Read an Excerpt
Beyond All My Fears
A northwestern gale blew furiously into Arnold’s fleet as it
headed south from New York. The winds picked up on Christmas Eve, the sea
foaming with whitecaps. Then the skies darkened and the rains came, pounding
the British ships for the next two days in a soaking deluge. Visibility diminished
almost completely as wafts of mist rose from the sea to meet the
clouds.
The sloop-of-war Swift and the armed brigantine Rambler heaved in the
swells, suffering under the weight of cannons and troops. Ships were driven
by the winds to shallow water near the coast. Rain pelted the sailors’ faces as
they climbed the rigging and tied up sails to avoid being swept away. As waves
crashed onto the decks, Arnold and the other commanders ordered the men to
lighten the ships. Sailors raced to unshackle the heavy cannons, working in
small groups to heave many of their most prized armaments into the sea. The
Sally, bristling with weaponry, was swamped with water and came close to
sinking.1
To venture on deck was to risk sliding into the abyss. The ropes were sodden,
the planks slicked, making it nearly impossible to maintain footing. A sailor
tackling a winter gale could quickly find his jacket drenched and then frozen
to his back, his hands numb, his eyes perpetually blinking away the moisture.
Many of the men had experienced such danger before and knew how quickly
frostbite could take hold, leading to the loss of sensation in their hands or feet.
But they also knew how men were lost at sea for failing to deal immediately
with the threat of a ship overburdened by winter.
The situation was especially desperate on board the ship that carried a hundred
of the finest horses that Arnold could assemble. The tightly packed animals
were panicked by the howling winds and rain, the lightning and thunder.
They could not be contained as the boat rocked in the sea and water swamped
the deck. The boat itself was “very bad, infamously provided and totally unfit
for service.” As the storm raged, the horses’ caretakers finally were forced to
let more than forty of the animals go overboard, desperate to save weight and
prevent the ship’s sinking. “The very Skippers were fearful of sailing, and it required
every exertion of the Quarter-Masters to oblige them to weigh anchor,
and, at sea, the utmost industry and labor could barely keep them from foundering,”
wrote John Graves Simcoe, the commander of the Queen’s Rangers.2 Four
ships, including one with four hundred men, became separated from the main
fleet, not to be seen again for a week. For days, it was feared the vessels had sunk
to the bottom of the Atlantic. On the day after Christmas, the fleet “was so scattered
by a gale” that those aboard a ship carrying a Hessian corps found themselves
adrift, with no other vessels in sight. In an effort to keep details of the
mission secret, the officers in charge had not been told of their precise destination.
Instead, they had been given a sealed letter, to be opened only in the event
that the ships were separated. Now, after two days without seeing another ship,
the Hessian officer ordered this “letter of rendezvous” to be opened and the
destination revealed: the Cape of Henry at the mouth of the Chesapeake.3
The storm had one beneficial effect for the British: it hid the fleet from anyone
who might have spied them from land. Arnold was determined to push on,
believing that the British could win the war if they captured Virginia. He took
comfort that many of his men were Loyalists, including a corps of Virginians,
underscoring the British view that Virginia was deeply divided about the revolution
more than four years after the Declaration of Independence. Arnold
was sure that thousands more would defect to the British as he sailed up the
James River.
The Virginia coast had attracted seafarers, pirates, and plunderers
since the earliest days of British exploration. From the Atlantic Ocean, the
capes of Virginia seemed like two great gates, inviting vessels to enter the state’s
network of riverine highways. The settlers of Jamestown went through this opening
as if pulled into a vortex; many other ships followed. The Indians living
along the riverbanks could do nothing to stop these great British ships, and the
settlers began to establish a series of villages and forts along the inland waterways,
wary that the Spanish would come through the same waters and take Virginia
for themselves.
The waterways were Virginia’s strength and weakness. They stretched across
the state from the Atlantic to the Appalachians, forming a necklace, with Jamestown,
Richmond, Petersburg, and other towns and cities strung like beads
across it. During the Revolution, the British often blockaded the Capes with
their massive ships, while the Virginians were barely able to construct a handful
of poorly equipped vessels.
Before Collier’s raid in early 1779, Virginia had as many as sixty-nine armed
vessels, although many were poorly equipped and lightly manned. Many were
captured, destroyed, or badly damaged during the raid. Later that year, when
Jefferson became governor, his administration calculated that the state had
flight from monticello only twelve serviceable warships, with a combined eighty-eight guns and 343
naval personnel.4 The navy received only two vessels in 1779 and 1780, neither
of them warships; one was a packet boat that served as a messenger service and
the other was intended to carry supplies to the prisoners at Charleston.5
Jefferson had been urged by aides to place ships at the Capes to prevent a
seaborne invasion. But Jefferson believed this was impossible, given the state of
what he called “our miserable navy.” Expressing the need for additional ships,
Jefferson said that “it has been my uniform opinion that our only practicable
defense was naval.” His effort to institute such a defense, however, was “unsuccessful
beyond all my fears.”6
Jefferson had been deeply impressed by an unusual ship developed by the
Pennsylvania navy, an open, half-deck vessel with one or two triangular sails
known as lateens attached to small masts. These ships had been effective during
engagements on the Delaware River and later were used by Arnold.7 Jefferson
hoped that Virginia would build such vessels, but the plan was changed
repeatedly as it passed through the legislature and state Navy Board. In the end,
a frustrated Jefferson wrote, there was “100,000 pounds laid out to not a shilling’s
benefit.” He believed “we should be gainers were we to burn our whole navy.”8
The British seemed to capture American ships at will, while the Americans
rarely caught a British vessel. “A British prize would be a more rare phenomenon
than a comet, because the one has been seen but the other has not,” Jefferson
wrote.9 In 1779, the Virginia navy vessel Dolphin encountered three
British ships shortly after passing Cape Henry. Captain John Cowper, who had
vowed never to surrender his vessel, unwisely decided to engage the British
despite being outmanned, and the Dolphin was promptly shredded on all sides
by a cannonade. Virginians watched the engagement from the shore, barely
making out the sails of the four ships. The thunder and smoke of the cannons
could be heard and seen in the distance, but when the battle ended, all that was
visible was three British vessels departing. The Dolphin sank and her entire
crew of seventy-five died. It was the worst loss in the short history of the Virginia
navy, emboldening the British and leaving Virginia’s sailors hesitant to
engage the enemy at sea unless they had clear superiority.10 Failing to gain help
from the state or Congress, Jefferson suggested to a French diplomat that it
would be worthwhile for Paris to order a fleet to Virginia “to protect the Commerce
of your own state . . . what is best for your nation, is best for us also.”11
Notwithstanding Jefferson’s disillusionment, Virginia’s navy occasionally
had done wonders even with its limited resources in the early days of the revolution.
Through guile and daring, James Barron, whom Jefferson had picked
to head the state’s navy, had captured several British ships while sailing on
Chesapeake Bay aboard the Liberty. But the invasions by Leslie and Collier
devastated the navy. Moreover, the destruction of Norfolk had resulted in the
loss of shipwrights, sailmakers, rope workers, and countless other experts in the
trade. The shipyard at Portsmouth had been mostly destroyed. The newer shipyard
on the Chickahominy River near Williamsburg was still a small operation.
Much of the state’s navy consisted of privately owned vessels impressed into
service; the owners hoped to capture British ships or to seize property owned
by Loyalists. Virginians seemed resigned to the fact that if an invasion came
by sea, the enemy would have free rein and could not be stopped before they
reached land. Some believed it was impossible for Virginia’s forces to defend a
region larger than some European countries with a minuscule force: less than
one militiaman to every square mile, and only one in five militiamen in possession
of a serviceable weapon.12
At the same time, Jefferson was distracted by fighting on another front.
During the days that Arnold was en route to Virginia, Jefferson was more concerned
about British stirring up the Indians—a faraway threat in the Ohio
country—than about the possibility of another seaborne invasion by the British.
Just six days before Arnold’s invasion, Jefferson wrote about enemies forming
in the south and west, while making no mention of a threat from the north that
might result in an invasion through Chesapeake Bay. “There seems but one
method of preventing the savages from spreading slaughter and desolation over
our whole frontier,” Jefferson wrote about the Indians to militia leaders in western
Hampshire and Berkeley counties on December 24, 1780. “That is by carrying
the war into their own country.” On Christmas Day, Jefferson wrote a
lengthy letter to his friend and Albemarle County neighbor, Brigadier General
George Rogers Clark, filled with explicit instructions about how to attack the
Indians. Jefferson proposed sending Clark everything from four cannons and
a thousand spades to whatever boats were necessary. Jefferson wrote that he
had received intelligence that “a very extensive combination of British and Indian
savages” was planning to invade the state’s western frontier. By some estimates,
Jefferson wanted to devote as many as one thousand valuable Virginia
soldiers to his westward aspirations, which would further weaken Virginia’s defenses
in the east.13
The legislature had recognized how vulnerable the eastern portion of the
state was to an invasion from the sea. A few months earlier, in October 1780,
the legislature passed an act that required that “proper attention shall be paid
to the defence of the commerce and the shores of Chesapeak bay and its dependencies.”
The measure called for a number of vessels to be fully manned and
armed “for the purpose of suppressing the cruizers belonging to the enemy, and
flight from monticello affording protection and safety to the good citizens inhabiting the shores of
the bay and rivers.”14 The terms of the act were never fulfilled, however. While
the invasion was under way, Jefferson acknowledged, “we had three vessels of
16 guns, one of 14, five small gallies, and two or three armed boats. They were
generally so badly manned as seldom to be in condition for service.”15
Jefferson seemed fed up with being governor under such conditions. He
urged his old friend John Page to take his place, leaving the impression that he
might resign before his term expired the following June, or at least not seek a
third term. A horrified Page implored Jefferson to remain at his post. “I know
your love of study and retirement must strongly solicit you to leave the hurry,
bustle, and nonsense your station daily exposes you to,” he wrote Jefferson, but
insisted there was no one else in Virginia who had the ability to lead the state
at such a moment. Jefferson remained as governor, hoping that reports of a
British force headed southward were another false alarm.16
If an invasion did come, Virginia had no system to warn its citizens. No riders
were posted at lookouts, no drums of tar that could be lit as fire signals were
set out, no full-time force manned artillery along the coast. A communication
system set up earlier by Jefferson, consisting of some of Virginia’s finest horsemen
posted at forty-mile intervals, had been shut down due to the expense and
the belief that it was no longer needed. The legislature also had failed to approve
plans to construct a series of fortified batteries at key points along major
rivers.
Such was Virginia’s state of affairs as Arnold sailed south: an ineffective navy,
no lookouts, a dispersed and poorly armed militia, a recalcitrant legislature,
and a coastal citizenry still recovering from the last two invasions.
Few doubted Arnold’s ability as a naval commander. Five years earlier, when
Arnold was fighting on the American side at Lake Champlain, Jefferson himself
had written that Arnold was “a fine sailor.”17 His British superiors hoped
Arnold would, at the least, tie up American forces in Virginia, preventing them
from coming to the aid of troops battling against Cornwallis in the Carolinas.
Arnold had his own ambitions, as can be seen clearly by a secret deal he
struck that he hoped would enrich him. Arnold’s 1,600-man force was split
between the British army and navy. While Arnold was the lead commander of
both services, he had direct control only over the army. The navy was overseen
by Thomas Symonds, commander of the forty-four-gun HMS Charon. Under
the British rules of engagement, Symonds’s naval forces were allowed to keep
as “prizes” the bounty from captured enemy vessels. It was a major incentive to
serve in the highly risky profession of sailor. The army did not typically trade
in such prizes. Arnold thought this was unfair. As the ships sailed to Virginia,
Arnold proposed to Symonds that the navy and army split the prizes equally,
no matter which branch seized the ships and plunder. Arnold later swore in a
deposition that Symonds had readily agreed to the plan.
Sir Henry Clinton, who had of course chosen Arnold for this mission, gave
him somewhat limited orders. Arnold was to destroy some arms depots if there
is a “favourable opportunity” and only if “it may be done without much risk.”
Arnold’s main mission was to establish a base at Portsmouth, just as Collier had
suggested, and gather together as many Loyalists from Norfolk and Princess
Anne counties as possible. After establishing the base, Clinton continued,
Arnold was not to “make any excursions from thence unless they can be effected
without the smallest danger to the safety of the post which is always to
be considered as the primary mission.”
Arnold promptly stretched these orders to fit his designs. He viewed the
instruction to destroy the arms depots as a license to head straight for the interior
of Virginia on a two-week raid before setting foot in Portsmouth. From
the moment he reached Virginia, Arnold would make clear that he was his
own commander. Indeed, Clinton had anticipated Arnold’s aggressiveness and
made clear that he did not entirely trust him. He told Arnold not to take any
major action until checking with two British officers—Simcoe, the aforementioned
leader of the Queen’s Rangers, and Colonel Thomas Dundas, head
of the 80th Regiment of Foot.18 Clinton gave Simcoe and Dundas the authority
“to execute the duties of the command which is entrusted to his direction”
in case of Arnold’s death or incapacity. “Incapacity” was loosely defined. If
Dundas or Simcoe thought Arnold was taking an improper action, they could
assume command. The order was to be kept secret from Arnold. “You are upon
no Account to make known that You are possessed of such a Commission,”
Clinton told the officers.19
Arnold assembled a nimble corps, including specialists in la petite guerre,
or “little war,” in which small units engaged in ambushes and raids. These included
the Queen’s Rangers, an expeditionary force of Loyalists who specialized
in unorthodox tactics and wore green jackets—instead of the traditional
British red coats—that kept them better hidden in forests from spring through
fall. The Queen’s Rangers were accompanied by an independent attachment,
the Bucks County Volunteers, Loyalists serving under Captain William Thomas.
Another group, the Loyal American Regiment, was under the command of
Lieutenant Colonel Beverley Robinson Jr. It was Robinson’s father who had
played a key role in convincing Arnold to defect to the British and who had also
arranged for his son’s commission in the regiment. While many British officers
would chafe under Arnold’s command, Robinson reveled in it, delighted to be
serving on the mission to restore Virginia to the control of the crown.
An elite group of Hessian soldiers completed the convoy. It was led by Johann
von Ewald, one of the most revered Hessians to serve the British. Unlike
British officers, many of whom received their commissions as a result of family
connections and financial payments, Ewald’s position was based purely on his
knowledge of the art of war. He would go on to play one of the most important
roles in the invasion of Virginia, ably performing his duty but also clashing
with Arnold at key moments.
On December 29, the fleet assembled at Cape Henry, passing the Chesapeake
Bay estuary at 4:00 p.m. and anchoring that evening at Lynnhaven Bay.
At nine o’clock the next morning the fleet set sail and reached Hampton Roads,
at the mouth of the James River, and proceeded to Newport News, where
Arnold anchored in the evening. Despite a howling wind, Arnold gave a prearranged
signal for commanding officers to leave their ships and row aboard
small craft to the sloop-of-war Charon. There Arnold laid out the battle plan:
a swift strike against an unwitting enemy. The larger ships, carrying the artillery
and cavalry corps, would provide an armed escort. Most of the men were transferred
to open sloops and boats, where they huddled on crowded decks, bundled
up against the wind. Each man was given five days’ rations: salted meat,
biscuits, and plenty of rum. The food and drink were expected to last until they
had reached the capital, Richmond.