A Long-run Collaboration On Long-run Games

by Drew Fudenberg (Editor), David K Levine (Editor)

Overview

This book brings together the joint work of Drew Fudenberg and David Levine (through 2008) on the closely connected topics of repeated games and reputation effects, along with related papers on more general issues in game theory and dynamic games. The unified presentation highlights the recurring themes of their work.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9789812818461
Publisher:	World Scientific Publishing Company, Incorporated
Publication date:	12/16/2008
Pages:	416
Product dimensions:	6.70(w) x 9.70(h) x 1.10(d)

Table of Contents

Acknowledgments v

Introduction ix

I Limits, Continuity and Robustness 1

1 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria of Finite- and Infinite-Horizon Games D. Fudenberg D. K. Levine 3

2 Limit Games and Limit Equilibria D. Fudenberg D. K. Levine 21

3 Open-Loop and Closed-Loop Equilibria in Dynamic Games with Many Players D. Fudenberg D. K. Levine 41

4 Finite Player Approximations to a Continuum of Players D. Fudenberg D. K. Levine 59

5 On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements D. Fudenberg D. M. Kreps D. K. Levine 67

6 When Are Nonanonymous Players Negligible? D. Fudenberg D. K. Levine W. Pesendorfer 95

II Reputation Effects 121

7 Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player D. Fudenberg D. K. Levine 123

8 Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed D. Fudenberg D. K. Levine 143

9 Maintaining a Reputation Against a Long-Lived Opponent M. Celentani D. Fudenberg D. K. Levine W. Pesendorfer 163

10 When is Reputation Bad? J. Ely D. Fudenberg D. K. Levine 177

III Repeated Games 207

11 The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information D. Fudenberg E. Maskin 209

12 The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information D. Fudenberg D. K. Levine E. Maskin 231

13 Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players D. Fudenberg D. K. Levine 275

14 An Approximate Folk Theorem with Imperfect Private Information D. Fudenberg D. K. Levine 309

15 The Nash-Threats Folk Theorem with Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two Player Games D. Fudenberg D. K. Levine 331

16 Perfect Public Equilibrium when Players are Patient D. Fudenberg D. K. Levine S. Takahashi 345

17 Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring D. Fudenberg D. K. Levine 369

Erratum 389