Arguments that Count: Physics, Computing, and Missile Defense, 1949-2012

Arguments that Count: Physics, Computing, and Missile Defense, 1949-2012

by Rebecca Slayton
Arguments that Count: Physics, Computing, and Missile Defense, 1949-2012

Arguments that Count: Physics, Computing, and Missile Defense, 1949-2012

by Rebecca Slayton

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Overview

How differing assessments of risk by physicists and computer scientists have influenced public debate over nuclear defense.

In a rapidly changing world, we rely upon experts to assess the promise and risks of new technology. But how do these experts make sense of a highly uncertain future? In Arguments that Count, Rebecca Slayton offers an important new perspective. Drawing on new historical documents and interviews as well as perspectives in science and technology studies, she provides an original account of how scientists came to terms with the unprecedented threat of nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). She compares how two different professional communities—physicists and computer scientists—constructed arguments about the risks of missile defense, and how these arguments changed over time. Slayton shows that our understanding of technological risks is shaped by disciplinary repertoires—the codified knowledge and mathematical rules that experts use to frame new challenges. And, significantly, a new repertoire can bring long-neglected risks into clear view.

In the 1950s, scientists recognized that high-speed computers would be needed to cope with the unprecedented speed of ICBMs. But the nation's elite science advisors had no way to analyze the risks of computers so used physics to assess what they could: radar and missile performance. Only decades later, after establishing computing as a science, were advisors able to analyze authoritatively the risks associated with complex software—most notably, the risk of a catastrophic failure. As we continue to confront new threats, including that of cyber attack, Slayton offers valuable insight into how different kinds of expertise can limit or expand our capacity to address novel technological risks.


Product Details

ISBN-13: 9780262316545
Publisher: MIT Press
Publication date: 08/16/2013
Series: Inside Technology
Sold by: Penguin Random House Publisher Services
Format: eBook
Pages: 344
File size: 2 MB
Age Range: 18 Years

About the Author

Rebecca Slayton is a Lecturer in Public Policy and Junior Faculty Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University.

Table of Contents

Acknowledgments ix
Introduction 1
1 Software and the Race against Surprise Attack 17
2 Framing an “Appallingly Complex” System 41
3 Complexity and the “Art or Evolving Science” of Software 63
4 “No Technological Solution”? 85
5 What Crisis? Software in the “Safeguard” Debate 109
6 The Politics of Complex Technology 133
7 The Political Economy of Software Engineering 151
8 Nature and Technology in the Star Wars Debate 173
9 Conclusion: Complexity Unbound 199
Notes 227
Unpublished Sources and Notations 301
Index 305

What People are Saying About This

William Aspray

This well-researched, well-argued book provides insight into the history of American missile defense systems and the complex software that controls them. While this is an interesting and important topic in its own right, the book engages an even broader theme: how experts form judgments about complex technological solutions to societal problems, how they make their arguments politically persuasive, and what role these experts play in modern society. Historians and policy scholars of software, physics, and other complex technological systems will find much of interest in this volume.

Gabrielle Hecht

Based on extensive new research, Slayton's groundbreaking book dissects the long-running debates over missile defense. Her analysis of how scientists make arguments persuasive and authoritative is important for understanding not just the history of today's military systems, but also the very ability of these systems to function at all.

Endorsement

Based on extensive new research, Slayton's groundbreaking book dissects the long-running debates over missile defense. Her analysis of how scientists make arguments persuasive and authoritative is important for understanding not just the history of today's military systems, but also the very ability of these systems to function at all.

Gabrielle Hecht, Professor of History, University of Michigan; author of Being Nuclear: Africans and the Global Uranium Trade

From the Publisher

This well-researched, well-argued book provides insight into the history of American missile defense systems and the complex software that controls them. While this is an interesting and important topic in its own right, the book engages an even broader theme: how experts form judgments about complex technological solutions to societal problems, how they make their arguments politically persuasive, and what role these experts play in modern society. Historians and policy scholars of software, physics, and other complex technological systems will find much of interest in this volume.

William Aspray, Bill and Lewis Suit Professor of Information Technologies School of Information, University of Texas at Austin

Rebecca Slayton's comprehensive and well-researched history of the science—and politics—of missile defense sheds new and valuable light upon a consistently under-appreciated aspect of the challenge: computer software.

Gregg Herken, Emeritus Professor of History, University of California; author of Brotherhood of the Bomb: The Tangled Lives and Legacies of Robert Oppenheimer, Ernest Lawrence, and Edward Teller

Based on extensive new research, Slayton's groundbreaking book dissects the long-running debates over missile defense. Her analysis of how scientists make arguments persuasive and authoritative is important for understanding not just the history of today's military systems, but also the very ability of these systems to function at all.

Gabrielle Hecht, Professor of History, University of Michigan; author of Being Nuclear: Africans and the Global Uranium Trade

Gregg Herken

Rebecca Slayton's comprehensive and well-researched history of the science—and politics—of missile defense sheds new and valuable light upon a consistently under-appreciated aspect of the challenge: computer software.

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