Paperback(Bicentenni)
-
SHIP THIS ITEMTemporarily Out of Stock Online
-
PICK UP IN STORE
Your local store may have stock of this item.
Available within 2 business hours
Related collections and offers
Overview
Product Details
| ISBN-13: | 9781611860382 |
|---|---|
| Publisher: | Michigan State University Press |
| Publication date: | 03/01/2012 |
| Edition description: | Bicentenni |
| Pages: | 312 |
| Product dimensions: | 6.00(w) x 8.90(h) x 0.80(d) |
About the Author
Read an Excerpt
The War of 1812 in the Old Northwest
By Alec R. Gilpin
Michigan State University Press
Copyright © 1958 Michigan State University PressAll rights reserved.
ISBN: 978-1-61186-038-2
CHAPTER 1
TIPPECANOE: PRELUDE TO WAR
THE PRELUDE TO THE WAR OF 1812 started in the backwoods of the Old Northwest in the 1760's. The French had come and gone, the British were there then, to be replaced or challenged after 1783 by the Americans. Each occupation of the area had its inevitable impact on the Indians, not only in regard to their traditional lands but also on their culture.
Irrespective of the interested power, certain of the Indians regarded the encroachment on their lands with equanimity; others, however, were not so tolerant and, as a result, frequent skirmishes took place over the years. Among those who took objection to the changing times was the son of a Shawnee father and a Creek mother—Tecumseh, the "Shooting Star" or "Crouching Panther."
Born in 1768 in a hut near the Mad River in the future state of Ohio, Tecumseh was destined to become a Shawnee war chief and to win the respect of the British army. His brother, Laulewaikau or Elkswatawa, probably born in 1775, was to achieve a somewhat lesser fame.
As a young brave, Tecumseh fought in frontier skirmishes between the Indians and Americans, notably in the battle against General Anthony Wayne's army at Fallen Timbers. Unlike his brother, Elkswatawa spent his youth as a vagabond, idling and drinking. However, as often happens, in about 1805 he was suddenly transformed after a vision, in which he claimed the Great Spirit had instructed him to lead a crusade among the Indians against the white man's ways. Either because of expediency or belief, Tecumseh became his follower.
The Prophet, as Elkswatawa became known, aided by Tecumseh, preached that the Indians should return to their old customs and virtues and refrain from mingling with the American usurpers of their hegemony. His followers spread the tale of his vision, greatly embellished, to the Indians of the Old Northwest. In 1808 the Prophet and Tecumseh received permission from certain Potawatomi and Kickapoo representatives to establish a camp site along the Tippecanoe River near its junction with the Wabash. Soon there were forty Shawnee and one hundred other Indians at this village, which became known as Prophet's Town. While the Prophet pursued his crusade, Tecumseh attempted to establish a confederation of the tribes to prevent further cessions of land to the Americans.
After General Wayne's victory at Fallen Timbers, the 1795 Treaty of Greenville reaffirmed previous Indian grants of land north of the Ohio River and provided for a generous extension of the former boundaries. In addition, the Indians recognized various enclaves around the newly built American forts in Indian country. This pact, which Tecumseh refused to sign although many of the other Indian leaders did, bore the signature of William Henry Harrison, whose name was to loom large in future Indian negotiations.
Born in Virginia in 1773, the future President attended several colleges, ostensibly studying for a medical career, but usually pursuing his primary interest, military history. In 1791 he received his commission as an ensign in the First United States Infantry, and was assigned to duty at Fort Washington (Cincinnati, Ohio), where he served under General James Wilkinson. In 1792 General Wayne took command of the army, and the next year made Harrison, by this time a lieutenant, one of his aides. Harrison served with distinction at the Battle of Fallen Timbers and was a signatory to the Treaty of Greenville. In 1798 he resigned from the army to become Secretary of the Northwest Territory. A year later he was elected a Territorial delegate to Congress, but resigned in 1800 to become Governor of the then new Indiana Territory.
As Governor, Harrison made several treaties which extended the boundaries of Indiana northward. In return for signing away their land, the Indians were to be paid annual annuities in goods, with the reluctant Indians usually being offered a larger initial amount as an added inducement to sign. Before 1809 the Indians had expressed little concerted opposition to this, and even in September of that year the Treaty of Fort Wayne—signed with the Delaware, Miami, Potawatomi, and certain lesser tribes—added many square miles to the Indiana boundaries.
At this point Tecumseh took a strong stand. It was not that he or his followers actually owned any of the lands ceded by the Treaty of Fort Wayne. His opposition stemmed from the belief that no Indian, regardless of tribe, had a right to alienate land without the consent of all Indians.
In the spring of 1810, as a result of Tecumseh's influence, some Indians refused to accept annuity payments. Striving to preserve peace, Harrison invited Tecumseh to a council, at the territorial capital in Vincennes, to discuss the matter.
On August 12, 1810, Tecumseh arrived with a group of four hundred, instead of the thirty he had led the Americans to expect. He stated that he had been authorized by the tribes involved to kill the Indians who had signed the Treaty of Fort Wayne because they had not been official delegates of their entire tribes. If the United States would return the land, Tecumseh would forego this punishment. The disputed lands, pointed out Governor Harrison, had been owned by the Miami long before the Shawnee had settled there; in other words, it was none of Tecumseh's business. A fight threatened between Tecumseh's followers and Harrison's forces. However, Tecumseh withdrew at Harrison's request, and the council broke up on August 22, with the Governor promising to bring the land question to the President's attention. For his part, Tecumseh agreed to observe the boundary lines. At this time he was more interested in consolidating his position among the Indians than in disturbing the status quo.
The haggling at the council convinced the Governor of the increasing danger and complexity of Indian affairs. The militia was drilled more frequently, and some regulars were moved to Vincennes. In October Harrison contemplated, but abandoned until spring, the building of a fort along the Wabash River, not far from Prophet's Town, but within the grant of 1809.
In the spring of 1811 small sporadic Indian raids harassed settlers in the Wabash area. Suspecting that Tecumseh had knowledge of these raids, Harrison sent him a strongly worded letter: If the Indians did not cease their raids, Harrison would attack the tribes of the entire area. Tecumseh replied that he would come to Vincennes for a council.
Before the council gathered, there was evident distrust on each side. Tecumseh was reluctant to come with the few followers Harrison requested. The Governor was doubly concerned: A large number of Indians would bring danger of attack, for the settlers in the area could not distinguish hostile from friendly Indians. Learning that a large number of Indians were en route, Harrison sent Captain Waller Wilson, of the Indiana militia, to convey his disapproval. Wilson met Tecumseh at Busseron, twenty miles from Vincennes. Tecumseh explained that only twenty-four Indians belonged to his official party, the rest were coming of their own accord, but did not bother to explain why he had paused to wait for them before continuing to Vincennes.
By July 28 about three hundred Indians were in Vincennes; of these less than thirty were women and children. The Governor was uneasy. He wrote the Secretary of War, William Eustis, that he never would have allowed such a formidable group to approach, except for Presidential instructions to deal with the matter as peacefully as possible. Harrison ordered three companies of militia to stand by. To dramatize his strength, he invited Tecumseh to witness a special review of seven or eight hundred militiamen.
The council opened on July 30, 1811, but brought no meeting of minds. Harrison refused to discuss the Fort Wayne Treaty because it was now in the hands of the President. Tecumseh refused to surrender two Potawatomi who had committed murders in the Missouri area the previous fall, and suggested that they be forgiven as he had forgiven the murderers of some Indians in the Illinois country. He added that he was going South to persuade the southern tribes to unite with the northern, pointedly commenting that the Indians had not objected when the white man had formed the United States. In conclusion, he hoped no further American expansion would take place during his absence. The Governor retorted that his government, under no circumstances, would allow its people to be murdered, and broke up the council.
The 1811 council reflected a significant change in Harrison's official policy. In 1810 he had asserted that Tecumseh had no authority in these matters. This was not mentioned in 1811.
Governor Harrison was not the only one to express distrust of the Prophet's Town inhabitants. On July 31 President Madison received a petition bearing signatures of seven of the leading political figures of Vincennes. Having heard Tecumseh's speech to Harrison, the signers asserted they were sure that an Indian confederation already existed. To bolster their plea for assistance, they enclosed resolutions approved at a public meeting in Vincennes: that peace could be ensured only by crushing the Wabash stronghold; that the British in Canada not only had knowledge of the Indians' plans but were, in reality, behind them; that only forceful action would nullify the danger of the Indians; and that the meeting had fully approved Harrison's measures to date.
The government in Washington had already acknowledged the threat to the Old Northwest. In a letter of July 17, the Secretary of War advised Harrison to consult with Ninian Edwards, Governor of the Illinois Territory, who had reported serious Indian threats. He also informed Harrison that the Fourth Regiment of the United States Infantry, augmented by a company from the Rifle Regiment, had been ordered to descend from Pittsburgh and place themselves under his orders. If Prophet's Town became a serious threat, and if a sufficient force of regulars and militia were available, the Secretary of War authorized Harrison to attack.
A few days later Eustis wrote that the President still hoped to preserve peace, although not at the cost of permitting the formation of an Indian confederation. He added that Colonel John P. Boyd, commanding the Fourth, was to halt at Newport, Kentucky, and expressed the hope that a subsequent march to Indiana would be unnecessary, thus freeing the regiment for other, unspecified, service.
At this time mail between Washington and Vincennes took close to three weeks. Before Eustis' letter arrived, Harrison had already determined his course of action, and written to Eustis of his intentions. A number of Indians, in his belief, remained in Prophet's Town only out of fear of Tecumseh; indeed, Tecumseh was the key to the situation, and the opportune time to attack was during his absence in the South. To justify his views, Harrison pointed out that Tecumseh had let nothing deter him from his plans and observed that the Shawnee was "one of those uncommon geniuses, which spring up occasionally to produce revolutions and overturn the established order of things."
Harrison then outlined his plans for Eustis' approval. He would enforce the provision of the Greenville Treaty requiring the deliverance of murderers and barring hostile Indians from passing through the signatories' lands. All tribes would be notified that the Americans considered members of the Prophet's band as hostiles and would be asked to refuse them tribal protection. Obviously these terms were an ultimatum.
If the terms were not met by September, Harrison would move the two regular companies from Vincennes and Fort Knox, plus seventeen companies of militia, to the northern boundary set by the Treaty of Fort Wayne. If attack were necessary, militia and volunteers from Kentucky and Indiana could be added. Harrison preferred using the regulars of the Fourth, but, if unable to do so, would employ mounted militia when possible.
Harrison was soon able to report that Governor Edwards, of the Illinois Territory, and Governor Benjamin Howard, of the Louisiana-Missouri Territory, agreed that force should be used only as a final resort, but that Prophet's Town must not be allowed to grow. On August 14, 1811, Lieutenant Abraham Hawkins, of the Fourth Regiment, arrived in Vincennes to receive Harrison's orders as to the disposition of Boyd's command. Hawkins had been detached from a company, then at Louisville in advance of the Fourth Regiment at Newport. (Harrison, although he made no mention of it, must have been aware that Eustis would be unlikely to order the regiment on other duty if it actually were stationed at Vincennes, near a possible scene of action.) The Wabash was unusually high, and Boyd's command had keelboats-—so Harrison ordered their advance over the waters of the Ohio and the Wabash.
He then traveled to Jeffersonville, Indiana, the location of the rapids of the Ohio, to meet the regiment. He waited a week, watching the river level getting steadily lower, auguring ill for the arrival of the force in Vincennes in time for them to take up duty in mid-September. Since he had already sent messengers to the Indians demanding compliance with the Greenville Treaty, he now informed Eustis that he was considering a march to Prophet's Town to demand hostages as proof of good conduct, and perhaps even the erection of a fort in Indian country. After the regiment arrived at Jeffersonville on September 3, he and Colonel Boyd journeyed overland to Vincennes.
By September 10 the Fourth Regiment, with Lieutenant-Colonel James Miller in command, was fighting the Wabash River. The water was low, but the current rapid; and many soldiers were victims of a fever that plagued newcomers to the area. But the regulars pushed, poled, and tugged their way upstream, arriving at Vincennes on September 19. They were greeted by an exuberant militia, dressed in deerskins and brandishing tomahawks and scalping knives. The Fourth, an essentially New England regiment, apparently was properly impressed.
Harrison had decided to take the field. But there still remained a problem of a disagreement with Eustis concerning the size and composition of the force. Harrison wanted 1,200 men, including all the regulars available. Eustis authorized the use of the regulars, but restricted the additional request to two militia companies. Harrison deemed this an insufficient force.
On September 17 he wrote to Eustis explaining why he was forced to exceed the letter of his orders. First of all, excessive sickness would reduce his regulars, including the Fort Knox garrison, to an effective force of less than 450. Two companies of militia would add only 100 men. Moreover, he had received a message from Touissant Dubois, an Indian trader of some thirty years' standing, informing him that a party of Indians from Prophet's Town had received presents at the British outpost of Fort Malden and that the British were dispensing more presents to Indians than ever before. Eustis' orders, Harrison reminded, had been that he was not to attack unless sure of victory. Furthermore, a strong demonstration could counteract British largess. In short, he concluded, he had determined to employ as large a force as he could gather.
As Eustis' reply would take several weeks to arrive, Harrison began preparations for his campaign. With the support of the Governor of Kentucky, Charles Scott, he had already called for Kentucky volunteers. Joseph H. Daviess, a United States attorney, was one of the first to respond. Most volunteers came in small groups, but a skeleton company of mounted militia reported under Captain Peter Funk. When Captain Frederick Geiger's mounted riflemen reported, Kentucky was represented by 101 men—many of them prominent citizens.
In addition to the Kentuckians, Harrison eventually had the following force: nine companies of regulars, six companies of Indiana infantry militia, and three companies of Indiana mounted riflemen; two companies of Indiana light dragoons ; one company of Indiana riflemen, and a company of scouts. Not all units were present when the expedition left Vincennes, and none was at full strength. Slowly these units converged on Vincennes for the job ahead, and the final plans were readied. Captain William Piatt of the regulars was appointed quartermaster, Joseph Daviess was placed in charge of the militia dragoons and mounted riflemen, with the rank of major in the Indiana militia, and Waller Taylor and Henry Hurst, each with the rank of major, were appointed Harrison's aides.
The time had come to instruct the troops in battle drill while on the march. Extremely simple maneuvers were devised and practiced. The primary object of these maneuvers was to avoid scattering men in wooded or irregular terrain and to minimize the danger of attack at a vulnerable time.
The chain of command was then announced. All infantry, regular and militia, were to form a brigade under the command of Colonel Boyd, with the acting rank of brigadier-general. This brigade was to form two lines in case of action, the first to consist of the regulars, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel James Miller; the second, under Lieutenant-Colonel Joseph Bartholomew. All mounted troops and scouts were to be directly under Harrison's orders.
On the march the infantry was to move in two single-file columns. Each column was to be composed of two battalions, regulars forming the front battalion, militia forming the rear. The columns were to be far enough apart so that when the direction of march changed, the flanks of each would meet. The mounted men were to extend for one hundred and fifty yards on all sides of the infantry. The scouts and spies were to be in advance of the rest of the army.
(Continues...)
Excerpted from The War of 1812 in the Old Northwest by Alec R. Gilpin. Copyright © 1958 Michigan State University Press. Excerpted by permission of Michigan State University Press.
All rights reserved. No part of this excerpt may be reproduced or reprinted without permission in writing from the publisher.
Excerpts are provided by Dial-A-Book Inc. solely for the personal use of visitors to this web site.
Table of Contents
The War of 1812 in the Old Northwest: An Introduction to the Bicentennial Edition by Brian Leigh Dunnigan vii
I Tippecanoe: Prelude to War 3
II The Old Northwest Acquires an Army 23
III War 44
IV Invasion of Upper Canada 63
V A Problem in Logistics 86
VI The Surrender of Detroit 109
VII The Second North Western Army 126
VIII Frontier Actions and the Battle of River Eaisin 147
IX Siege of Fort Meigs 173
X Frontier Expeditions; Battle of Lake Erie 194
XI Battle of the Thames 214
XII Mackinac Island; Minor Actions 235
XIII Peace 259
Bibliography 263
Index 271