Agents of Innovation: The General Board and the Design of the Fleet that Defeated the Japanese Navy

Agents of Innovation: The General Board and the Design of the Fleet that Defeated the Japanese Navy

4.0 1
by John T. Kuehn
     
 

View All Available Formats & Editions

The author examines the influence of the General Board of the U.S. Navy as an agent of innovation in the years between the world wars. A formal body established by the secretary of the Navy, the General Board served as the organizational nexus for the interaction between fleet design and the naval limitations imposed on the Navy by treaty. Particularly important,

Overview

The author examines the influence of the General Board of the U.S. Navy as an agent of innovation in the years between the world wars. A formal body established by the secretary of the Navy, the General Board served as the organizational nexus for the interaction between fleet design and the naval limitations imposed on the Navy by treaty. Particularly important, Kuehn argues, was the Board's role in implementing the Washington Naval Treaty, which limited naval armaments after 1922. Kuehn explains that the leadership of the Navy at large and the General Board in particular felt themselves especially constrained by Article XIX of the Washington Naval Treaty, which implemented a status quo on naval fortifications in the western Pacific.

Product Details

ISBN-13:
9781612514055
Publisher:
Naval Institute Press
Publication date:
07/10/2013
Sold by:
Barnes & Noble
Format:
NOOK Book
Pages:
256
File size:
2 MB

Customer Reviews

Average Review:

Write a Review

and post it to your social network

     

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

See all customer reviews >

Agents of Innovation: The General Board and the Design of the Fleet that Defeated the Japanese 4 out of 5 based on 0 ratings. 1 reviews.
RichRB More than 1 year ago
Very useful and interesting description of the General Board and its relationship to SecNav and Bureaus. Has clear flaws. Repeatedly repetitive and uses modern terminology that fits by definition (change in "paradigm") but diminishes from thinking in terms used at time. Also has unique use of words "Strategic", "tactical", and "organizational" that does not match anything. Also mixes terminology incorrectly, especially referring to any vessel other than a battleship as an "auxiliary". With those flaws it is still an insightful complement to other publications about Navy organization and planning of the era, especially "War Plan Orange". The other appears to have done well in constructing reasonable conclusions from available source material, which he says is limited by lack of official notes and reports as intentional in the system.