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Dr. Taylor presents an original theory of the dynamics of confusion in governments and in the lives of ordinary citizens. His model postulates a vicious cycle in which the causes of confusion evoke coping tactics that often worsen those causes. One of the most destructive coping tactics, ...
Dr. Taylor presents an original theory of the dynamics of confusion in governments and in the lives of ordinary citizens. His model postulates a vicious cycle in which the causes of confusion evoke coping tactics that often worsen those causes. One of the most destructive coping tactics, "Find-an-Enemy-and-Lose-Your-Confusion" spawns conflict and increases the lies and other information pathology already circulating. "Exports" from this vicious cycle include environmental depredation, political oppression, war and death.
Using his model, he illuminates the binds entrapping Robert McNamara and Lyndon Johnson as they expanded the Vietnam War in 1965. He then extends the theory using fuzzy cognitive maps (FCMs), and submits the model to the ultimate test: forecasting in "real time" certain events in the 1999 NATO-Serbia War and its aftermath. He published these predictions on his web site during and after that war.
This project represents the first use of FCMs to forecast political-military events in real time.
The concluding chapters test whether a knowledge of confusion dynamics will increase empathy between opponents, and whether the model is useful for planning humanitarian efforts by betterment organizations.
|Chapter 1||Amplifying The Definition of Confusion||3|
|Chapter 2||Spotlighting The Sources||14|
|Chapter 3||Complexity: Overload's Fashionable Twin||22|
|Chapter 4||The Complete Array of Confusion Sources||36|
|Chapter 5||Coping with Confusing Situations||56|
|Chapter 6||Connections Among Coping Methods||79|
|Chapter 7||Oversimplified Initial Version of The 1965 Vietnam War Expansion Decision||93|
|Chapter 8||Confusion Dynamics in The 1965 Decision to Escalate||108|
|Chapter 9||Conflicting Agendas Binding McNamara and Westmoreland||131|
|Chapter 10||More Elements in The Dilemma||143|
|Chapter 11||Failure of Peace Initiatives||158|
|Chapter 12||Robert McNamara's Recommendations Based on The Vietnam Experience||170|
|Chapter 13||Forecasting With Fuzzy Cognitive Maps During and After The Kosovo War||177|
|Chapter 14||Kosovo Section of The Web Site||183|
|Chapter 15||The War Goes On||213|
|Chapter 16||Interrupting The Web Site Transcript to Examine My Own Confusion||225|
|Chapter 17||Returning to The Web Site Excerpts||232|
|Chapter 18||Combining The US/NATO and Serbian Matrices||242|
|Chapter 19||The Approach of "Peace"||258|
|Chapter 20||More Complexities in Peace||273|
|Chapter 21||Trying to Incorporate The Serb Perspective, and A Possible Role For The CIA||278|
|Chapter 22||Continued Disarray||292|
|Chapter 23||Russia, China, India Form Alliance to Counter Us Dominance||300|
|Chapter 24||Seeking Tools for Clarification 1: Individual Efforts||329|
|Chapter 25||Seeking Tools For Clarification 2: Group and Organizational Efforts Toward More Effective Reforms||357|
|About the Author||383|