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Heidegger's Contributions to Philosophy
An Introduction
By Daniela Vallega-Neu Indiana University Press
Copyright © 2003 Daniela Vallega-Neu
All rights reserved.
ISBN: 978-0-253-21599-4
CHAPTER 1
A FAILURE OF LANGUAGE
In the "Letter on Humanism," Heidegger explains that the main problem that led him to interrupt the itinerary of Being and Time and seek a new way of posing the question of being was a failure (Versagen) of language. The problem was that Being and Time still attempted to use "the language of metaphysics." At the same time, Heidegger maintains that already in this earlier work he questions being in a more original way than metaphysics. We may say, then, that in Being and Time Heidegger fails to say what he attempts to say. In Besinnung, Heidegger also explicitly notes that in Being and Time there is at work the attempt to be guided once again by "the basic ways of questioning" (Grundfragestellungen) of the history of metaphysics, but in a new beginning and point of view (GA 66, 413). Heidegger's approach remains indebted to metaphysics, especially in his "transcendental" approach to the question of being, which includes the notions of "transcendence," of "horizon," of "condition of possibility," and his thinking in terms of the ontological difference. But while, in Being and Time, Heidegger takes up anew the basic questionings of the history of philosophy, he does this by rethinking these questions so radically that he deconstructs the metaphysical tradition from which they arise and uncovers an utterly finite, non-metaphysical "abysmal ground" of being, namely the temporal horizon in which being discloses and things come to presence. This temporal horizon, which in Contributions is reconceived as the truth ofbe-ing, is not a metaphysical ground in that it is not presented, analogously to beings, as a being of any kind, and in that it discloses finitely in Dasein's resolute being-towards-death. In this respect, Heidegger's first major work already pursues its questioning in a more originary way than the metaphysical tradition out of which it arises.
So — viewed retrospectively — Being and Time remains somewhat ambiguous, a work of transition, as Heidegger repeatedly points out in Contributions;. Since this ambiguity is nothing one could overcome, the following reading of Being and Time involves a double task: that of showing how Heidegger uses the notions of transcendence, horizon, and the condition of possibility in a way that is radically different from metaphysics, and also that of showing that these notions and Heidegger's specific systematic approach inevitably point back toward metaphysics. In order to pursue this task we need to take a careful look at the directions of thought Being and Time takes, i.e., at the movements of thought in the path of questioning, which find their articulation in the notions of "transcendence," "horizon," and the "condition of possibility." We will see in the next chapter that one of the main differences between Contributions and Being and Time concerns precisely the directionality and the movements of thought and the way in which they come to language. The path of questioning (and accordingly the language) of Being and Time is imbedded in the project of fundamental ontology as a whole. This is why we need to reconsider the main task of Being and Time and the way Heidegger pursues it.
a) The Itinerary of Being and Time
Heidegger states that the first task of Being and Time is to explicate time as the transcendental horizon for the question of being. This is what fundamental ontology is meant to prepare by way of an analysis of Dasein (of human being). An analysis of Dasein provides access to the question of being as such because Dasein has both "ontic" and "ontological" characteristics. Dasein is both an entity (a being) and, in its understanding of being, discloses being as such. As Heidegger states in section 4 of Being and Time, "The ontic distinction of Dasein lies in the fact that it is ontological" (BaT10; SuZ12), which means that Dasein is a being which, in distinction to other beings, is constituted in such a way that in its existence being as such is disclosed. Thus, an analysis of Dasein intrinsically leads to the question of being as such.
Dasein understands itself pre-theoretically in its being, and thereby not only discloses possibilities of its own being but also of the being of beings in general (BaTll; SuZ13). As Heidegger emphasizes, this understanding of being (Seinsverstandnis) is not a property of a being we call man, but it is rather "we that are always already involved in an understanding of being" (BaT4; SuZ5). It is out of this usually unquestioned, pre-theoretical understanding of being that we first come to know ourselves as well as other beings. The understanding of being that belongs to Dasein discloses at the same time Dasein's own possibilities of being, world, and beings that become accessible within the world (BaT11; SuZ13). It should be clear, then, that Heidegger does not take Dasein to be a self-enclosed subject that leads to the question of something other than itself (being as such). Rather, Heidegger questions being as such by way of an analysis of Dasein because Dasein, human being, is constituted as being-in-the-world, which means that in Dasein a world and, thus, the being of beings in general is disclosed. Dasein is both a being (in an ontic sense) and is ontological (because it is open to being as such), and thus can serve as the being that is interrogated (das Befragte) in order to gain access to what is asked about (das Befragte), namely, being as such.
In its pre-theoretical understanding of being, Dasein "stands out" (eksists) in the open horizon of being, and this is what in his essay "On the Essence of Ground" Heidegger will call more explicitly the "transcendental constitution" of Dasein. Here, "transcendental" means that, in existing, Dasein occurs temporally as a transcending beyond beings into the disclosure of being as such, so that in this transcending not only its own possibilities of being but also the being of other beings is disclosed. We see here the ambiguity of Dasein: on the one hand, at the beginning of Being and Time, it is taken as a being that is questioned; on the other hand, in its existence (in its being), Dasein is always already beyond itself (transcends itself in terms of a being) in the temporal horizon of being as such and comes to be who it is out of this horizon. In the itinerary of Being and Time Heidegger moves from this transcendental constitution of Dasein to the temporality as the meaning of Dasein s being, and then to the horizonal temporality as the meaning of being as such. We will follow this itinerary more closely, starting with the transcendental constitution of Dasein.
Heidegger develops the transcendental constitution of Dasein's being as the unity of Dasein s three "existentials," i.e., of three aspects that structure Dasein's existence: projection (Entwurf), thrownness (Geworfenheit), and being with beings (sein bei ...). In section 41 of Being and Time he says that Dasein is always already ahead of itself in its being. "Dasein* is always already 'beyond itself,' [...] as being toward the potentiality-for-being which it itself is" (BaT179; SuZ191f). Dasein does not first reach being by transcending itself as a being but occurs always already in being-ahead-of-itself. This "being-ahead-of-itself" occurs in Dasein's projection. Yet, being ahead of itself, that is, projecting itself into possibilities of being, Dasein is also always already thrown into a world and, thus, into possibilities of being that are consigned to it. Finally, in "being-ahead-of-itself-in-already-being-in-a-world," Dasein is also always already with inner-worldly things at hand. Projection, thrownness, and being with beings are the three existentials that constitute care, the being of Dasein. Heidegger finds this existential constitution of Dasein by inquiring into and analyzing Dasein in its everyday being in the world. The existential constitution of Dasein (care) must then be shown to be rooted in temporality, which step, in turn, leads to the disclosure of being as such out of being's temporality.
Before explicating care in terms of temporality, Heidegger explores the possible being-a-whole of Dasein in its being-towards-death. By questioning the possible being-a-whole of Dasein, Heidegger exposes the limits of its being-ahead-of-itself in already being-in-a-world, that is, the finitude of Dasein's transcending projection. This limit is not disclosed in our everyday being with inner-worldly things at hand, but is only disclosed when our everyday engagement with beings is interrupted or withdraws, as happens in the fundamental attunement of anxiety. In anxiety, death is disclosed as the utmost possibility of Dasein, the possibility of being which is the possibility of not being at all. However, death is not simply a limit in a negative sense. Rather, Heidegger thinks of death as a limit in the same way that he reads the Greek word for limit: perns, that is, as a limit that gives something free in its limiting. Death is a limit that frees Dasein's own most potentiality of being (eigenstes Seinkönnen) (BaT232; SuZ250). By comporting oneself toward death (not by attempting to flee it, but by being open to its possibility, i.e., by anticipating the possibility of not being), the possibility of being and not being first genuinely discloses. By anticipating its own death, the limit of its being, Dasein exists authentically.
In existing authentically, the finite whole of Dasein's possibility of being is disclosed, and this "whole" includes the being of other beings (BaT243f; SuZ264). In anticipation of death, then, being as such is disclosed out of the limit of Dasein's possibility of being. However, as Heidegger says at the end of section 53 of Being and Time, in the anticipatory being-towards-death we have only found the ontological possibility of being-a-whole. This ontological possibility needs an ontic existentiell attestation (Bezeugung), which means that it needs to be found in a concrete mode of being. Why that? We may answer this question with what Heidegger says in the introduction to Being and Time, namely, "the roots of the existential analysis [...] are ultimately existentiell — they are ontic" (BaTll; SuZ13). This means that the ontological structure of Dasein (the existentiality of existence) must be disclosed in an existentiell way (factually); otherwise it could not become a phenomenon for philosophical inquiry. But, in turn, the condition of possibility of this existentiell, factual, disclosure of Dasein's most extreme possibility of being presupposes the disclosure of being itself. To put it briefly: The ontological is disclosed in the ontic, at the same time that the ontic presupposes the ontological as its "condition of possibility." Yet, in the itinerary of Being and Time Heidegger exposes the ontological structure of Dasein independently from its ontic existentiell opening.
Heidegger finds the ontic attestation for Dasein's ontological possibility of being-a-whole in the "call of conscience." In his analysis of conscience in chapter two of the second division of Being and Time, Heidegger explores "anticipatory resoluteness" as Dasein's authentic mode of disclosure in which it explicitly chooses its authentic being-itself and its authentic possibility of being in being-towards-death. In this authentic possibility of being, Heidegger says, Dasein takes over "the fact that it is the not-ground* of its nothingness*" ("der nichtige Grund seiner Nichtigkeit'y0 (BaT283; SuZ306). The ground of Dasein's transcendence, which it reaches in thrown projection and takes over in anticipatory resoluteness, is permeated by "nothingness." This is the point where Heidegger's notion of transcendence discloses a "ground" of being that is utterly different from a metaphysical ground in that it has neither the character of presence nor of permanence, but is both finite and a temporal occurrence. We should take a closer look at the way in which Heidegger arrives at this notion of a "not-ground" (nichtiger Grund), of a ground of being permeated by nothingness.
In order to disclose Dasein's ownmost, finite possibility of being, Dasein's everyday involvement with beings needs to be interrupted. This occurs through the call of conscience, a call that occurs without sound (BaT252; SuZ273). "The call of conscience," says Heidegger, "has the character of summoning Da-sein to its ownmost potentiality-of-being-a-self, by summoning it to its ownmost quality of being a lack" (BaT249; SuZ269). Of course, here Heidegger is considering the call of conscience as an ontological term rather than as a psychological phenomenon. He emphasizes the disclosive function of conscience: "Conscience gives us 'something' to understand, it discloses" (ibid.). "What" consciousness discloses is Dasein's finitude (its being a "lack") and, with it, Dasein's ownmost possibility of being.
The disclosive power of the call of conscience requires a listening and responding to this call, which Heidegger calls "wanting-to-have-a-conscience." Wanting-to-have-a-conscience is the existentiell phenomenon that Heidegger sought when he looked for an ontic-existentiell attestation for Dasein's ontological possibility of being a whole. In wanting-to-have-a-conscience, Dasein chooses in an authentic existentiell way its ownmost possibility of being. As noted earlier, Heidegger calls this choice "resoluteness." Of course, we should keep in mind that this "choice" is not a choice made by a human subject. Rather, it is an occurrence that determines Dasein, involving a free response to the call of conscience, and, thus, a taking up of a disclosive mode of being.
With respect to the call of conscience, Heidegger distinguishes three aspects: the one summoned in the call, what is called, and the caller. That to which the call is addressed is Dasein as the everyday "they-self" (Man selbst), i.e., who Dasein is indistinctly in everydayness. The call interrupts Dasein's listening to the "they." In other words, the call interrupts a mode of being in which one does what "one" does without awareness of the meaning of one's own being. In the disclosiveness of the call "lies the factor of a jolt, of an abrupt arousal" (BaT251; SuZ271), says Heidegger; secondly, he says: "The call calls from afar to afar. It reaches him who wants to be brought back," back, of course, to his authentic, finite, and unique self. Thus, the call calls Dasein from its immersion in the they-self back to its own proper self (das eigene Selbst), that is, to its ownmost possibilities of being.
Thirdly, the "caller" in the call of conscience remains, as Heidegger says, in a "striking indefiniteness," which is a positive characteristic in the sense that "who" calls is nothing else but the calling. "'Es' ruft," says Heidegger, "a calling occurs" that comes "from me, and yet over me" (BaT254; SuZ275). The caller is not determined by anything. It is "Dasein in its uncanniness, primordially thrown being-in-the-world, as not-at-home, the naked 'that' in the nothingness of the world" (BaT255; SuZ276). The caller is Dasein in its most primordial, finite thrownness, i.e., Dasein in its utmost possibility of being: the possibility of not being at all, which discloses the mere "that" of Dasein's existence.
The call of conscience turns out to be the call of care: "the caller is Dasein*, anxious in thrownness (in its already-being-in ...) about its possibility-of-being. The one summoned is also Dasein, called forth to its ownmost possibility-of-being (its being-ahead-of-itself ...). And what is called forth by the summons is Dasein*, out of falling prey to the they (already-being-together-with-the-world-taken-care-of ...)" (BaT256; SuZ277). Thus the "toward what" (Dasein) and the "whence" (Dasein) of the call of conscience are the same occurrence. The call is "a calling back that calls forth (ein vorrufender Rückruf)" (BaT259; SuZ280).
After having thus related conscience back to the ontological structure of Dasein, Heidegger goes on to analyze what the call announces: guilt. This will lead us to the question of the "ground" of Dasein, the ground toward which and out of which Dasein always already transcends, a ground that, as we will see, is a temporal occurrence in which being as such is disclosed finitely.
(Continues...)
Excerpted from Heidegger's Contributions to Philosophy by Daniela Vallega-Neu. Copyright © 2003 Daniela Vallega-Neu. Excerpted by permission of Indiana University Press.
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