A Chance for Possibility: An Investigation into the Grounds of Modality

by Alexander Steinberg

Overview

A Chance for Possibility defends the view that the objective modal realm is tripartite: truths about possible worlds supervene on modal truths, which in turn supervene on truths about objective chances.
An understanding of supervenience in terms of grounding is developed which — unlike the standard modal characterization — allows the question of what modal truths supervene on to have a non-trivial answer. Relying on this understanding, a negative result is established: modal truths do not supervene on truths about possible worlds, whether possible worlds are conceived of as Lewisian concreta or as abstract objects of some kind. Instead, a conception of pleonastic possible worlds is developed that reverses the direction of supervenience. On the basis of linguistic considerations concerning our use of natural language ‘might’ and ‘might have’ sentences, Steinberg finally argues that truths about objective chances are able to provide a supervenience base for modal truths.
A Chance for Possibility is an investigation in analytic metaphysics, drawing on related work in the philosophy of logic and language as well as linguistics. It provides a detailed case study for the fruitful use of a notion of grounding in the clarification and evaluation of longstanding philosophical issues.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9783110334890
Publisher:	De Gruyter
Publication date:	10/17/2013
Series:	Philosophische Analyse / Philosophical Analysis , #51
Pages:	276
Product dimensions:	9.06(w) x 6.10(h) x 0.04(d)
Age Range:	18 Years

About the Author

Alexander Steinberg, University of Hamburg, Germany.

Table of Contents

1 Introduction 7

2 Supervenience 13

2.1 Supervenience 15

2.2 Covariance 19

2.3 Covariance and Ontological Priority 26

2.4 Covariance and Modal Supervenience 31

2.5 Modal Supervenience and Explanation 36

2.6 Explaining Explanations 44

A Strong and Global Supervenience 55

A.1 Kim's Attempted Equivalence Proof 56

A.2 Non-Equivalence Examples 58

A.3 Restricted Entailment? 61

A.4 Against Restricted Entailment 63

3 Concrete Possible Worlds 69

3.1 Possibility and Possible Worlds 70

3.2 The Analysis Claim 72

3.3 Lewis Worlds 73

3.4 The Irrelevance Objection 76

3.4.1 Against IO₁ 77

3.4.2 Against IO₂ 81

3.4.3 Against IO₃ 86

3.5 Counterparts 89

3.6 Actual Problems for Lewis 96

3.6.1 Possible Non-Existence 96

3.6.2 Surprises 99

3.6.3 Actuality 101

3.7 Lewisian Explanations 107

4 Abstract Possible Worlds 113

4.1 Something from Nothing 115

4.1.1 Pleonastic Properties 117

4.1.2 Something-from-Nothing Entailment Claims 120

4.1.3 Property Concepts 127

4.1.4 True SNECs 135

4.2 Pleonastic Possible Worlds 152

4.3 Objections and Clarifications 167

4.3.1 Existence 168

4.3.2 Explanation 171

4.3.3 Competitors 177

5 Possibility and Probability 181

5.1 Initial Motivation 183

5.2 Different Kinds of Probability 188

5.2.1 Epistemic Probabilities 189

5.2.2 Objective Probabilities 194

5.3 The Temporal Structure of Might's 201

5.3.1 Might 201

5.3.2 Might Have 206

5.3.3 Different Readings 210

5.4 DeRose on 'Might' Sentences 214

5.5 Supervenience 224

5.6 Objective and Metaphysical Possibility 229

6 Conclusion 237

Appendix A Non-Nominal Quantification 241

Name Index 257

Bibliography 261