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CHAPTER 1

Executive summary

Background to the conflict

When communities lose their stakes in peace, conflict breaks out. The reasons behind civil war in Africa are often connected with livelihoods and power. Tensions may centre on ethnic differences and other identities. There are also always issues specific to particular contexts. The main causes of the 1994-5 conflict in northern Ghana are summarised below.

Economic insecurity and uneven development

• Northern Ghana remains a relatively undeveloped area. Public-service provision is weak, standards of literacy, nutrition, and health are correspondingly poor, and agriculture undeveloped. This situation creates insecurity. It has been exacerbated by the negative impacts of economic structural adjustment.

• Within the region, some areas are particularly deprived in terms of service infrastructure, especially the rural areas. This disproportionately affects the ethnic groups concentrated in those areas, often acephalous populations (segmentary groups or groups without chiefs), and this in turn heightens tensions between ethnic groups.

Disputes centred on land and production issues

• Access to land and rights of control over land use are contested between different ethnic groups. 'Chiefly' (cephalous) groups claim ultimate ownership of land, vested in paramount chiefs. Acephalous peoples (with no chiefly power structures) contest this.

• Production systems differ. Acephalous groups tend to practise long-term shifting cultivation, moving on to fertile areas when soil fertility is exhausted. Cephalous groups tend to live in permanent nucleated villages, using a system of rotational fallowing to maintain soil fertility. This has led to tension where cephalous groups believe 'their' land to be damaged by shifting cultivation practices.

• Outright land sales are few. Most land is controlled by traditional authorities. Which authority has this right in any particular area may be contested. State-registered land titling is possible, but remains restricted.

• Limited agricultural development has prioritised rice. Funds have been available for large-scale entrepreneurs to create irrigated rice farms. They have sometimes purchased land titles outright, using their knowledge of the formal land-tiding processes. This has created tensions in these areas where local farmers consider that their rights to land have been trespassed upon.

• Competition in the wholesaling and retailing of yams has created tensions. Markets have also become symbolically important in terms of ethnic identity, and practically significant as arenas for meeting and organising for war. The Konkomba yam market in Accra is a case in point.

Issues of governance

• There have been disputes over traditional political leadership in the Northern Region, where four chiefly groups claim the right to rule. In terms of numbers, these groups are in the minority. The 12 acephalous groups now claim the right to self-determination. The denial of this right has precipitated conflict.

A further cause of conflict is the fact that chiefly groups have paramount chiefs who wield great influence over development and decide on traditional questions and land matters, cooperating on these issues as members of the Houses of Chiefs. Acephalous groups also seek self-determination in the form of chieftaincy structures and aspire to have their own paramounts, in order to influence the course of development and to gain representation and sway in the Regional and National Houses of Chiefs.

• Tensions have arisen from the democratisation and decentralisation processes: recent initiatives have opened up competition for limited resources at the local level. Where District authorities have become the preserve of one ethnic group, manipulation of resource-flows by that group has sometimes disadvantaged others.

• The rise of youth associations has been a cause of conflict. With the spread of education, associations have been formed, headed by members of the literate urban elite. These constitute an alternative power base to chieftaincy in the Region. At first working for the development of the Region and for education in particular, newer associations have been formed along ethnic lines and they work for these smaller group interests. Since ethnic groups are effectively in competition (for the limited state resources in the Region, land control, and so on), these groups are often mutually hostile. Alliances tend to form within groupings of the traditionally cephalous and groupings of acephalous youth associations. Youth associations as well-established structures have been implicated in inciting conflict in pursuit of their own interests.

Religious identity

• In rural areas, cults of the earth are practised, and there have been disputes over who has the right to perform associated rituals. These are often disputes between cephalous and acephalous peoples.

• Most Muslims in northern Ghana belong to chiefly ethnic groups, whereas most Christians are members of acephalous societies. Tensions between these groups have been fuelled by partisan missionary and development organisations, deciding to assist one group and not another.

Ethnicity

• Some development work has empowered certain groups to assert their ethnic identities and even to crystallise and standardise identities that were previously disparate.

• The ethnic groups make conflicting claims about rights to particular areas of land, based on contrasting legitimising factors (conquest or claims to an indigenous origin). These are linked to claims about rights either to rule other groups or to gain independence from such rule.

The arms race

Although weapons of war have been officially banned in northern Ghana since 1981, arms were stockpiled and other preparations were made before the 1994-5 conflict. This exacerbated tensions.

Previous conflicts

Northern Ghana has been subject to a cycle of conflict. Previously unresolved issues and desire for revenge form the background to this conflict. Rising belligerence, fuelled by rumours and the press and by partial application of justice and day-to-day insults, served to increase tensions.

Dispute over a guinea fowl

Conflict was generally expected six months before its outbreak, although not on the scale on which it actually occurred. The spark for the war was a dispute over the price of a guinea fowl at a market in the Nanumba District.

The impact of the conflict

• The conflict affected seven Districts in the Northern Region. Both modern weaponry and traditional techniques were used. Fighting was most intense between February and May 1994 and in March 1995.

• Lives lost are estimated at 15,000. Approximately 200,000 people were displaced.

• The conflict entailed destruction of personal property, housing, and government services and infrastructure, and the dislocation of social life.

• Interruption of the agricultural cycle meant food shortages throughout the country. Vast government expenditure on peace-keeping reduced development budgets.

Immediate peace-keeping and humanitarian response

• Government peace-keeping was effective and fair and has received wide acclaim.

• The government undertook a relief and rehabilitation programme, including a refugee evacuation and shelter programme, with food-aid assistance from the WFP.

• Non-government organisations (NGOs) in northern Ghana formed an informal Consortium which co-ordinated their humanitarian aid efforts. NGOs organised refugee camps, food distributions, and the provision of other basic necessities. Co-operation with government peace-keepers and relief efforts was good.

The peace process

Government

• The government formed a Permanent Peace Negotiating Team that negotiated with each of the warring factions separately to draft a peace treaty in June 1994. This initiative had limited long-term success in terms of reconciliation, because the parties were not brought together, and the approach relied on arbitration rather than facilitation.

NGOs and civil society

• Seeing that NGO efforts at long-term development were being compromised by recurrent conflict in the Region, the Consortium sought permission to complement government efforts through a parallel peace process.

• The Consortium sought the co-operation of the Nairobi Peace Initiative (NPI), a Kenyan NGO specialising in conciliation work.

• The Consortium and NPI started work at the grassroots, seeking to build up trust with communities and at the same time seek out peace-makers who could head a peace and reconciliation process led by representatives of civil society.

• After identifying such 'voices of reason' among all the warring factions, the Consortium and NPI went on to facilitate peace workshops with all these individuals together at Kumasi. A civil-society organising group, the Peace Awareness Committee, was then formed. It worked with the Consortium and the NPI to continue peace education work at the local, Regional, and national levels and to facilitate more workshops at Kumasi involving various influential actors in the north, from youth-association leaders to politicians.

• The talks were highly successful: tensions eased, and some of the bases of the conflict were addressed. The process resulted in the signing of the Kumasi Peace Accord by the warring factions in March 1996.

• The peace process also entailed the creation and capacity-building of a new body, the Northern Region Youth and Development Association (NORYDA). Its Constitution was ratified by leaders of 12 ethnic groups in the Region. As a representative civil-society organsation, it aims to continue the peace campaign, defuse new tensions that arise, and work for the development of the Region. It provides the capacity for northern peoples to solve their own problems together, to sustain the peace process.

• Since the creation of NORYDA, the body has assisted in the dispersion ol tension in the Region on several occasions. NORYDA provides means for creating sustainable peace.

• Peace-awareness groups, meetings, and working groups for peace were established to work on the issues in the communities. This work is being continued and co-ordinated by NORYDA.

• Some of the contested issues have been resolved. For example, chiefly groups have agreed to recognise new paramount chiefs of some of the traditionally acephalous groups. Other issues remain outstanding, notably the Nawuri–Gonja land-ownership dispute, which has been exacerbated by tensions over the distribution of food aid during the current food crisis.

Conclusion

• NGO networks, like the Consortium, can play an invaluable role in promoting a sustainable peace after conflict. Networks provide a neutral status which allows NGOs to work with groups across civil society.

• Informal, flexible consortia have many advantages. In northern Ghana, an informal consortium has been created which can build on its capacities generated during the conflict response, and its flexibility, to take on other roles. Indeed it is attempting to do this during the current food crisis in north-east Ghana.

• The process is a good example of the advantages that can be gained by networking with other specialised NGOs in the continent to share skills and build learning and capacities.

• In working towards the creation of a strong civil-society organisation and in continuing to fund it, capacity can be built within civil society to modify relationships peaceably and to sustain peace.

Summary of recommendations

For the Consortium

Organisation and direction: Retain the flexible character of the Consortium. Build its capacity by devising emergency-preparedness plans, incorporating more gender planning, improving co-ordination, fostering linkages with international donors, and strengthening relations with local and national government to improve collaboration on information-sharing and other responses to conflict.

Consortium activities: Continue to support NORYDA. Institute peace training with NGOs, government officials, and local leaders. Implement data-gathering and disseminating for early warning on crises.

Individual NGOs: Incorporate peace objectives into development work, and monitor on this basis. Improve development planning with government at all levels and with other NGOs. Many NGOs need to build capacities for all these areas.

For local government

Continue to promote peace and improve the impartiality of resource distribution. Improve collaboration with NGOs.

For traditional authority and civil-society leaders

Build on reconciliation work at all levels and adhere to the Kumasi Peace Accord. Improve collaboration with local government, especially in the development of political representation for all groups. Support and increase the capacity of NORYDA. The Houses of Chiefs should work to improve the representative capacity of these institutions and work quickly on conflict-related issues concerning chieftaincy and land.

For central government

Continue the successful peace-keeping efforts. Ensure that policy incorporates development for all, to address inter-Regional and intra-Regional imbalances. Facilitate political participation for all. Tighten arms-control measures. Recognise and support NORYDA's work and NGO development activity.

For donors

Lobby for and support the equitable development of the Northern Region. Assist NORYDA's capacity-building and peace and development work. Support the Consortium's future activities. Research and recognise the problems of channelling aid through the NGO or government sectors.

CHAPTER 2

Introduction

In Northern Ghana, ethnic conflict during 1994 and 1995 resulted in casualties and displacement on an unprecedented scale. NGOs in the region formed a consortium to deal with the immediate crisis and to initiate a process of peace negotiation among the warring factions.

This report describes these events and reviews the peace process. Commissioned by the Consortium, it is based on an analysis of primary and secondary documents in Ghana and the UK, undertaken by Ada van der Linde and Rachel Naylor, and on interviews carried out in Ghana in August and September 1996 by Ada van der Linde and in October 1998 by Rachel Naylor.

Interview respondents comprised the following:

• Leaders of the warring factions who participated in NGO-sponsored peace workshops and agreements: chiefs, youth association leaders, opinion leaders, and members of Parliament.

• Principal representatives of the NGO Consortium.

• Government officials at Regional and District levels.

• Divisional chiefs, community leaders, and men and women at village level.

• Aid-agency representatives based in Accra.

The initiative for this documentation came from non-government organisations. Consequently, there was limited access to government officials at national and local level. Van der Linde could not meet with the government-appointed Permanent Peace Negotiation Team (PPNT). Thus, the report says little about the government perspective.

This final report was written by Rachel Naylor.

CHAPTER 3

Background to the conflict

Introduction

Political and economic overview

Northern Ghana comprises three Regions: Northern, Upper East, and Upper West, bordered by Togo, Cote d'lvoire, and Brong Ahafo Region (Figure 1). Together, these three Regions constitute one third of Ghana's land area. The 1994-5 conflict was confined to the Northern Region.

Before independence, northern Ghana was administered as a separate Protectorate by the British. Independence in 1957 brought unity and a promising economic start. However, strong state intervention in the economy, coupled with a policy of import-substituting industrialisation and agricultural mechanisation, resulted in a sharp economic decline that began in 1975. By 1983 the country was in crisis. This led to the adoption of economic liberalisation and structural adjustment policies in conjunction with the IMF and the World Bank, and a certain level of economic recovery.

The macro-economy grew 50 per cent during 1983-93, and Ghana was hailed as a flagship of economic reform by the IMF. However, the social impact of the reforms has been severe. Adjustment involved thousands of compulsory redundancies in the civil service and the parastatal organisations. Cost-recovery was introduced in health and education services, resulting in sharp declines in attendance at health centres and schools. Removal of agricultural subsidies meant that inputs rose drastically in price, affecting production. These changes had the greatest impact on the poor.

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Excerpted from "Building Sustainable Peace"
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Copyright © 1999 Oxfam GB.
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