Appointing Central Bankers: The Politics of Monetary Policy in the United States and the European Monetary Union

by Kelly H. Chang

Overview

Focusing on how the President and the Senate influence monetary policy by appointing Federal Reserve Board members, this book answers three questions about the appointment process and its effects. First, do politicians influence monetary policy via Federal Reserve appointments? Second, who influences the process—only the President or the President and the Senate? Third, how is the structure of the Federal Reserve appointment process explained? The study extends the analysis of the Federal Reserve Board to the European Central bank.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780521823333
Publisher:	Cambridge University Press
Publication date:	08/18/2003
Series:	Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions
Pages:	176
Product dimensions:	5.98(w) x 9.02(h) x 0.55(d)

Table of Contents

List of figures; List of tables; Acknowledgments; 1. Introduction; 2. A formal model of the appointment process; 3. Estimating monetary policy preferences; 4. Empirically testing the model's predictions; 5. Appointments to the European Central Bank; 6. The origins of the Federal Reserve appointment process; 7. Conclusions; Bibliography; Index.

Editorial Reviews

"Appointing Central Bankers makes an important contribution to our understanding of appointment power dynamics and impact on monetary policy in the United States and the European Central Bank. It is a "must read" for students of these institutions and should become an important methodological reference for students of other central banks and other types of regulatory agencies."
Irwin L. Morris, Perspectives on Politics

From the Publisher