The Battle of Kohima was the turning point in the Japanese invasion of India and known as 'the Stalingrad of the East'. It was a bitter battle fought in three stages, spanning three months and ending with the siege of Imphal. Against the odds, the Commonwealth troops conducted a brilliant defence and counter-attack to pave the way for the re-conquest of Burma. If you want to understand what happened and why - read Battle Story.
The Battle of Kohima was the turning point in the Japanese invasion of India and known as 'the Stalingrad of the East'. It was a bitter battle fought in three stages, spanning three months and ending with the siege of Imphal. Against the odds, the Commonwealth troops conducted a brilliant defence and counter-attack to pave the way for the re-conquest of Burma. If you want to understand what happened and why - read Battle Story.
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Overview
The Battle of Kohima was the turning point in the Japanese invasion of India and known as 'the Stalingrad of the East'. It was a bitter battle fought in three stages, spanning three months and ending with the siege of Imphal. Against the odds, the Commonwealth troops conducted a brilliant defence and counter-attack to pave the way for the re-conquest of Burma. If you want to understand what happened and why - read Battle Story.
Product Details
| ISBN-13: | 9780752493947 |
|---|---|
| Publisher: | The History Press |
| Publication date: | 06/03/2013 |
| Series: | Battle Story |
| Sold by: | Barnes & Noble |
| Format: | eBook |
| Pages: | 128 |
| File size: | 3 MB |
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Read an Excerpt
Kohima 1944: Battle Story
By Chris Brown
The History Press
Copyright © 2013 The History PressAll rights reserved.
ISBN: 978-0-7524-9394-7
CHAPTER 1
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Archaeological evidence indicates that there was widespread human settlement in Burma by about 11,000 BC, but the first recorded population consisted of the Pyu people who migrated into Burma from China about 2,200 years ago and who had developed a sophisticated community of city-states before AD 400, and by the Mon people who settled along the southern coast. In the ninth century the Myanmarese, or Burmese, moved in from the Kingdom of Nanzhao and, by the middle of the eleventh century, had established the Pagan Empire which unified most of what we call Burma or Myanmar today. The Pagan Empire disintegrated in 1287 and several rather smaller kingdoms – including Arakan, Ava and Hanthawady – emerged as the more significant centres of authority. By 1600 the Toungoo Dynasty had brought all of these kingdoms, and the various minor Shan states, under their control and established Burma as one of the most significant nations in South Asia.
In the later eighteenth century the Toungoos were replaced by the Kongbaung Dynasty, which remained the dominant political force in Burma for more than 100 years. A series of wars with Siam (Thailand) and China achieved only marginal gains for either side and, in the early ninth century, King Bodapaya started to look west to expand his kingdom, conquering Assam and Manipur. This brought Burma into greater contact with the British, who waged three major wars between 1824 and 1885, when they finally completed the conquest of Burma. In part, the establishment of British colonial rule was an exercise in protecting northern India from Burmese expansion, but it was also a reaction to the French acquisition of Indo-China (modern-day Vietnam) and a desire to ensure that Britain would be the most significant European power in South and East Asia and serving notice to Siam that the British would not tolerate Siamese territorial ambitions in northern Malaya. Additionally, there was a view that the expansion of British rule and the development of institutions on the British model was, of itself, a desirable objective and, of course, there were bound to be commercial opportunities – not least the prospect of mineral and agricultural development, and the expansion of markets for British goods and services.
Burma changed radically under British rule. A lengthy campaign in the north eventually eliminated local potentates who might become a threat in the future, and Burma was ruled by a colonial administration as, essentially, a province of British India. The advent of the British wrought huge changes in Burmese society and there was considerable economic and social development in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The opening of the Suez Canal and technological improvements in shipping made it economical to export Burmese rice and teak to Europe, but very few Burmese people benefitted from this. The formation of a British colonial administration attracted large numbers of Indian merchants, who cleared mixed farming communities in order to increase rice production and who engaged in money-lending and land speculation which naturally bred considerable resentment among the local population.
The new government also afforded opportunities in the administration itself and, in the years after the end of the Third Burma War in 1885, the civil service and the courts came to be dominated by the British, Anglo-Indian and Anglo-Burmese, effectively excluding Burmese people from power as well as the economy. The Indian population was further enlarged by the development of a railway system. Most of the labour and the vast majority of the administrative staff who would run the system came from India and established their own communities with very little social interaction or integration with the Burmese people.
By the 1920s a nationalist movement had developed largely, though not exclusively, among the Buddhist Burmese. The movement enjoyed some success and by the 1920s Burma had achieved its own legislating body and a degree of autonomy within the structure of British India, and there were moves afoot to ensure greater Burmese participation in all the arms of government. However, any hopes that these concessions would be enough to bring about a general acceptance of British rule were, at best, optimistic. Unlike India or Malaya, Burma had a long-established tradition of being a single – if not always very united – political entity. Although the developments of the 1920s were reasonably popular, they fell far short of Burmese nationalist aspirations; they did little or nothing to the benefit of the mass of the population and, if anything, helped to further the influence of the Anglo-Indian and Anglo-Burmese communities.
Charles Pawsey MC
Sir Charles Ridley Pawsey served as a lieutenant, and later captain, in the Worcestershire Regiment during the First World War, during which time he won a Military Cross for gallantry. At the outbreak of the Second World War he was the District Commissioner for the Naga Hills area and was known as a staunch advocate of the liberties and well-being of the Naga people. He stayed in Kohima throughout the siege and could be seen visiting posts and generally doing whatever he could to bolster morale and support the efforts of the garrison commander, Col Richards.
The nationalist movement, though itself divided along political, cultural and regional lines, continued to grow in strength and a spate of riots in 1934–35 led the British to consider a greater degree of Burmese autonomy, thereby giving Burma a more distinct identity within the imperial structure. A series of initiatives brought about a new political structure for Burma. Under the 1937 Government of India Act, Burma's legislature would wield much more authority, but any process of passing power and influence away from the Anglo-Indian and Anglo-Burmese community was going to be very gradual, so once again, although the measures were not unpopular, they were not enough to undermine the nationalist movement.
The very fact that a degree of self-government had been achieved encouraged people to believe that full independence was a practical proposition; if Burma could govern most of her affairs under the British, why should she not govern all of them as a free nation? These developments did not pass unnoticed in other quarters. Siam had every reason to have doubts about British colonial ambitions in South Asia and Burmese nationalists enjoyed a good deal of financial and other support from that quarter. Such support was not altruistic; Siam had fought several wars with the objective of incorporating eastern provinces of Burma and this might be more easily achieved in the future if Burma was to leave the British sphere of influence.
Further afield, the Japanese Government also took a fairly active interest in Burmese affairs. Fearing economic and diplomatic isolation, and eager to become the prime power in South and East Asia, Japan had good reason to support any movement which might impede British expansion.
At the same time, the fact that Britain had fought three lengthy and expensive wars to secure Burma, and in doing so had bought a considerable degree of protection for her colonial administrations throughout South Asia, meant that she was not going to abandon those gains easily. Burma had been acquired at a great cost, but, perhaps more importantly, abandoning a colonial possession under any circumstances would be bad for the government of the day at home and equally bad for the worldwide perception of Britain as an imperial power; something that had become, if anything, more significant in the wake of the First World War. A withdrawal from Burma would inevitably encourage national sentiment in British India, where there was growing interest in the prospect of a single Indian Union, which would encompass not only the British-held provinces but also the many princely states which, though nominally independent, were dependent on British protection in war.
Beyond the issues of economic activity or international prestige, Burma was also significant in terms of British imperial defence planning as a part of the wider Far East policy. Through the 1930s Britain built a string of airfields to link India and Malaya via Burma, so that if necessary the RAF presence in Malaya and Singapore could be reinforced relatively rapidly by air rather than crating up aircraft and sending them by sea or allotting one or more aircraft carriers.
Brewster Buffalo
At the beginning of the war against Japan, the RAF only had a handful of fighter aircraft based in Burma, and all of those were Brewster Buffaloes. Originally designed as carrier-borne aircraft for the US Navy, the Buffalo was not a success and large numbers were sold to Britain, primarily for training pilots, though a considerable number – well over 100 – found their way to the Far East where they were used in combat. Despite claims that the Buffalo was perfectly adequate as an air-defence fighter against the Oscars and Zeros of the Japanese Army and Navy air forces, the Buffalo was, in comparison, slow, cumbersome, lightly armed and had very little protection for the pilot.
In general, both the political and military hierarchies were rather inclined to reject the possibility of Japanese invasion of Malaya, or at least to assume that, if an invasion was ever mounted, it would come directly by sea to Singapore and be defeated at sea or by planned or existing island defences.
This attitude dominated defence thinking in the Far East for a generation and continued to do so right up to December 1941, despite warnings from various intelligence agencies and analysts, and the advice of Gen. Broad, who served as commander in chief of the Eastern Army in India in 1940. As early as 1936, the man who would eventually have responsibility for stopping the Japanese in Malaya, Lieutenant General (Lt Gen.) Arthur Percival, had made a report to his then superior, Gen. Dobbie, that there was every reason to believe that a Japanese invasion would, in fact, start in northern Malaya and press south to Singapore; a view confirmed by the events of 1941–42. Although there were many factors that contributed to the Japanese victory at Singapore, two of the chief issues were a lack of modern fighter aircraft and a total dearth of tanks. Given the British commitments in 1941 – home defence, fighter cover for bombing missions and, of course, support of the campaigns in the Middle East – it is hardly surprising that the authorities in London did not feel that they could spare Hurricanes and Spitfires for Malaya. Nevertheless, the failure to provide adequate armoured fighting vehicles was a mistake of massive proportions, since it gave such a huge advantage to the Japanese despite the fact that their own tanks were relatively few in number and rather dated in design. When the invasion started, a large proportion of the Commonwealth troops in Malaya had never seen a tank, let alone undergone training in how to deal with an armoured attack.
A similar attitude held sway in relation to Burma. Japan was not really taken seriously as a threat and rather glib assumptions were made about the impossibility of taking large forces – including armour – through the jungles, forests and mountains that separate Burma from Thailand. Indeed, little consideration was given to the very real possibility that Thailand would allow free transit to Japanese forces to mount such an invasion, despite the fact that it was clearly apparent that Japan had a closer diplomatic relationship with Thailand than any of the European powers.
Chi-Ha Tank
Although there was very little combat between armoured vehicles at any period of the Burma campaign, armour was significant despite the relatively modest numbers deployed by either side. The Chi-Ha was the better of the two models most widely used by the sole Japanese armoured unit – 14th Tank Regiment. Earlier Chi-Has carried a 37mm gun, which was later replaced with a high-velocity 47mm weapon for better armour penetration. Weighing in at a little over 15 tons, the Chi-Ha had a cruising speed of about 20mph and a range of over 150 miles (240km). In the first year of the campaign, the Chi-Ha performed well against the Stuarts and Valentines of the Commonwealth forces, but was inferior to the Grants in every way. An improved model – the Shinhoto – became available in the latter stages of the war, but was not a match for either the Grant or the Sherman.
Japan's interest in Burma was not altogether dissimilar from that of Britain. Burma's mineral and agricultural resources were very attractive to a country with a growing population and heavy industrial demands that could not possibly be met by her own resources. There was also the matter of Japan's role as a major Asian power. Although she had been among the victorious Allies in 1918, the Japanese political establishment felt – with some justice – that she had not been well rewarded compared to the other powers. The annexation of Manchuria and its conversion to a puppet state – Manchukuo – not only led to Japan leaving the League of Nations, but damaged her economic relationships across the industrialised world in general, and most importantly with the United States.
Throughout the 1930s Japan had become increasingly concerned about British expansion in South Asia. The massive British naval base at Singapore was certainly part of a plan to ensure safe communication between Britain's Asian colonies, Australia, New Zealand and India, but it was also a declaration of intent, a statement that the British Navy would be a potent power throughout the Pacific and the South China Sea. The Washington Conference agreements after the First World War had imposed limits on all of the great naval powers of the world, but political and public opinion in Japan saw the constraints as unfair and even derogatory, essentially placing Japan in the second tier of naval powers. Her exit from the Washington agreements in 1936 allowed Japan to renew her fleet and to build more of the vessels that would dominate naval warfare in the future – the aircraft carrier. Japan also needed a general industrial expansion to provide export goods and jobs at home, and this could not be achieved without access to raw materials on a grand scale; but the minerals and produce required could not be obtained due to embargoes which had been put in place by the United States and the European powers as a result of Japan's annexation of Manchuria and her war in China.
In the eyes of much of the political and military establishment of Japan, the only means of acquiring the materials that Japan needed for prosperity and security was a physical expansion of its empire. There were two schools of thought as to how that might be best achieved. Most of the generals favoured a northern policy, expanding Japan's borders into China and Manchuria to obtain minerals that were both vital for domestic production and tradable on the world markets. By 1940 that policy had, effectively, been pursued, but, although it had brought some benefits, the cost was very high. The war in China had not turned out to be a quick campaign that would force China to accept an unequal peace, but instead had become a major long-term drain on military resources, and there was no end in sight. The alternative policy, which included the annexation of territories in South Asia, had seemed impractical in the early 1930s since all of the potential targets – with the exception of Thailand – were colonies of France, Britain or the Netherlands or, in the case of the Philippines, under the quasi-colonial administration and protection of the United States.
Defeating the Netherlands and seizing the Dutch East Indies would very probably have been a manageable task for the Japanese armed forces, except for the fact that Britain and France would almost certainly go to war to protect the general principle of European colonialism; furthermore, even if America stood back from the ensuing conflict, she was very likely to provide non-military support to prevent Japanese expansion. The start of the war in Europe in 1939 did not change the picture immediately, but the German offensive of May 1940 revealed the weakness of the European powers. Within a matter of weeks the Netherlands and France had been conquered and Britain was isolated in a struggle against Germany and Italy. The new Vichy Government in France was in no position to protect its colonial administration in Indo-China; the Netherlands East Indies would have to run its own affairs without support from the home country; and Britain was too absorbed in her own defence and affairs in north and east Africa to pay much attention to bolstering her position in the Far East, and remained confident that the United States Fleet at Pearl Harbor would provide enough of a disincentive to any ambitious moves on the part of Japan.
Over the course of the next year and more, the situation continued to tip in Japan's favour. The British Armed Forces and the Indian Army became thinly stretched in the campaigns in Africa and in the Atlantic. An isolated triumph at the Battle of the River Plate did little to disguise the fact that Britain's fleets were already over-committed and that India's remarkably small peace-time army was being stripped bare to provide replacements for the desert and to form new units as part of a huge expansion programme. By the latter end of 1941, the only bulwark for British imperial defence in South Asia was the American Pacific Fleet and the forces already assigned to Malaya Command. Japanese intelligence was well aware of the state of Lt Gen. Percival's army in Malaya; most of the units were under strength or only partially trained, or both; there was not a single operational tank in the whole peninsula; the British, Australian and New Zealand air force squadrons were few in number and were mostly equipped with fighters that were a decade behind the times; and the so-called 'fortress' of Singapore was anything but impregnable, regardless of British propaganda claims. If the Pacific Fleet could be taken out of the equation then Malaya and the Dutch East Indies would be vulnerable to a sudden offensive, and Burma could easily follow.
(Continues...)
Excerpted from Kohima 1944: Battle Story by Chris Brown. Copyright © 2013 The History Press. Excerpted by permission of The History Press.
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Table of Contents
Contents
Title,Acknowledgements,
List of Illustrations,
Introduction,
Timeline,
Historical Background,
The Armies,
The Days Before Battle,
The Battlefield,
After the Battle,
The Legacy,
Orders of Battle,
Further Reading,
Copyright,