Bargaining and Markets / Edition 1by Martin J. Osborne, Ariel Rubinstein
Pub. Date: 04/01/1990
Publisher: Emerald Group Publishing
The formal theory of bargaining originated with John Nash's work in the early 1950s. This book discusses two recent developments in this theory. The first uses the tool of extensive games to construct theories of bargaining in which time is modeled explicitly. The second applies the theory of bargaining to the study of decentralized markets. Rather than surveying the field, the authors present a select number of models, each of which illustrates a key point. In addition, they give detailed proofs throughout the book.
* Uses a small number of models, rather than a survey of the field, to illustrate key points
* Detailed proofs are given as explanations for the models
* Text has been class-tested in a semester-long graduate course
- Emerald Group Publishing
- Publication date:
- Economic Theory, Econometrics, and Mathematical Economics
- Edition description:
- New Edition
- Product dimensions:
- 6.00(w) x 9.00(h) x 0.69(d)
Table of Contents
The Axiomatic Approach.
The Strategic Approach.
A Model of Alternating Offers.
The Relation between the Axiomatic and Strategic Approaches.
A Strategic Model of Bargaining between Incompletely Informed Players.
Models of Decentralized Trade:
First Approach Using the Nash Solution. Strategic Bargaining in a Steady State Market.
Strategic Bargaining in a Market with One-Time Entry.
The Role of the Trading Procedure.
The Role of Anonymity.
Most Helpful Customer Reviews
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As always, Osborne and Rubinstein aim to please. The exposition of the book is wonderfully clear, and the analysis is very precise. By concentrating on particular models, without going into the entire literature, this book is very instructive.