Artillery in Korea: Massing Fires and Reinventing the Wheel

Artillery in Korea: Massing Fires and Reinventing the Wheel

by D.M. Giangreco
     
 

View All Available Formats & Editions

Trained to fight a linear war in Europe against conventional Soviet forces, field artillery units were unprepared for combat in Korea, which called for all-around defense of mutually supporting battery positions, and high-angle fire. Pacific theater artillery tactics were discarded as an aberration after War World II, but Red Legs soon found that they

Overview

Trained to fight a linear war in Europe against conventional Soviet forces, field artillery units were unprepared for combat in Korea, which called for all-around defense of mutually supporting battery positions, and high-angle fire. Pacific theater artillery tactics were discarded as an aberration after War World II, but Red Legs soon found that they “frequently [have] to fight as doughboys” and “must be able to handle the situation themselves if their gun positions are attacked.” A second problem with artillery in Korea was felt most keenly by the soldiers that the artillery was supposed to support—the infantry. Commanders at all levels had come to expect that in any future war, they would conduct operations with fire that equaled or even surpassed the lavish support they had recently enjoyed in northwest Europe. It was clear almost from the beginning, however, that this was not going to happen in Korea because there was a shortage not only of artillery units but also of the basic hardware of the cannoneers’ craft—guns and munitions. Until the front settled down into a war of attrition in the fall of 1951 (which facilitated the surveying of reference points and positioning of “an elaborate grid of batteries, fire direction centers, [and] fire support coordination centers”), massed fires were achieved by shooting at unprecedented speed. This tactic, in turn, exposed the fact that the huge surplus of World War II munitions was actually deficient in some calibers, and strict ammunition rationing became the norm until production caught up with demand in the last days of the fighting.

Product Details

ISBN-13:
2940148929833
Publisher:
ReadCycle
Publication date:
11/25/2013
Sold by:
Barnes & Noble
Format:
NOOK Book
Sales rank:
902,498
File size:
2 MB

Meet the Author

D. M. Giangreco, served as an editor at Military Review, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, for 20 years. Giangreco has lectured widely on national security matters. An award-winning author of 12 books on military and sociopolitical subjects, he has also written extensively for various national and international publications and news agencies. Giangreco was awarded the Society for Military History's 1998 Moncado Prize for his article "Casualty Projections for the US Invasions of Japan, 1945-1946: Planning and Policy Implications." Giangreco also won the Gerard Gilbert Award (1988 France and Colonies Philatelic Society) for his book Roosevelt, de Gaulle, and the Posts, and his article "The Truth About Kamikazes," was the principal nomination of US Naval Institute, Annapolis, for the Association of Naval Aviation's award for Best Article of 1997 on Naval Aviation. Giangreco's work has been translated into French, German, Spanish, Russian (pirated), Japanese, and Chinese. His most recent books are, Dear Harry on the correspondence of "Everyday Americans" with the Truman White House (2000), Artillery in Korea: Massing Fires and Reinventing the Wheel (2003), the Eyewitness series for Barnes & Noble Books -- Eyewitness D-Day (2004), Eyewitness Vietnam (2006), Eyewitness Pacific Theater (2008), and most recently, Hell to Pay (2009), and The Soldier from Independence (2009).

Customer Reviews

Average Review:

Write a Review

and post it to your social network

     

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

See all customer reviews >