Auction Theory / Edition 1

Auction Theory / Edition 1

by Vijay Krishna
     
 

ISBN-10: 012426297X

ISBN-13: 9780124262973

Pub. Date: 03/13/2002

Publisher: Elsevier Science

Through accessible, detailed examinations of themes central to auction theory, Vijay Krishna explores auctions and competitive bidding as games of incomplete information. His results on bidding strategies, efficiency, and revenue maximization, and his clear proofs for each proposition, make this book both the standard reference on auctions and the first source of

Overview

Through accessible, detailed examinations of themes central to auction theory, Vijay Krishna explores auctions and competitive bidding as games of incomplete information. His results on bidding strategies, efficiency, and revenue maximization, and his clear proofs for each proposition, make this book both the standard reference on auctions and the first source of authoritative information about multi-unit auctions. Well organized and featuring straightforward intuition, Auction Theory's depth and breadth lay bare the complexity and utility of this growing field.

• The standard reference on auctions and the first source of authoritative information about multi-unit auctions
• Explores auctions and competitive bidding as games of incomplete information
• Uses accessible, detailed examinations of themes central to auction theory

Product Details

ISBN-13:
9780124262973
Publisher:
Elsevier Science
Publication date:
03/13/2002
Edition description:
New Edition
Pages:
200
Product dimensions:
6.04(w) x 9.34(h) x 0.80(d)

Table of Contents

Private Value Auctions; The Revenue Equivalence Principle; Qualifications and Extensions; Mechanism Design; Auctions with Interdependent Values; The Revenue Ranking ("Linkage") Principle; Asymmetries and Other Complications; Efficiency and the English Auction; Mechanism Design with Interdependent Values; Bidding Rings; An Introduction to Multiple Object Auctions; Equilibrium and Efficiency with Private Values; Some Revenue Considerations; Sequential Sales; Nonidentical Objects; Multiple Objects and Interdependent Values; Appendices: Continuous Distributions' Stochastic Orders; Order Statistics; Affiliated Random Variables; Some Linear Algebra; Games of Incomplete Information; Existence of Equilibrium in First-Price Auctions.

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