Auction Theory / Edition 2

by Vijay Krishna

Overview

Auction Theory, Second Edition improves upon his 2002 bestseller with a new chapter on package and position auctions as well as end-of-chapter questions and chapter notes. Complete proofs and new material about collusion complement Krishna's ability to reveal the basic facts of each theory in a style that is clear, concise, and easy to follow. With the addition of a solutions manual and other teaching aids, the 2e continues to serve as the doorway to relevant theory for most students doing empirical work on auctions.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780123745071
Publisher:	Elsevier Science
Publication date:	08/12/2009
Edition description:	2nd Revised ed.
Pages:	336
Product dimensions:	6.10(w) x 9.10(h) x 1.00(d)

Table of Contents

I Single Object Auctions
Private Value Auctions
The Revenue Equivalence Principle
Qualifications and Extensions
Mechanism Design
Auctions with Interdependent Values
The Revenue Ranking ("Linkage") Principle
Asymmetries and Other Complications
Efficiency and the English Auction
Mechanism Design with Interdependent Values
Bidding Rings

II Multiple Object Auctions
An Introduction to Multiple Object Auctions
Equilibrium and Efficiency with Private Values
Some Revenue Considerations
Sequential Sales
Nonidentical Objects
Packages and Positions
Multiple Objects and Interdependent Values

III Appendices
Continuous Distributions
Stochastic Orders
Order Statistics
Affiliated Random Variables
Some Linear Algebra

What People are Saying About This

From the Publisher

Develops the main concepts of auction theory from scratch in a self-contained and theoretically rigorous manner

Editorial Reviews

"Krishna’s superb Auction Theory is an ideal text and reference because his clear and precise exposition distills the vast literature and provides excellent motivation, examples, exercises, and connections to commercial applications." —Robert B. Wilson, Stanford University

"On its publication in 2002, Vijay Krishna's book immediately became a central reference in auction theory. But the subject has continued to develop, and so we're very fortunate that Krishna has now updated the text." —Eric Maskin, Institute for Advanced Study, Nobel Laureate in Economics

From the Publisher

In this complete evaluation of auction theory, Krishna (economics, Pennsylvania State U., University Park) covers the situations where a single object is sold; theory of auctions with private values; the revenue equivalence principle; the adjustments to the principle required by asymmetries, risk aversion, and budge constraints; mechanism design with private values; a model with interdependent values and affiliated signals; the revenue ranking principle; efficiency properties of English auction; mechanism design with interdependent values; and collusive behavior and bidding cartels. The second half of the book is devoted to the description and modeling of multiple object auctions. Annotation c. Book News, Inc., Portland, OR (booknews.com)

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