Applied Industrial Economics / Edition 1 by Louis Phlips | 9780521629546 | Paperback | Barnes & Noble
Applied Industrial Economics / Edition 1

Applied Industrial Economics / Edition 1

by Louis Phlips
     
 

ISBN-10: 0521629543

ISBN-13: 9780521629546

Pub. Date: 01/28/2007

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

This book is an important collection of papers published over the past ten years in American and European journals. Part 1 explains market structure as a function of sunk costs and market size. Part 2 illustrates the central role of pricing schemes (including parallel pricing, delivered pricing and competition clauses) in sustaining equilibrium outcomes in

Overview

This book is an important collection of papers published over the past ten years in American and European journals. Part 1 explains market structure as a function of sunk costs and market size. Part 2 illustrates the central role of pricing schemes (including parallel pricing, delivered pricing and competition clauses) in sustaining equilibrium outcomes in oligopolistic markets. Parts 3 and 4 give a game-theoretic foundation to competition policy and merger control. Louis Phlips offers a comprehensive introduction to the text in which he very carefully explains the reasoning behind his choice of papers, and provides a superb synthesis of the material.

Product Details

ISBN-13:
9780521629546
Publisher:
Cambridge University Press
Publication date:
01/28/2007
Edition description:
New Edition
Pages:
456
Product dimensions:
5.98(w) x 8.98(h) x 0.91(d)

Table of Contents

Preface; Introduction; Part I. Market Structure: 1. Game theory and industry studies: an introductory overview John Sutton; 2. Game-theoretic models of market concentration: sunk costs and market structure - a review article Richard Schmalensee; 3. Expanding markets: capacity expansion in the titanium dioxide industry Pankaj Ghemawat; 4. Declining markets: the devolution of declining industries Pankaj Ghemawat and Barry Nalebuff; 5. Empirical evidence: exit from declining industries - 'shakeout' or 'stakeout'? Marvin B. Lieberman; Part II. Industrial Pricing and Pricing Schemes: 6. Intertemporal pricing schemes: experimental tests of consciously parallel behaviour in oligopoly Ronald Harstad, Stephen Martin and Hans-Theo Normann; 7. Spatial pricing schemes: on the strategic choice of spatial price policy Jacques-François Thisse and Xavier Vives; 8. Best-price policies: facilitating practices - the effects of advance notice and best-price policies Charles A. Holt and David T. Scheffman; 9. Vertical pricing schemes: vertical restraints and producers' competition Patrick Rey and Joseph Stiglitz; 10. Price discrimination in a common market: international price discrimination in the European car market Frank Verboven; 11. Tacit collusion (I): interfirm rivalry in a repeated game - an empirical test of tacit collusion Margaret E. Slade; 12. Tacit collusion (II): collusive equilibrium in the great salt duopoly Ray Rees; Part III. Competition Policy: 13. Collusion and predation: on the detection of collusion and predation Louis Phlips; 14. Vertical restraints: vertical restraints in European competition policy J. A. Kay; 15. Franchising agreements: economic assessment of competition law provisions applicable to franchising OECD; 16. Joint R&D ventures: cooperative and noncooperative R&D in duopoly with spillovers C. d'Aspremont and A. Jacquemin; Part IV. Mergers and Merger Control: 17. Unprofitable exogenous mergers: losses from horizontal merger - the effects of an exogenous change in industry structure on Cournot-Nash equilibrium S. W. Salant, S. Switzer and R. J. Reynolds; 18. Profitable horizontal mergers and welfare: horizontal mergers - an equilibrium analysis Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapiro; 19. Using the Herfindahl-Hirschman index: horizontal mergers - comment Gregory J. Werden; 20. Cournot and merger control: horizontal mergers - reply Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapiro; 21.Vertical mergers: vertical mergers in multi-product industries and Edgeworth's paradox of taxation Michael A. Salinger; 22. Enforcement of the US merger guidelines: empirical evidence on FTC enforcement of the merger guidelines Malcolm B. Coate and Fred S. McChesney; 23. Enforcement of the European merger regulation: the merger decisions of the European Commission Damien Neven, Robin Nuttall and Paul Seabright; Index.

Customer Reviews

Average Review:

Write a Review

and post it to your social network

     

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

See all customer reviews >