering slaughtered shelo lishmah does not fulfill the owner's obligation is that, simply, it was not offered for its own sake. By implication, an offering made without explicit intention (that is, explicit intention to counteract an offering's validity) does fulfill the owner's obligation. The logical next step is to see such an offering without explicit intention as comparable to a sacrifice made lishmah. Rava now comes to the contradiction: A Mishnah in tractate Gittin (Divorces) teaches that a bill of divorce written not for the sake of the woman involved is null and void. This seems to fly in the face of Rava's reasoning about sacrifices. Rava's answer is that, even without an explicit designation, offerings are made for their own sake; should a sacrifice be made without a specific intention, the animal remains consecrated to whatever its owner sought. By contrast, if a bill of divorce fails to mention a specific woman, there is no divorce.

What is Rava's textual source for claiming an offering without explicit intention is just as valid as one offered lishmah? Perhaps, it is the fact that the Mishnah used the locution "any sacrifice slaughtered not for its own sake" (and not "any sacrifice not slaughtered for its own sake")—the word order seeming to stress that the slaughterer made a point of doing what he did and that it was not simply due to a lapse. But this won't due, because the Mishnah concerning a bill of divorce uses the same word order. Inasmuch as the result is different, this can't be Rava's source.

Perhaps, another Mishnah which we shall come to shortly (on daf 13a) will fit the bill. It describes a sacrifice begun for the sake of a pesach and carried on for the sake of a shelamim; the offering is invalid for apesach because it was offered explicitly for both sakes. If he had begun the offering for the sake of a pesach and finished without explicit intention, the pesach would be legitimate, as the absence of explicit intention is quite distinct from shelo lishmah. The Gemara doesn't accept this as proof—the presiding Kohen (member of the priestly class) may have been explicit in beginning the offering of the pesach as such and remained mum thereafter; that proves nothing about a change of intent, for his silence implies a continuation of his previously stated intent.

Another effort now ensues for the Gemara to make its case, basically by turning the aforecited Mishnah around. This attempt proves even less successful. In this rendition it is the first part of the avodah that is done without explicit intention and the second that finishes the process for the sake of a pesach. Thus, the absence of an intent at the start means that the latter intent may determine the overall intent.

Back to the drawing board, as the Gemara now comes up with yet another source (a Mishnah on daf 46b, or roughly one-third of the way through our tractate) to establish that the absence of explicit intent can render a sacrifice valid. There we shall learn that an offering is slaughtered for the sake of six things: (1) lishmah, the offering itself; (2) for the atonement of the offerer; (3) for God; (4) for the fires that will completely burn the parts of the offering requiring such; (5) for the aroma (meaning that the meat of the offering needs to be placed raw on the Altar, not to be roasted first); and (6) to please God, as it were, whose commandments are being followed. In addition, the chatat and asham are also offered to atone for the commission of a transgression or some sort. R. Yose opines that one's offering is valid even if one was not at the time thinking of any one of these things. He argues that the Court made clear that an offering's owner should not explicitly express that he is making his offering lishmah. He might err and state that he is making this sacrifice for the sake of another, different offering, and that would delegitimize the sacrifice. Here we have the Court supporting the notion that absence of explicit intent does not invalidate an offering.

So, this would constitute Rava's source for claiming that an offering without explicit intent is nonetheless valid. What would be his source, then, for claiming the opposite with respect to a bill of divorce? Answering this will require several efforts as well and takes us to tractate Gittin. There (24a) the Mishnah poses the highly unlikely scenario of a man walking through town when he hears scribes reading out a bill of divorce that, necessarily, names the man, his wife, and their town of residence. The three conditions match his, hers, and theirs to a "T," and he decides to use it for himself. The Mishnah rules this bill of divorce invalid, because it was not transcribed with explicit intention for the woman involved (his wife). The Gemara doesn't like this means to an end. Perhaps, as Rav Pappa suggests, the scribes involved were just learning their trade; that would mean that the bill of divorce involved was not written with any specific divorce in mind, just a practice run. Had it been written with a specific intent to effect a divorce, it might have been valid even if for a woman not directly involved.

The next daf will start with another effort to substantiate Rava's case.

ZEVACHIM 3

We left the Gemara on the last daf trying to find a source to prove Rava's statement that a bill of divorce must have explicit intent or it is invalid. A second proof is offered from a later portion of the same Mishnah (Gittin 24a) used yesterday. The Mishnah posits a man (and only men could initiate divorce proceedings) who wrote a bill of divorce for his wife and then had second thoughts; he then met a fellow townsman who, by virtue of the fact that the two men had the same name as did their wives have the same name as one another, suggests he (the second man) use the bill of divorce (and save the cost of a scribe) to divorce his wife. The Mishnah rules such a bill of divorce null and void, for (again) a bill of divorce must be written with explicit intent for the woman who is its object. Again, though, the Gemara won't accept such a "proof," for it may be the case that the scribe wrote the bill of divorce shelo lishmah and not with an inexplicit intention.

Another try: Suppose a man has two wives with the same name, and he wrote a bill of divorce for the older of the two; the Mishnah teaches that he may not use that bill of divorce for the younger wife. This ruling would seem to hold that, if written without an explicit intent, a bill of divorce is invalid. No dice: Maybe the bill of divorce was initially written for the younger wife, then withdrawn so it could be used for the older wife. That makes this instance potentially incomparable.

One more potential source from the same Mishnah, also to be discarded, before we conclude. We have our bigamous male subject with two identically-named wives, and he instructs a scribe to write him a bill of divorce which he will use if and when he should choose to divorce one of them. The bill of divorce is, needless to say, unacceptable for use with either wife. Written as it was with no explicit intent for one of his wives, the bill of divorce is invalid. The Gemara has a hermeneutic principle known as bererah (retroactive clarification) whereby, if intent is specific, one can designate an object X before the fact and have that designation corroborated after the fact. However, bererah does not hold here, because we do not know for which of the two wives this bill of divorce was written.

If a text can be frustrated, our Gemara may be at this point, but it now turns to a later Mishnah in tractate Gittin (26a) to make its case. This Mishnah deals with a scribe of bills of divorce who prepares the standard portions of the text and who perforce must leave blank spaces for the names of the man and woman concerned, as well as spaces for witnesses to sign and for the date to be affixed, all in the appropriate spots. R. Yehudah adds that the scribe must also leave empty a space for the scribe to write the words "You are hereby permitted to every man" (remembering that it is the husband serving divorce papers on his soon-to-be ex-wife). The point here is that bills of divorce must be composed with explicit intent for the woman being served.

On the previous daf, Ravina was regaling Rav Pappa with a story of Rava's brilliant analysis of contradictions involved in a sacrifice offered lishmah. We then became caught up in the first of these, but now back to Ravina. He cites another authority to the effect that, if someone were to offer a chatat for the sake of an olah, it would be illegitimate, but if offered for the sake of chullin (non-holy items), then it actually is valid. The point here is that chullin is completely outside the realm of offerings, and as such it doesn't impede sacrifices, whereas one kind of offering can impede another. By contrast, as we learn from the same Mishnah (Gittin 24a) we were citing earlier, a bill of divorce not written specifically for the woman in question is out; even if written for an idolatress (meaning a woman completely outside the realm of giving and receiving bills of divorce), it is not valid. Rava's answer to this whole conundrum is the fact that, without explicit intention, a bill of divorce is useless, but without explicit intention, offerings may be valid. The latter requires opposing intention (shelo lishmah) to disqualify an offering, whereas a bill of divorce does not.

Ravina still has one more explication of Rava's contradictions to recount. If one slaughtered a chatat for the sake of an olah, it is (still) invalid, but if slaughtered for the sake of chullin, it is okay—for the reasons just adjudged. However, if a sheretz (one of a number of rodents and reptiles whose bodies convey tumah) falls into a pot made of earthenware, anything inside it becomes tamei; if, though, there is another sealed vessel (not of earthenware) containing food within the earthenware one, its food is protected from the sheretz's tumah. The walls of the inside vessel form a protective shield against the tumah. The point for our discussion is that unlike items can indeed interfere with one another.

---

Excerpted from (Sacrifices) Left at the Altar by Joshua A. Fogel. Copyright © 2014 Hamilton Books. Excerpted by permission of ROWMAN & LITTLEFIELD.
All rights reserved. No part of this excerpt may be reproduced or reprinted without permission in writing from the publisher.
Excerpts are provided by Dial-A-Book Inc. solely for the personal use of visitors to this web site.

---