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This compact book gives readers a half-century of NATO history in just over 250 pages! An integrated look at the evolution of the foreign policies of the major NATO states during and after the Cold War, it concentrates on the politics and diplomacy of the Alliance as well as studies the nature of a successful military coalition. The book's treatment of the diplomatic crisis over the US-led war in Iraq makes it the most up-to-date study of NATO, and its lucid explanation of deep-seated trans-Atlantic divergence on the nature of contemporary global affairs and the place of multilateralism within them allows readers to learn a great deal in a short period.
Topics include: the American mission in Europe, Atlantic Ostopolitik, the expeditionary NATO (Desert Storm, the Bosnia crisis, and humanitarian war), smart war and responsible statecraft, the decline of NATO, and the future for Atlanticism.
An excellent reference for those involved in state and foreign affairs, this book is also an excellent source of information for any reader interested in NATO and international relations.
Alliances are formed as often to avoid wars as to win them. Because the Atlantic Alliance can be said to have won its war unconditionally without actually fighting it, its claim to be the most successful alliance of modern history is unassailable. Its survival as a military coalition is not. In fact, the NATO of 2004 scarcely resembles that of 1989. In the spring of 1999 it went to war for the first time in its fifty-year history, not to defend Western Europe against the massed might of Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces but rather against Serbia, a single republic of the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. What's more, NATO did not fight in defense of sovereign territory in accordance with Article V of its founding document. It in fact abridged the principle of sovereignty, officially for the higher goal of arresting a campaign of ethnic cleansing against the Albanian population in the Serb province of Kosovo. The Alliance's commitment to peace-support and political trusteeship in the Balkans constitutes an expansion every bit as meaningful as the offer of membership NATO extended to the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland in 1997, in the first round of post-Cold War enlargement, and the offer to seven additional East European states made official at the 2002 Prague summit. The Alliance has "gone East" to an extent few would have imagined at the conclusion of the Cold War, and it has changed fundamentally in the process.
The great contradiction of NATO's presence in the former Yugoslavia is that it is primarily the result of American determination, yet no member of the Alliance is more concerned with extracting itself from the region than is the United States. Armed interventionin Kosovo in particular can be viewed as the redemption of a warning registered by the first Bush administration and reiterated by the Clinton administration, that repressive actions by Belgrade in the province would result in a military response from Washington. It was the United States that led the way to the Dayton Accords and to the Rambouillet ultimatum, yet almost weekly American foreign policy commentary maintained during the 1990s that a Europe whose unity is worth anything ought to be able to handle a neighborhood problem alone. In Kosovo, Operation Allied Force demonstrated that Europe's collective military resource pale in comparison with those of the United States and that Europeans are collectively far from equal to the challenges posed by a region that has been a vector for war since the nineteenth century.
The Alliance's future as a political community is related to, though not wholly determined by, its radically altered military mission-in particular where its commitment to the safety and international vitality of democratic government is concerned. This book makes no claim to be a history of NATO, nor is it a comprehensive study of the Alliance's post-Cold War transformation. What follows, rather, is an ex; tended essay on the American commitment to European peace and security through NATO, an organization that has always had an overtly political as well as a military mandate, and the change in the definition of that commitment since the end of the Cold War. It argues that NATO is the agent of Atlanticism, the notion that the democracies of the North Atlantic realm have a common political heritage and a joint responsibility to it-a responsibility that now reaches beyond Europe to the hills off Afghanistan. More specifically, the Alliance has successfully adopted and adapted principles developed by President Woodrow Wilson as a prescription for international peace at the end of World War I to the extent that key aspects of the Wilsonian legacy are dominant features of the Alliance's political and diplomatic culture.. Disagreements between the United States and its European allies over which principles have been vindicated by the experience of the twentieth century provide a good deal of the grist for present acrimony within NATO. Indeed, they are in many, instances disagreements about the very nature of contemporary international affairs.
But they are not the whole story. Of equal importance is the strategic and political drift that has occurred between the United States and Western Europe over the past fifteen years. This drift has been accelerated by, yet did not begin with, the national trauma experienced by the people and government of the United States on the morning of September 11, 2001. Its roots go deeper and are found both in the enormous differential in military power between the United States and its allies as well as in an American strategic culture that is increasingly global rather than Eurocentric in perspective. Especially since the diplomatic fracture of the Alliance occasioned by the UN debate on Iraq, some of the most prominent scholars of Atlanticism view this drift as little short of tragic.' This book is less pessimistic. It does not hold that NATO's internal conflicts were inevitable—nothing in politics is inevitable—but attempts to show that they were probable and need not be terminal to the political vitality of Atlanticism.
|Ch. 1||The American mission in Europe||1|
|The Atlantic charter||3|
|Bringing in Germany||5|
|The emergence of Helsinki Europe||10|
|The cold war endgame||14|
|Ch. 2||Atlantic ostpolitik north and south||23|
|The demilitarization of security||24|
|The Balkan catalyst||33|
|The ambit of Atlanticism||37|
|Ch. 3||Expeditionary NATO||45|
|Peace and democracy in Bosnia||48|
|The capabilities cap||50|
|Ch. 4||Smart war and responsible statecraft||64|
|The high tide of interventionism||65|
|Righteous might and casual war||67|
|The hollow shell of burden-sharing||73|
|A decade's dividend||77|
|Ch. 5||The decline of NATO||82|
|A distinctly American internationalism||84|
|World order and imperial power||88|
|The failure of Atlantic unity||90|
|Ch. 6||A future for Atlanticism||102|
|The international community||103|
|Three versions of Europe||106|
|Atlantic commonwealth and world order||109|