Table of Contents

Preface ix

Introduction xiii

1 Prologue 1

U-boats in First World War

introduction of convoy system foils single U-boat attacks

prisoner of war of British

my interest in U-boats and decision to stay in German Navy

training as surface sailor between wars

appointment as chief of new U-boat arm

2 The New Task 9

Anglo-German Naval Agreement 1933

London Submarine Treaty 1936

Asdic-building up of Weddigen U-boat Flotilla

need to" assert usefulness of U-boat as first class weapon of offence

problems and training.

3 Wolf-pack Tactics 18

Need for joint U-boat action

evolution of U-boat wolf

pack tactics

problems of control of operations and communications

German Armed Forces Manoeuvres in Baltic 1937

exercises in Atlantic-'939 my book describes problems and tactics

nevertheless, British underestimation of U-boat arm.

4 U-boat Building Policy 1935-39 25

Exigencies of Anglo

German Naval Treaty

what type of U-boat to build

large boats not really advantageous

the golden mean, medium sized

I recommend Type VII to be developed

conflict with Naval High Command

my recommendations to meet growing war crisis

British preparations, convoy system to be used

my wolf-pack training vindicated.

5 The Decisive Months of 1939 37

1938 Planning Committee

British merchant navy main strategic target

Plan for new fleet

I disagree with emphasis on surface vessels

I demand more U-boats-weak state of navy and rearmament requirements

outbreak of war

decision to build more U-boats-my requests to supervise expansion rejected.

6 The U-boat War Begins: September 1939-March 1940 51

What is a war of aggression

Nuremberg, London Submarine Agreement 1936 and Prize Ordinance rulings

hostilities begin

attacking ships sailing independently

restrictions on U-boat activities against merchantmen, passenger ships, neutral ships, French ships

removal of restrictions by Naval High Command

attacks on convoy system

Gibraltar shipping

control of U-boats-mine-laying by U-boats-Scapa Flow

operational value of U-boats.

7 The Norwegian Operation and the Torpedo Crisis 75

April 1940

distribution of U-boats to prevent British landing

our failures-torpedo misfires-magnetic firing in northern waters

loss of faith in torpedo, but I raise morale

Court of Inquiry and Court Martial

not enough research by Torpedo Experimental Establishment between wars

solution found in 1942

the torpedo becomes a really efficient weapon.

8 The Battle of the Atlantic: July-October 1940 100

Inadequate protection of British convoys

first joint attacks on convoys

high number of sinkings by U-boats-conquest of northern France

advantages of Biscay ports

destruction of enemy shipping our most important offensive measure.

9 Organization of U-boat Arm and of U-boat Construction 118

U-boat war in Atlantic

U-boat building at home

Operations Branch and training establishment merged under Friedeburg

my faith in U-boats, and the need for more

new building programme

Goering's opposition

Hitler's lack of co-operation.

10 The Battle of the Atlantic: November 1940-December 1941 127

Tear of deficiencies and dissipation of forces

operational planning in France

North Atlantic most fruitful area

need for Naval Air arm-: opposition from Goering

I protest-Hitler places some aircraft under my command

importance 'of combined exercises

problem of locating convoys-co-operation of Admiral Parana and the Italian Navy

disappointing results from Italians in convoy battles

wastage of U-boats-transfer of 15 U-boats to North African theatre

part played by surface ships in Atlantic

dock repairs to U-boats-the Bismarck sunk

some Atlantic convoy Battles

failures in South Atlantic.

11 America's War Against Us Before December 11, 1941

Neutrality Act of 1937

Churchill persuades Roosevelt to abandon neutrality

Naval conference in London

America assumes protection of Atlantic shipping

extension of US security zones

Hitler orders avoidance of incidents

first incident, the Greer

restrictions on U-boat activities

Japan enters war

Germany declares war on America.

12 Operations in American Waters: January-July 1942 195

U-boat war on American coast

favourable peace-time conditions

number of U-boats available

great number of sinkings

attempts to save fuel-Hitler's 'intuition'

some U-boats deflected to Norway

I protest

decisive effect on Atlantic battle

the Caribbean shipping off Freetown

^more operations in American waters

profitable period

less success in Atlantic against British shipping

British preeminence in Radar operating on short wave

'milch cow' submarine tankers

America adopts convoy tactics.

13 Convoy Battles and Distant Operations: July-September 1942 225

U-boats' main task war on enemy shipping

still lack of U-boats-better maintenance necessary

superiority of British detection device and strengthening of British air patrols in Biscay

German defensive measures

Atlantic convoys still main target

successes on 'Great Circle'

subsidiary areas of operations

Brazil and Freetown

successes in American waters and Caribbean begin to diminish

Brazil declares war.

14 The Laconia 255

British liner Laconia sunk in South Atlantic August 194s

Italian prisoners aboard

I order rescue of survivors

American bombers attack

jeopardy of U-boats

attack by seaplane

enemy do not attempt to help rescue

dangers of attack from air-I order cessation of all rescue work.

15 Improvements in U-boat Equipment and Armament 265

Need for submarine of high under

water speed

advantages of Walter U-boat-need for counter device to Radar

need for insulation against surface location

better AA armament needed

the 'aircraft trap'-increasing menace from air-need for He 1775 with long radius

inadequate torpedoes.

16 More Convoy Battles and Operations in Distant Waters: October-December 1942 272

Allied landings in North Africa

complete surprise-failure of German Secret Intelligence Service

importance of dislocating enemy's supply lines with U-boats

shallowness of water

operations off Gibraltar difficult

I object to transfer of U-boats from Atlantic

usefulness of submarine tankers

resumption of operations in North Atlantic

great successes in November

first collision between U-boats

convoys in Trinidad area-Cape Town sinkings-our losses.

17 Commander-in-Chief of the Navy 299

Raeder resigns

I assume command

my attitude towards National Socialism

good aspects of Nazism

disapproval of persecution of Jews

Hitler's misconception of British mentality

why I decide to fight for Germany-politics and duty should not be mixed

first personal contact with Hitler

I gain his confidence and support for Navy

clash with Goering.

18 Collapse of the U-boat War: January-May 1943 315

Admiral Horton's appointment

I still command U-boat war

convoy battle-losses on both sides

our lack of air reconnaissance

more convoy battles

March 1943 the peak of bur success

stronger escorts for enemy shipping, 'support groups'

importance of radar

lack of submarines

bad weather-decline in our successes and increase in U-boat losses.

19 My Tasks as Commander-in-Chief 1943-45 401

Problems of naval rearmament

our defensive role

Navy's steel and labour requirements

'Fleet Building Programme 1343'

Walter U-boat and Type XXI-mass-production-U-boats in Mediterranean theatre

assistance to Italian Navy

sign of disintegration of Italian armed forces

transport of German troops from Sicily to mainland

senior commands of Navy and light forces

problem of the capital ships

sinking of Scharnhorst and Tirpitz

Black Sea theatre of operations

Normandy invasion

Navy's advisory capacity

enemy air superiority

Baltic theatre of war.

20 July 20, 1944 401

I learn about the conspiracy

tendency to shake morale at front

my disapproval as member of armed forces but I can condone moral motives

high treason.

21 The U-boat War from May 1943 to the End 406

Necessity of continuing U-boat campaign-new weapons, AA armament, acoustic torpedo, bunkers for U-boats-menace of air attacks at sea

'aircraft trap'-loss of U-boats-the 'Schnorchel'-U-boats and the Normandy invasion

offensive in enemy waters-new type of U-boat.

22 Head of the Government 430

My reasons for resisting unconditional surrender

proposed Allied partition of Germany-U-boat campaign dwindling

transference of naval forces to Baltic

threat of Bolshevism-lam Hitler's successor

my policy-show-down with Himmler

death of Hitler-I appoint Schwerin

Krosigk political adviser-situation of armed forces

attempt to evacuate refugees to western Germany and hold eastern front

separate and partial capitulation

Friedeburg negotiates with Montgomery

handing over of ships

Eisenhower rejects partial surrender

Jodl negotiates with him

surrender-my ignorance of concentration camps

my government until taken prisoner.

23 Epilogue 475

German Navy's performance of its duty

Hitler's role in history

his suggestive influence

his misconception of British mentality

fatal principle of Fuehrerprinzip-democracy and patriotism.

Appendix 1 U-boats of the German Navy 479

Appendix 2 'Defence of Merchant Shipping Handbook 1938'480

Appendix 3 Causes of Torpedo Failures 482

Appendix 4 'The Second World War' 486

Appendix 5 U-boat Building Programme 487

Appendix 6 Figures concerning the German U-boat War 1939-45 489

Afterword 491

Index 511