Aggressive Network Self-Defense / Edition 1by Neil R. Wyler, Johnny Long, Seth Fogie
Pub. Date: 04/01/2005
Publisher: Elsevier Science
Over the past year there has been a shift within the computer security world away from passive, reactive defense towards more aggressive, proactive countermeasures. Although such tactics are extremely controversial, many security professionals are reaching into the dark side of their tool box to identify, target, and suppress their adversaries. This book will
Over the past year there has been a shift within the computer security world away from passive, reactive defense towards more aggressive, proactive countermeasures. Although such tactics are extremely controversial, many security professionals are reaching into the dark side of their tool box to identify, target, and suppress their adversaries. This book will provide a detailed analysis of the most timely and dangerous attack vectors targeted at operating systems, applications, and critical infrastructure and the cutting-edge counter-measures used to nullify the actions of an attacking, criminal hacker.
• First book to demonstrate and explore controversial network strike back and countermeasure techniques.
• Provides tightly guarded secrets to find out WHO is really attacking you over the internet.
• Provides security professionals and forensic specialists with invaluable information for finding and prosecuting criminal hackers.
- Elsevier Science
- Publication date:
- Edition description:
- 1st Edition
- Product dimensions:
- 0.86(w) x 7.00(h) x 10.00(d)
Table of Contents
What's in a hat?
Chapter 1: Is it Legal to Strike Back?
Chapter 2: Automated Strike Back Worms
Chapter 3: Targeting an Attacking Host
Chapter 4: Aggressive Intrusion Prevention Systems Chapter 5: Honey Pots and Honey Nets
Chapter 6: Windows Insecurity: Shattering the Glass. Chapter 7: Disinformation Campaigns
Chapter 8: Cyber Terrorism and Counter Intelligence Chapter 9: Know Your Enemy: Social Engineering Chapter 10: Google This!
Chapter 11: When Enough is Enough
and post it to your social network
Most Helpful Customer Reviews
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The book is riddled with sloppy prose that has not seen the attention of a careful editor. As only example (there are others), Chapter 12 repeatedly has phrases like 'the diagram in Figure 12.11'. This can be shortened to 'Figure 12.11', as is done in several places in that chapter. Speaking of figures, several in that chapter were poorly drawn. Blurry. And in some cases, graphics boxes within a figure are cut off by the border. Again, sloppy. Throughout the book, most figures are annoying. They are screen or window captures. The authors chose the quick and dirty way of doing this and then pasting them into the text. But the resolution of the resultant printed images makes the contents out of focus. Yes, perhaps if you squint hard enought and interpolate, you can deduce the text. But this is what I mean. Annoying. The chapters do offer amusing fictional plots that give tactics on both intruder and defender. Part of the appeal of the book is that these roles can switch. There are enough technical details supplied in the text to make the tactics credible to a computer person. The discussion on the limitations of MD5 to a crafted collisions attack is well done. Very sneaky. Though still quite speculative, as the text rightfully points out. The Strike Back chapter describes Armpit - a tool written as a 'human detector'. It is run as a daemon on a server. It permits access to resources only if the client browser can interpret Flash. This is seen as tantamount to implying that there is a human at the client, and not an automated attack tool, since most instances of the latter cannot do Flash. But this just begs the question. Surely if Armpit becomes common, it gives incentive for future attack tools to be able to run Flash? The narrative gives no technical reason why a cracker cannot take this logical countermeasure. More importantly, the book fails to recognise that Armpit is a challenge-response method. Those of you familiar with antispam ideas should realise this immediately. Plus, Mailblocks has a patent on challenge-response. It would have been useful for the book to discuss whether this patent (or any others) could make any infringement claims against the company that wrote Armpit.