Read an Excerpt
From Chapter 1: "Return of the Plutocrats"
 Imagine this: you are given one dollar every second.
       At that rate, after one minute, you would have sixty dollars. And  after twelve days, you would be a millionaire—something beyond most  people’s wildest dreams.
 But how long would it take to become a billionaire? Well, at that rate, it would take almost thirty-two years.
      Being a billionaire isn’t just beyond most people’s wildest dreams;
 it’s likely beyond their comprehension.
      Another way to grasp the sheer size of billionaires’ fortunes is  to imagine how long it would take Bill Gates, generally considered the  world’s richest man, to count his $53 billion. If he counted it at the  same rate—one dollar every second—and he counted nonstop day and night,  he’d have it all tallied up in 1,680 years. Still another way to look at  it is this: if Bill Gates had started counting his fortune at that rate  back in 330 ad—the year that the Roman emperor Constantine had his wife  boiled alive and chose Byzantium as the empire’s new capital—he’d just  be finishing up now.
  
  
 After years of basking in the glow of a flattering limelight, by the  fall of 2011 the very rich were experiencing something new and  altogether jarring: the glare of a harsh spotlight trained directly on  them. The temptation to bark orders like: “Dim that light, or else!” was  natural enough, but perhaps unwise. After all, those shining the  spotlight were not their employees and were swarming in large numbers  through the streets of lower Manhattan, behaving like the sort of unruly  mob one finds in faraway places where the ways of the free world are  insufficiently appreciated.
      All of a sudden, right here in America, being wondrously,  fulsomely, voluptuously rich was no longer a badge of honor, something  to announce gleefully to the world by squealing the tires of one’s  Lamborghini at pedestrians who were in the way. Wall Street—the nexus of  ambition, brains, greed, glamour, the very g-spot of the American  Dream—was no longer something to be glorified, but rather occupied.
      Where would it end? Could the trappings of wealth become a source  of embarrassment? Could the day come when a yacht became like a fur  coat—one of life’s small pleasures ruined by the prospect that wearing  it (or docking it) might attract a crowd of protestors? Imagine a  protestor so mean-spirited that she would object to the sight of a  banker lounging on a pleasure craft massively larger than the house she  had once owned but that now belonged to . . . a bank.
      Of course, it could be worse. Luckily for the bankers, the  occupiers were a little fuzzy in their targeting, going broadly after  the top 1 percent, apparently unaware that the real red meat was much  higher up the food chain—the top .01 percent, the top .001 percent, or  all the way up to the dizzying heights occupied (in this case  appropriately so) by billionaires.
      Anyway, help was on the way. Already, the lobbying industry was  swinging into action. By late November 2011, one of the leading  Washington lobby firms—Clark, Lytle, Geduldig & Cranford—had  prepared a memo for the American Bankers Association (leaked to the  press by some mean-spirited soul), which laid out a media strategy for  countering the Occupy Wall Street juggernaut.
      The lobbyists insisted that the answer lay in a carefully pre-  pared counter-campaign aimed at slinging mud at the motives of the occupiers:  “If we can show they have the same cynical motivation as a political  opponent, it will undermine their credibility in a profound way.” (It’s  tough to imagine what cynical motivation might lead people to live in  water-soaked tents for weeks on end.)
      The danger was that the anti–Wall Street message, if unchallenged,  could turn the big Wall Street banks into fodder for the Democratic po-  litical machine—and worse. As the memo noted: “The bigger concern  should be that Republicans will no longer defend Wall Street  companies—and might start running against them too.”
      The lobbyists even raised the prospect of the Tea Party crowd  joining in some kind of a Right-Left populist free-for-all of  bank-bashing: “The combination has the potential to be explosive later  in the year when media reports cover the next round of bonuses and  contrast it with stories of millions of Americans making do with less  this holiday season.” (It’s gratifying to see that, even when they’re  plotting the destruction of a democratic movement, lobbyists now use  inclusive language about the “holiday season.”)
      All this looming victimization was no doubt baffling to members of  the financial elite, who still had trouble grasping the notion that  they were somehow supposed to feel culpable for the 2008 financial  crash.
      That bewilderment had been evident as early as January 2009, only  months after the crash, at the elite gathering in the Swiss town of  Davos, where bankers, business leaders, political shakers, and other big  thinkers come together every year to celebrate the globalized world of  liberated financial markets, shrunken government, and reinvigorated  capitalism. Of course, some bewilderment was inevitable in Davos that  year, with even questions popping up about why markets had done such a  poor job of policing themselves. The headline on a dispatch that  appeared on the website Slate captured the mood: “Davos Man,  Confused.” Written by journalist Daniel Gross, the piece explained that,  despite the confusion, there was a broad consensus at Davos that  “[s]uccess is the work of Great Men and Women, while failure can be  pinned on the system.” Or, as another journalist, Julian Glover noted in  the UK’s Guardian: “The shock is real, the grief has hardly  begun, but no one in Davos seems to think [this] means they should be  less important or less rich.”
      That would have involved a change of mindset, which was not what  these economic overlords seemed inclined toward. After all, a key  concept behind the economic order of the past few decades has been the  central importance of individual talent—and the need to nurture it with  abundant financial rewards. That way, so the idea goes, the brilliant in  our midst would be lured to the top jobs that run the world. Ensuring  the active participation of these giants among us was clearly understood  to be worth a lot, and pay scales were adjusted accordingly, going  through the roof at the upper end. Just because the global economy was  now in a free fall hardly seemed like grounds to beat up the very people  who’d played key roles in designing it.
      So, in Manhattan, then-CEO of Merrill Lynch John Thain apparently  saw no irony as he explained why he’d felt it necessary to pay $4  billion in executive bonuses to keep the “best” people on staff—right  after those same overachievers had steered the company to a stagger- ing  net loss of $27 billion and, in the process, helped trigger the global  economic meltdown. The decision of the Wall Street crowd to collectively  pay themselves a record $140 billion in 2009—outstripping even their  2007 record—may have seemed odd under the circumstances, but then no one  ever accused Wall Street bankers of being unduly modest, unassuming, or  prone to self-doubt.
      Away from the rarified air of Davos and Manhattan, doubts were  beginning to appear. Some less-gifted types were now clamoring for  change, even suggesting that cutting executive pay might induce the  hypertalented to seek more socially useful employment in areas like  teaching or health care. But a letter to the New York Times clarified  the danger of this approach, making a compelling case for maintaining  extravagant pay, even huge executive bonuses: “Without them, Wall  Streeters will all look for other jobs. Do we really want these greedy,  incompetent clowns building our houses, teaching our children or driv-  ing our cabs?”
  
  
 As a result of the dramatic increase in the concentration of income and  wealth at the top during the last few decades, the United States has  become an extremely unequal society.
      Before going any farther, we should point out that we are not  against all inequality. On the contrary, some reasonable degree of  inequality is not only acceptable and inevitable but even desirable  because it allows for different rewards for different levels of  individual effort and contribution. But what exists today in the United  States—and to a lesser extent in Britain and Canada—is a level of  inequality that is extreme compared to the rest of the advanced,  industrialized world. Indeed, the level of inequality in the United  States today is actually more considerably extreme than what exists in  many developing countries, including India, Cambodia, and Nigeria, and  even in many Middle Eastern countries, such as Egypt and Tunisia, where  excessive inequality is widely believed to have played a role in  sparking the Arab spring uprisings of 2009–2010.
      Over the past three decades, virtually all the growth in American  incomes has gone to the top 10 percent, with particularly large gains  going to the top 1 percent and spectacularly large gains going to the  top .01 percent. Between 1980 and 2008, the incomes of the bottom 90  percent of the population grew by a meager 1 percent, or an average of  just $303. Meanwhile, over those same years, the incomes of the top
 .01 percent of Americans grew by 403 percent, or an average of a  massive $21.9 million. The richest 300,000 Americans now enjoy almost as  much income as the bottom 150 million. These high rollers make up an  enormously rich and powerful class that can best be described as a  plutocracy—not unlike the plutocracy of financial interests that  dominated America back in the 1920s, when the opulence of the wealthy  and their disproportionate influence over the political process was  particularly blatant.