AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS
AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS
SECTION I. OF THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF MORALS.
DISPUTES with men, pertinaciously obstinate in their principles, are,
of all others, the most irksome; except, perhaps, those with persons,
entirely disingenuous, who really do not believe the opinions they
defend, but engage in the controversy, from affectation, from a spirit
of opposition, or from a desire of showing wit and ingenuity, superior
to the rest of mankind. The same blind adherence to their own arguments
is to be expected in both; the same contempt of their antagonists; and
the same passionate vehemence, in inforcing sophistry and falsehood.
And as reasoning is not the source, whence either disputant derives his
tenets; it is in vain to expect, that any logic, which speaks not to the
affections, will ever engage him to embrace sounder principles.
Those who have denied the reality of moral distinctions, may be ranked
among the disingenuous disputants; nor is it conceivable, that any human
creature could ever seriously believe, that all characters and actions
were alike entitled to the affection and regard of everyone. The
difference, which nature has placed between one man and another, is
so wide, and this difference is still so much farther widened, by
education, example, and habit, that, where the opposite extremes come at
once under our apprehension, there is no scepticism so scrupulous,
and scarce any assurance so determined, as absolutely to deny all
distinction between them. Let a man's insensibility be ever so great,
he must often be touched with the images of Right and Wrong; and let
his prejudices be ever so obstinate, he must observe, that others are
susceptible of like impressions. The only way, therefore, of converting
an antagonist of this kind, is to leave him to himself. For, finding
that nobody keeps up the controversy with him, it is probable he will,
at last, of himself, from mere weariness, come over to the side of
common sense and reason.
There has been a controversy started of late, much better worth
examination, concerning the general foundation of Morals; whether
they be derived from Reason, or from Sentiment; whether we attain
the knowledge of them by a chain of argument and induction, or by an
immediate feeling and finer internal sense; whether, like all sound
judgement of truth and falsehood, they should be the same to every
rational intelligent being; or whether, like the perception of beauty
and deformity, they be founded entirely on the particular fabric and
constitution of the human species.
The ancient philosophers, though they often affirm, that virtue is
nothing but conformity to reason, yet, in general, seem to consider
morals as deriving their existence from taste and sentiment. On the
other hand, our modern enquirers, though they also talk much of the
beauty of virtue, and deformity of vice, yet have commonly endeavoured
to account for these distinctions by metaphysical reasonings, and by
deductions from the most abstract principles of the understanding. Such
confusion reigned in these subjects, that an opposition of the greatest
consequence could prevail between one system and another, and even in
the parts of almost each individual system; and yet nobody, till very
lately, was ever sensible of it. The elegant Lord Shaftesbury, who first
gave occasion to remark this distinction, and who, in general, adhered
to the principles of the ancients, is not, himself, entirely free from
the same confusion.
It must be acknowledged, that both sides of the question are susceptible
of specious arguments. Moral distinctions, it may be said, are
discernible by pure reason: else, whence the many disputes that reign in
common life, as well as in philosophy, with regard to this subject: the
long chain of proofs often produced on both sides; the examples cited,
the authorities appealed to, the analogies employed, the fallacies
detected, the inferences drawn, and the several conclusions adjusted to
their proper principles. Truth is disputable; not taste: what exists
in the nature of things is the standard of our judgement; what each
man feels within himself is the standard of sentiment. Propositions in
geometry may be proved, systems in physics may be controverted; but the
harmony of verse, the tenderness of passion, the brilliancy of wit, must
give immediate pleasure. No man reasons concerning another's beauty; but
frequently concerning the justice or injustice of his actions.
1101953280
SECTION I. OF THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF MORALS.
DISPUTES with men, pertinaciously obstinate in their principles, are,
of all others, the most irksome; except, perhaps, those with persons,
entirely disingenuous, who really do not believe the opinions they
defend, but engage in the controversy, from affectation, from a spirit
of opposition, or from a desire of showing wit and ingenuity, superior
to the rest of mankind. The same blind adherence to their own arguments
is to be expected in both; the same contempt of their antagonists; and
the same passionate vehemence, in inforcing sophistry and falsehood.
And as reasoning is not the source, whence either disputant derives his
tenets; it is in vain to expect, that any logic, which speaks not to the
affections, will ever engage him to embrace sounder principles.
Those who have denied the reality of moral distinctions, may be ranked
among the disingenuous disputants; nor is it conceivable, that any human
creature could ever seriously believe, that all characters and actions
were alike entitled to the affection and regard of everyone. The
difference, which nature has placed between one man and another, is
so wide, and this difference is still so much farther widened, by
education, example, and habit, that, where the opposite extremes come at
once under our apprehension, there is no scepticism so scrupulous,
and scarce any assurance so determined, as absolutely to deny all
distinction between them. Let a man's insensibility be ever so great,
he must often be touched with the images of Right and Wrong; and let
his prejudices be ever so obstinate, he must observe, that others are
susceptible of like impressions. The only way, therefore, of converting
an antagonist of this kind, is to leave him to himself. For, finding
that nobody keeps up the controversy with him, it is probable he will,
at last, of himself, from mere weariness, come over to the side of
common sense and reason.
There has been a controversy started of late, much better worth
examination, concerning the general foundation of Morals; whether
they be derived from Reason, or from Sentiment; whether we attain
the knowledge of them by a chain of argument and induction, or by an
immediate feeling and finer internal sense; whether, like all sound
judgement of truth and falsehood, they should be the same to every
rational intelligent being; or whether, like the perception of beauty
and deformity, they be founded entirely on the particular fabric and
constitution of the human species.
The ancient philosophers, though they often affirm, that virtue is
nothing but conformity to reason, yet, in general, seem to consider
morals as deriving their existence from taste and sentiment. On the
other hand, our modern enquirers, though they also talk much of the
beauty of virtue, and deformity of vice, yet have commonly endeavoured
to account for these distinctions by metaphysical reasonings, and by
deductions from the most abstract principles of the understanding. Such
confusion reigned in these subjects, that an opposition of the greatest
consequence could prevail between one system and another, and even in
the parts of almost each individual system; and yet nobody, till very
lately, was ever sensible of it. The elegant Lord Shaftesbury, who first
gave occasion to remark this distinction, and who, in general, adhered
to the principles of the ancients, is not, himself, entirely free from
the same confusion.
It must be acknowledged, that both sides of the question are susceptible
of specious arguments. Moral distinctions, it may be said, are
discernible by pure reason: else, whence the many disputes that reign in
common life, as well as in philosophy, with regard to this subject: the
long chain of proofs often produced on both sides; the examples cited,
the authorities appealed to, the analogies employed, the fallacies
detected, the inferences drawn, and the several conclusions adjusted to
their proper principles. Truth is disputable; not taste: what exists
in the nature of things is the standard of our judgement; what each
man feels within himself is the standard of sentiment. Propositions in
geometry may be proved, systems in physics may be controverted; but the
harmony of verse, the tenderness of passion, the brilliancy of wit, must
give immediate pleasure. No man reasons concerning another's beauty; but
frequently concerning the justice or injustice of his actions.
AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS
AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS
SECTION I. OF THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF MORALS.
DISPUTES with men, pertinaciously obstinate in their principles, are,
of all others, the most irksome; except, perhaps, those with persons,
entirely disingenuous, who really do not believe the opinions they
defend, but engage in the controversy, from affectation, from a spirit
of opposition, or from a desire of showing wit and ingenuity, superior
to the rest of mankind. The same blind adherence to their own arguments
is to be expected in both; the same contempt of their antagonists; and
the same passionate vehemence, in inforcing sophistry and falsehood.
And as reasoning is not the source, whence either disputant derives his
tenets; it is in vain to expect, that any logic, which speaks not to the
affections, will ever engage him to embrace sounder principles.
Those who have denied the reality of moral distinctions, may be ranked
among the disingenuous disputants; nor is it conceivable, that any human
creature could ever seriously believe, that all characters and actions
were alike entitled to the affection and regard of everyone. The
difference, which nature has placed between one man and another, is
so wide, and this difference is still so much farther widened, by
education, example, and habit, that, where the opposite extremes come at
once under our apprehension, there is no scepticism so scrupulous,
and scarce any assurance so determined, as absolutely to deny all
distinction between them. Let a man's insensibility be ever so great,
he must often be touched with the images of Right and Wrong; and let
his prejudices be ever so obstinate, he must observe, that others are
susceptible of like impressions. The only way, therefore, of converting
an antagonist of this kind, is to leave him to himself. For, finding
that nobody keeps up the controversy with him, it is probable he will,
at last, of himself, from mere weariness, come over to the side of
common sense and reason.
There has been a controversy started of late, much better worth
examination, concerning the general foundation of Morals; whether
they be derived from Reason, or from Sentiment; whether we attain
the knowledge of them by a chain of argument and induction, or by an
immediate feeling and finer internal sense; whether, like all sound
judgement of truth and falsehood, they should be the same to every
rational intelligent being; or whether, like the perception of beauty
and deformity, they be founded entirely on the particular fabric and
constitution of the human species.
The ancient philosophers, though they often affirm, that virtue is
nothing but conformity to reason, yet, in general, seem to consider
morals as deriving their existence from taste and sentiment. On the
other hand, our modern enquirers, though they also talk much of the
beauty of virtue, and deformity of vice, yet have commonly endeavoured
to account for these distinctions by metaphysical reasonings, and by
deductions from the most abstract principles of the understanding. Such
confusion reigned in these subjects, that an opposition of the greatest
consequence could prevail between one system and another, and even in
the parts of almost each individual system; and yet nobody, till very
lately, was ever sensible of it. The elegant Lord Shaftesbury, who first
gave occasion to remark this distinction, and who, in general, adhered
to the principles of the ancients, is not, himself, entirely free from
the same confusion.
It must be acknowledged, that both sides of the question are susceptible
of specious arguments. Moral distinctions, it may be said, are
discernible by pure reason: else, whence the many disputes that reign in
common life, as well as in philosophy, with regard to this subject: the
long chain of proofs often produced on both sides; the examples cited,
the authorities appealed to, the analogies employed, the fallacies
detected, the inferences drawn, and the several conclusions adjusted to
their proper principles. Truth is disputable; not taste: what exists
in the nature of things is the standard of our judgement; what each
man feels within himself is the standard of sentiment. Propositions in
geometry may be proved, systems in physics may be controverted; but the
harmony of verse, the tenderness of passion, the brilliancy of wit, must
give immediate pleasure. No man reasons concerning another's beauty; but
frequently concerning the justice or injustice of his actions.
SECTION I. OF THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF MORALS.
DISPUTES with men, pertinaciously obstinate in their principles, are,
of all others, the most irksome; except, perhaps, those with persons,
entirely disingenuous, who really do not believe the opinions they
defend, but engage in the controversy, from affectation, from a spirit
of opposition, or from a desire of showing wit and ingenuity, superior
to the rest of mankind. The same blind adherence to their own arguments
is to be expected in both; the same contempt of their antagonists; and
the same passionate vehemence, in inforcing sophistry and falsehood.
And as reasoning is not the source, whence either disputant derives his
tenets; it is in vain to expect, that any logic, which speaks not to the
affections, will ever engage him to embrace sounder principles.
Those who have denied the reality of moral distinctions, may be ranked
among the disingenuous disputants; nor is it conceivable, that any human
creature could ever seriously believe, that all characters and actions
were alike entitled to the affection and regard of everyone. The
difference, which nature has placed between one man and another, is
so wide, and this difference is still so much farther widened, by
education, example, and habit, that, where the opposite extremes come at
once under our apprehension, there is no scepticism so scrupulous,
and scarce any assurance so determined, as absolutely to deny all
distinction between them. Let a man's insensibility be ever so great,
he must often be touched with the images of Right and Wrong; and let
his prejudices be ever so obstinate, he must observe, that others are
susceptible of like impressions. The only way, therefore, of converting
an antagonist of this kind, is to leave him to himself. For, finding
that nobody keeps up the controversy with him, it is probable he will,
at last, of himself, from mere weariness, come over to the side of
common sense and reason.
There has been a controversy started of late, much better worth
examination, concerning the general foundation of Morals; whether
they be derived from Reason, or from Sentiment; whether we attain
the knowledge of them by a chain of argument and induction, or by an
immediate feeling and finer internal sense; whether, like all sound
judgement of truth and falsehood, they should be the same to every
rational intelligent being; or whether, like the perception of beauty
and deformity, they be founded entirely on the particular fabric and
constitution of the human species.
The ancient philosophers, though they often affirm, that virtue is
nothing but conformity to reason, yet, in general, seem to consider
morals as deriving their existence from taste and sentiment. On the
other hand, our modern enquirers, though they also talk much of the
beauty of virtue, and deformity of vice, yet have commonly endeavoured
to account for these distinctions by metaphysical reasonings, and by
deductions from the most abstract principles of the understanding. Such
confusion reigned in these subjects, that an opposition of the greatest
consequence could prevail between one system and another, and even in
the parts of almost each individual system; and yet nobody, till very
lately, was ever sensible of it. The elegant Lord Shaftesbury, who first
gave occasion to remark this distinction, and who, in general, adhered
to the principles of the ancients, is not, himself, entirely free from
the same confusion.
It must be acknowledged, that both sides of the question are susceptible
of specious arguments. Moral distinctions, it may be said, are
discernible by pure reason: else, whence the many disputes that reign in
common life, as well as in philosophy, with regard to this subject: the
long chain of proofs often produced on both sides; the examples cited,
the authorities appealed to, the analogies employed, the fallacies
detected, the inferences drawn, and the several conclusions adjusted to
their proper principles. Truth is disputable; not taste: what exists
in the nature of things is the standard of our judgement; what each
man feels within himself is the standard of sentiment. Propositions in
geometry may be proved, systems in physics may be controverted; but the
harmony of verse, the tenderness of passion, the brilliancy of wit, must
give immediate pleasure. No man reasons concerning another's beauty; but
frequently concerning the justice or injustice of his actions.
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AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS
AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS
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Product Details
| BN ID: | 2940012611468 |
|---|---|
| Publisher: | SAP |
| Publication date: | 05/16/2011 |
| Sold by: | Barnes & Noble |
| Format: | eBook |
| File size: | 133 KB |
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