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More About This Textbook
Overview
"This book not only sets out much of the theoretical literature on auctions—including results that are very recent—but does so with a clarity, elegance, and rigor that is characteristic of Vijay Krishna's work." —Eric Maskin, A.O. Hirschman Professor of Social Science, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, New Jersey, U.S.A.
"The book gives a superb presentation of auction theory, with clear and concise proofs of all results. It is essential reading for any serious student of auctions." —Peter Cramton, Professor of Economics, University of Maryland
"This is the book we have been waiting for: a high level treatment of auction theory that carefully presents the technical details necessary for an in depth understanding of the main themes of auction theory, ideal as a basis for a graduate course, and by an author who has himself made important contributions to the subject." —Paul Klemperer, Edgeworth Professor of Economics, Nuffield College, University of Oxford, U.K.
Through accessible, detailed examinations of themes central to auction theory, Vijay Krishna explores auctions and competitive bidding as games of incomplete information. His results on bidding strategies, efficiency, and revenue maximization, and his clear proofs for each proposition, make this book both the standard reference on auctions and the first source of authoritative information about multi-unit auctions. Well organized and featuring straightforward intuition, Auction Theory's depth and breadth lay bare the complexity and utility of this growing field.
Audience: Professional economists or business analysts working in contract theory, experimental economics, industrial organization, and microeconomic theory. Graduate students taking courses on auction theory, the economics of information, or the economics of incentives.
Editorial Reviews
Booknews
In this complete evaluation of auction theory, Krishna (economics, Pennsylvania State U., University Park) covers the situations where a single object is sold; theory of auctions with private values; the revenue equivalence principle; the adjustments to the principle required by asymmetries, risk aversion, and budge constraints; mechanism design with private values; a model with interdependent values and affiliated signals; the revenue ranking principle; efficiency properties of English auction; mechanism design with interdependent values; and collusive behavior and bidding cartels. The second half of the book is devoted to the description and modeling of multiple object auctions. Annotation c. Book News, Inc., Portland, OR (booknews.com)From the Publisher
"Krishna’s superb Auction Theory is an ideal text and reference because his clear and precise exposition distills the vast literature and provides excellent motivation, examples, exercises, and connections to commercial applications."Robert B. Wilson, Stanford University
"On its publication in 2002, Vijay Krishna's book immediately became a central reference in auction theory. But the subject has continued to develop, and so we're very fortunate that Krishna has now updated the text."
Eric Maskin, Institute for Advanced Study, Nobel Laureate in Economics
Product Details
Related Subjects
Table of Contents
Private Value Auctions: A First Look
The Revenue Equivalence Principle
Qualifications and Extensions
Mechanism Design
Auctions with Interdependent Values
The Revenue Ranking ("Linkage") Principle
Asymmetries and Other Complications
Efficiency and the English Auction
Mechanism Design with Interdependent Values
Bidding Rings
Section II: Multiple Object Auctions
An Introduction to Multiple Object Auctions
Equilibrium and Efficiency with Private Values
Some Revenue Considerations
Sequential Sales
Nonidentical Objects
Multiple Objects and Interdependent Values
Section III: Appendices
A: Continuous Distributions
B: Stochastic Orders
C: Order Statistics
D: Affiliated Random Variables
E: Some Linear Algebra
F: Games of Incomplete Information
G: Existence of Equilibrium in First-Price Auctions
References
Index