The second edition of Antitrust Economics provides a thorough treatment of the economic theory that both motivates (and to varying degrees) guides the design and enforcement of the antitrust laws of the Untied States. Citing relevant legislation and landmark court cases, the text offers a comprehensive analysis of both horizontal and vertical antitrust issues and uses economic theory to evaluate antitrust policy throughout.
The clear, accessible prose in Antitrust Economics explains the theory/policy cycle and provides thorough analysis of market structure and business conduct as they relate to antitrust policy. The text moves fluidly from theory to real world court cases to public policy, making it ideal for upper-level economics majors or law school courses in antitrust law.
ROGER D. BLAIR is the Huber Hurst Professor of Economics at the University of Florida. His teaching and research centers mainly on issues in antitrust economics. He has published several books and many articles in economics journals and law reviews. In addition, he has provided consulting services to the Department of Justice, the Federal Trade Commission, and many private parties.
DAVID L. KASERMAN is Torchmark Professor of Economics at Auburn University. He has over 25 years of experience as a professional economist and has been employed both in government agencies and academic institutions. His research interests are primarily in the fields of applied microeconmics and industrial organization
Antitrust in a Market Economy
The Case for Competition
The Case Against Monopoly
Antitrust Response to Monopoly
Antitrust Building Blocks: Market Definition and Market Power
The Law of Monopolization
Collusion: Horizontal Price Fixing
Alternative Forms of Horizontal Collusion
Oligopoly and Tacit Collusion
The Theory of Vertical Integration
Vertical Merger Policy
Maximum Resale Price Fixing
Resale Price Maintenance
Territorial and Customer Restrictions