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THE ROOTS OF THEATRE RETHINKING RITUAL AND OTHER THEORIES OF ORIGIN By ELI ROZIK UNIVERSITY OF IOWA PRESS Copyright © 2002 University of Iowa Press
All right reserved. ISBN: 978-1-58729-587-4 Chapter One BASIC DEFINITIONS
The thesis that theatre was generated by ritual is relatively new in the history of theatre theory. Until the end of the nineteenth century scholars almost unquestioningly subscribed to Aristotle's dictum that tragedy originated in dithyramb and comedy in phallic songs (Poetics 4.12); but he did not link either to ritual. It was the School of Cambridge that, under the influence of James G. Frazer's anthropological work, attempted to provide scientific support for the intuitive thesis of ritual origin, suggested by nineteenth-century scholars with regard to the crucial role of the Church in the recreation of European theatre.
As I intend to subject this thesis to severe criticism, the validity of both thesis and criticism depends on definitions of key terms, in particular "ritual," "drama," and "theatre," which present a methodological problem. Not only are scholars in disagreement on such definitions, but also, in most cases, these definitions are not even provided and must be extrapolated from the actual uses of these terms.
Initially the notion of "ritual" was restricted to a wide and diversified set of religious phenomena, from totemic dance, shamanistic seance, and pagan libation to the Yom Kippur service and the Christian Mass. More recent approaches have extended this category to include secular ceremonies and even various forms of repetitive and compulsive human behavior. The boundaries of this set have, therefore, become difficult to draw. It is also difficult to choose from among the wealth of theoretical approaches to ritual or its many definitions. Similar considerations apply to the notion of "theatre" on both levels: the delimitation of the set to the members to which the term properly applies and the variety of theoretical approaches to it and definitions of it. These appear to be vicious circles, because determining a set of entities or phenomena would condition the resultant definition and the mere formulation of a definition would determine the kind of phenomena included in it. Since both sets are also open to novel ritual and theatrical forms, constantly being discovered or created, we may speak at most of sound intuitions about the properties shared by all their members that distinguish these sets from others. Therefore, before examining the thesis under discussion, I commence by making explicit my own intuitions and working definitions regarding the notions of "ritual" and "theatre." Although "definitions establish nothing, in themselves they do, if they are carefully constructed, provide useful orientation, or reorientation, of thought ... [and] can be an effective way of developing and controlling a novel line of inquiry" (Geertz 1973: 90).
Eventually, I intend to show that ritual and theatre are ontologically different cultural entities, on different levels of existence. Whereas ritual is a mode of action in the real world, theatre is a kind of medium (i.e., a particular system of signification and communication). Because of their ontological difference, this is not a binary opposition. Ritual and theatre are mutually independent: ritual can use different media, including theatre; and theatre may or may not describe rituals. Theatre may even create fictional rituals.
I am aware that the theories of ritual origin of theatre rely on notions of both "ritual" and "theatre" that differ in various respects from my own. In principle, I respect the findings and theoretical achievements of experts in anthropology and sciences of religion with regard to ritual and do not intend to suggest an alternative view unless strictly necessary for my argument. In contrast, I do intend to examine those theories of theatre that underlie the various "theories of generation," from the viewpoint of a general theory of theatre. I assume that a theory that explains the origins of theatre in terms of ritual should conform with such a general theory, whatever the approach. Furthermore, the theories under scrutiny, which have been devised within various disciplines of research, are couched in different terms; therefore, some measure of translation to a common terminology is mandatory.
The following paragraphs provide a brief review of the main theoretical perspectives in anthropological research on ritual since the last decades of the nineteenth century. In order to facilitate the reader's assessment and critical judgment, I also provide an account of my own theoretical approach to theatre and drama. For each theory under examination in the following chapters, I attempt to reveal their implicit definitions of "ritual" and "theatre" as well as to examine in what sense it is claimed that theatre evolved from ritual.
The Notion of "Ritual"
Difficulty in distinguishing between the different kinds of custom on the grounds of definitions of "ritual," as a religious mode of action, motivated the development of an alternative paradigm that considers ritual as a function or aspect of different modes of action (Bell 1992: 72). In the following sections I discuss these functions and aspects of ritual initially in their anthropological context and eventually in relation to the question of theatre origin. I do not intend to deal with problems such as the nature, origins, and functions of religion. Most theories of theatre origin focus on religious ritual practices and not on religion in itself. At least one important theory is based on a wider definition of "ritual."
Religious and Secular Ritual
Emile Durkheim suggests that the notion of "ritual" should derive from the notion of "religion," which presupposes a fundamental distinction between the "sacred" and the "profane": "All known religious beliefs, whether simple or complex, present one common characteristic: they presuppose a classification of all things, real and ideal, of which men think, into two classes or opposed groups, usually designated by two distinct terms which are translated well enough by the words profane and sacred" (52). This distinction "is absolute," because these are two worlds with nothing in common: the forces or rules operating in one do not operate in the other (54).
The sacred is a wide category, which includes not only gods or other supernatural beings but also spirits and the souls of the dead (39). Moreover, faiths without gods, such as Buddhism, also feature in this category (39). Thus, "divinity," an idea that appears in late religions, does not characterize religion (44). Sacred things "are naturally considered superior in dignity and power to profane things, and particularly to man, when he is only a man and has nothing sacred about him" (52).
The notions of "sacred" and "profane" also underlie Durkheim's distinction between "practices" and "beliefs": "A religion is a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden-beliefs and practices which unite into one single moral community called a Church, all those who adhere to them" (62). Religious phenomena thus fall into two fundamental categories: beliefs and rites (practices): (1) religious beliefs are the thoughts that "express the nature of the sacred things and the relations either with each other or with profane things" (56); (2) rites are "the rules of conduct that prescribe how a man should comport himself in the presence of ... sacred objects" (56). "Between these two classes of facts there is all the difference which separates thought from action" (51). I believe this distinction between action and thinking, which underlies my own approach, to be of fundamental importance.
Max Gluckman shifted the definition of ritual "away from the Durkheimian notion that ritual was primarily concerned with religion or 'the sacred.' Gluckman defined ritual as a more embracing category of social action, with religious activities at one extreme and social etiquette at the other" (Bell 1997: 39). Although religious ritual is an obvious and central specimen within this wide category, focus on additional types of custom and ceremony became prominent. This approach proved most enlightening in the study of "civic rituals." In this vein terms such as "state ritual" and "state religion" were coined. Konrad Lorenz adds ethology, which "explores so-called ritualized patterns of behavior among animals" (Bell 1997: 31). Although in this context "ritual" is used in an obvious metaphorical sense, this term has definitely taken on a new literal sense.
Internal and External Viewpoints
J. R. Goody suggests that ritual is "a category of standardized behavior (custom) in which the relationship between means and the end is not 'intrinsic'" (159). In this context "intrinsic" is synonymous with "rational." Leach questions this view: "'rationality' is not easily defined," and "[i]f 'non-rationality' is made a criterion of ritual, it must be remembered that the judge of what is rational is the observer, not the actor" (1968: 521; emphasis in original). Indeed, for the nonbeliever, or the believer in another religion, ritual may appear devoid of intrinsic adequacy for its purpose. Observers may vary, however, and obviously the viewpoint of a priest of the same religion may reintroduce the notion of "rationality." For the believer, ritual presupposes that the relationship between means and ends is intrinsic and "efficacy" is thus ensured. Leach subscribes to this view without reservation: "Ritual acts are to be interpreted in the context of belief: they mean what the actors say they mean" (1968: 525). E. E. Evans-Pritchard supports this approach too: "He who accepts the reality of spiritual being does not feel the same need for such explanations, for, inadequate though the conceptions of soul and God may be among primitive peoples, they are not just an illusion for him" (121). Moreover, the acceptance and inclusion of the participant's internal viewpoint paradoxically enables a scientific approach to religion. Similar considerations apply to secular rituals. Gilbert Lewis observes that "[b]ehaviour that might seem arbitrary was made significant by tradition or convention, at least as far as recognition of identity and the obligation to obey went" (19).
Goody warns, however, that "if culturally defined behavior can only be interpreted by the actors, all cross-cultural generalization is impossible, and all attempts to make rational analysis of the irrational must necessarily be fallacious" (Leach 1968: 525; cf. Goody: 155). Consequently, in order to understand "ritual," there seems to be no other way than to accept the viewpoints of both the involved participants and the scientific observers and to be aware of the difference. Bell summarizes: "The nineteenth- and twentieth-century debate over magic, religion, and science has successively defined ritual activity as non-rational, then as rational given its premises, and finally as a fundamentally symbolic form of communication, which means that it is irrational with respect to science but rational in terms of its internal coherence and purpose" (Bell 1997: 50).
Ritual Practices and the Notion of "Performance"
Following Durkheim, there is widespread agreement that, within a religious framework, "ritual" refers to the practical or, rather, performative aspect of religion with regard to a sacred sphere. Jane Harrison, who subscribes to Durkheim's approach, notes that in ancient Greek dromenon (religious ritual) literally means "things done" (1951: 35; cf. Burkert 1979: 36). "Ritual practices" refers to the entire set of performed acts, such as sacrifice of animals, saying of prayers, and relating mythical narratives. A distinction should be made between the performative aspects of a prayer, for example, and the beliefs it conveys. Fundamentally, practices are nonverbal in nature.
Despite profound differences between magic and monotheistic rituals (cf. Durkheim: 57), in both the aim of ritual practice is to reach the sacred sphere and procure assistance for individual and/or community. Bronislaw Malinowski claims that magic and religion both belong in a single sphere, the magico-religious: "Man needs miracles not because he is benighted through primitive stupidity, [or] through the trickery of a priesthood ... but because he realizes at every stage of his development that the powers of his body and of his mind are limited" (1963: 301). The main difference is that magic presupposes that the divine can be compelled by ritual practices, whereas monotheistic religions assume that God is omnipotent and confers grace only by His own will. Edmund R. Leach claims: "From the viewpoint of the actor, rites can alter the state of the world because they invoke power. If the power is inherent in the rite itself, the analyst calls the action magic; if the power is believed to be external to the situation-a supernatural agency-the analyst says it is religious" (1954: 52; cf. Bell 1997: 47). Both kinds of religious practices, however, share a single aim: efficacy on the sacred sphere. Moreover, both assume dependence of their efficacy on the community's participation.
Ritual practices are usually extremely formalized. They are characterized by colorfulness, solemnity, prescribed behavior, recurrence, and long-term permanence. Their preestablished acts are obligatory, and transgression is penalized. "Failure to recognize the situation until too late, failure to conform or the actions done wrongly, may be expected to be met by sanction or misfortune, and a lapse prompts embarrassment, shame or anxiety" (Lewis 1988: 20).
Recurrence and stability are essential to ritual's symbolic function: its capacity to gather a periphery of verbal and nonverbal (particularly emotional) associations and evoke them anew and with renewed vigor whenever it is performed. These verbal and nonverbal associations usually attach to components of ritual, such as kneeling, narration (myths in particular), and even geometrical forms (e.g., the Star of David). Because of this symbolic potential, recurrence and stability should be seen as an integral and crucial factor in the alleged efficacy of religious ritual. Ritual practices develop from a kernel of meaning and grow associatively.
Rituals are usually performed in places that are exclusively devoted to sacred events, which have been consecrated by the community, such as synagogues, churches, and mosques. These places also gather symbolic meaning. They are performed at consecrated times, such as the annual religious celebrations, the cyclic transition of seasons, and the changing phases in individual life, such as birth, puberty, marriage, and death, for which Arnold van Gennep proposes the category of rites de passage. Cyclic time entails recurrence and stability, and thus such moments also gather symbolic meaning.
Interest in ritual practices led Turner, the anthropologist who probably most influenced the theory of theatre in the second half of the twentieth century, to explore ritual as performance (Bell 1997: 42). Turner endorses the view of ritual as the performance of acts with regard to supernatural forces:
In earlier publications I defined "ritual" as "prescribed formal behavior for occasions not given over to technological routine, having reference to beliefs in invisible beings or powers regarded as the first and final causes of all effects" ... I still find this formulation operationally useful.... I find it useful, because I like to think of ritual essentially as performance, enactment, not primarily as rules or rubrics.... To perform is ... to bring something about, to consummate something, or to "carry out" a play, order, or project. (Turner 1982: 79; emphasis in original)
Turner defines "ritual" as "performance" in terms similar to those of the speech act (Austin; Searle 1985; Levinson) or, rather, action theory (Dijk). Although his early application of "performance" was restricted to religious ritual, this definition enabled its expansion to other modes of action. On these grounds, Turner suggests that ritual generates some kinds of aesthetic performance: "ritual in its performative plenitude in tribal and many post-tribal cultures is a matrix from which several other genres of cultural performance, including most of those we tend to think of as 'aesthetic' have been derived" (Turner: 81). This set of genres includes theatre art. On these grounds, however, there is not much to distinguish between religious and secular ritual practices, apart from intentions and purposes. Moreover, it is difficult to see how the notion of "performance" can distinguish between ritual, in its wide sense, and nonritual.
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