Table of Contents
Preface iii
Figures ix
Tables xi
Summary xiii
Acknowledgments xxv
Abbreviations xxxi
Chapter 1 Introduction 1
Chapter 2 Highlights of the Campaign 13
Initial Reliance on Standoff Attacks 20
The Standoff War Continues 33
First Signs of Emerging Doubt 41
The Move to Ground Operations 49
Countdown to a Ceasefire 56
An Inconclusive Ending 63
Chapter 3 Key Israeli Air Accomplishments 73
Sustaining a New Battle Rhythm 78
Defusing the Strategic Rocket Threat 92
UAV Operations 110
Airlift and CSAR Support 126
The Ababil Downings 130
Chapter 4 Problems in Air Employment 135
The Intractable Katyusha Challenge 136
Failed Attempts Against Hezbollah's Leaders 154
A Polarizing Incidence of Noncombatant Fatalities 157
Overkill of Lebanon's Infrastructure 174
Issues in Air-Ground Coordination 181
Chapter 5 The Winograd Commission's Findings 199
On the IDF's Combat Performance 202
On the Olmert Government's Errors in Strategy 209
On Assessed Leadership Failings 215
Chapter 6 A Second Chance in Gaza 221
Getting Ready for the Next Round 224
An Improved Showing Against Hamas 234
Highlights of the Joint Operation 252
Where Israel Got It Right This Time 259
Chapter 7 The Second Lebanon War Reconsidered 277
Air Power in IDF Doctrine and Operational Practice 282
Explaining the Government's Strategy Choice 291
The Genesis and Execution of the Strategy 298
Where the Strategy Failed to Deliver 305
Was the Campaign Really a Lost Cause for Israel? 320
Chapter 8 Conclusions 335
Bibliography 345
Index 367
