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Gallipoli 1915
By Peter Doyle The History Press
Copyright © 2011 The History Press
All rights reserved.
ISBN: 978-0-7524-6850-1
CHAPTER 1
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The Balkans had seen an almost constant state of unrest since the end of the Crimean War. The volatility of the region was in part due to the parlous state of two of the oldest empires, the Austro-Hungarian Empire of the Hapsburgs and the Ottoman Empire, the 'Sick Old Man of Europe'. Riven by ethnic differences and the birth of new national awareness, the Balkan states turned inwards on each other in 1912–13, creating a powder keg that would ultimately lead to the outbreak of the First World War almost exactly a year later, and a headlong rush into conflict. Within weeks of the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo on 28 June 1914, the major European powers were at each other's throats, with, according to British Foreign Minister Sir Edward Grey, 'the lights going out all over Europe'.
For the Ottoman Empire, the prospect of another war after those fought in 1912–13 was an unpalatable one. Though the Young Turks who had overthrown the Sultan in 1909 had set about modernising the country and the military, it had been inadequate. The Ottomans had been roundly beaten in the Balkan Wars, its European possessions stripped bare to a small component of Thrace and that sliver of land that was to form the northern shore of the Dardanelles, the ancient Hellespont that had fascinated classicists for decades.
The Dardanelles, a narrow passageway between European and Asian Turkey, is a tightly constrained waterway that was created by geological faulting over millennia. This strategic waterway connects the Aegean Sea and Mediterranean with the Sea of Marmara and ultimately, through the Bosphorus, to the Black Sea, and had been a point of interest to military minds for centuries. Constantinople, (now the modern city of Istanbul), sits astride the Bosphorus and guards the entrance to the Black Sea, thereby controlling entry to the winter ports of Russia. Because of this and a myriad of other reasons, Constantinople had been coveted for centuries, particularly by the old enemies of Greece and Russia.
In European Turkey, the shores of the Dardanelles are guarded by the Gallipoli Peninsula, a narrow finger of land named after its principal settlement (Gelibolu, or Gallipoli). Opposing this is the Asiatic shore, the Aegean expression of the great Anatolian Peninsula, the greater part of modern Turkey, and the heart of the ailing Ottoman Empire in 1915. Fortified for centuries, the idea of squeezing a fleet of ships between the beetling brows of the shores of the Dardanelles had exercised the mind of the military of many nations for centuries, particularly so in the complex diplomacies of two centuries before the Gallipoli landings of 1915.
When war with Germany was declared on 4 August 1914, the Ottoman Empire ostensibly remained neutral; yet already the Ottomans had signed a treaty with Germany that would bind them into the Central Powers. For the Kaiser, the possibility of a Greater Germany, and an influence that would spread through the Balkans and into the Middle East, was an unbridled dream that would manifest itself in the construction of an unbroken railway link from Berlin to Baghdad, through Thracian Turkey and into Anatolia, passing over the Bosphorus at Constantinople. This would pass through aligned nations, with Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire pivotal in this; it was inconvenient, though, that belligerent Serbia sat squarely in the way.
Germany was also keen to ensure that its eastern enemy, Russia, was depleted in both supplies and support. As most Russian war materiel would have to travel, on the southern, winter, route through the Straits and into the Black Sea, the temptation to make certain that the Dardanelles was closed to traffic was pressing. German influence was already strong, with military missions to the Ottomans from the late nineteenth century; it was to grow when, on 3 August 1914, the British clumsily requisitioned two warships being built in British shipyards, at great cost to the Ottoman populace. Tensions came to a head on 10 August, when the German warships Goeben and Breslau were granted passage through the technically neutral Dardanelles to Constantinople, to become symbolic substitutes for the ships 'stolen' by the British. A final blow to British influence was the appointment of the German Admiral Souchon to the command of the Ottoman Navy – the Goeben and Breslau now technically Ottoman ships, the Yazus Sultan Salim and the Midilli.
With the Ottomans committed to war, some means was sought to make sure that they would be quickly despatched; for the British and French this would remove the possibility of Ottoman belligerency against their possessions and protectorates in the Middle East. Both had low opinions of the Ottoman military – defeat in the last Balkan War in 1913 was surely indicative of what might be expected in the coming conflict. But how would this be achieved? There were other players in the arena.
For centuries there had been Greek and Russian aspirations to possess the Imperial city of Constantinople, sitting astride the Bosphorus and in ultimate control of the Black Sea route. With the Ottomans in an uncertain period, the gears of diplomacy started to grind – the essential goal was the carving up of what remained of the Ottoman Empire, spreading from European Thrace into the Arabian Peninsula. First to act were the Greeks. On 19 August, the British Foreign Minister Sir Edward Grey received notice Premier Venizelos had placed all Greek naval and military resources at the disposal of the Allies. Seizing on this, the Russians approached the pro-German Greek King Constantine; would he consider providing an expeditionary force to assist an attack on the Dardanelles? Both sets of eyes were focused on Constantinople.
A combination of circumstances led to the evolution of the Dardanelles expedition – which would gradually spiral out of control – and which would consume all its originators and have lasting effects on their lives. The entry of the Ottoman Empire into the conflict left the Allies with little choice but to demonstrate their intention that this would not be taken lightly. The Russians in particular sought to show, by arms, that the Ottoman decision to side with the Central Powers was unwise.
Dawning in the minds of the British, was the old concept, exercised since the late nineteenth century, of the 'Forcing of the Dardanelles' in order to threaten Constantinople – especially if the north shore of the Straits, the Gallipoli Peninsula, could be taken in force by the Greeks, and if the Russians could be on hand to meet the Allies at Constantinople. This would surely lead to the surrender of the Ottomans, thereby removing the threat to Egypt and the Suez Canal. In November 1914, at the first meeting of the War Council set up to advise the Cabinet on directions in the war, Sir Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty, reignited the Dardanelles question by suggesting the best way to protect Egypt and the Suez Canal was to 'capture' the Gallipoli Peninsula; he was to persuade the council that this would be possible by purely naval action on 13 January 1915. The scene was set for the Gallipoli landings.
On 3 January 1915, the Admiralty signalled to Admiral Carden, commanding the Eastern Mediterranean Squadron, for his views on the forcing of the Dardanelles. As First Sea Lord, Churchill had hopes that the age-old naval concept of pitting ships' guns against stone fortresses in 'Forcing' a passage through the Dardanelles Straits could be achieved. However, knowing that the Dardanelles were well-defended, Carden was cagey with his political masters, replying: 'I do not consider Dardanelles can be rushed. They might be forced by extended operations with large numbers of ships.' This cautious, politically worded statement was taken as positive by the Admiralty, who asked Carden to expand his ideas. His detailed four-stage plan that followed involved the reduction of the forts at Sedd el Bahir and Kum Kale at the mouth to the Dardanelles, destroying the inside defences up to Kephez at the entrance to the Narrows, then reducing the forts at the Narrows and, finally, clearing the minefield, reducing the defences above the Narrows, and advancing into the Sea of Marmara. The plan was careful and cautious, but it caught the imagination of Winston Churchill, who, almost by seeing the plan written down, could imagine it being executed in theatre. It would be Carden's plan that would ignite the flames; Carden himself would bear the responsibilities heavily.
Yet the feeling at the Admiralty was that a combined operation was to be preferred to a purely naval attempt, and that troops would be needed to follow up a naval success and clinch the matter; the Gallipoli Peninsula and Constantinople would have to be occupied. With the Greeks and Russians involved, there could surely be no doubt about success; but there was no guarantee that their initial diplomatic advances would come to any concrete proposals. The Secretary of State for War, Field Marshal Lord Kitchener's view was that no British troops were available other than those already committed. Kitchener, a high autocrat, was careful in his husbanding of military resources, and resistant to all schemes to widen the war to other fronts, thereby diverting valuable manpower from the only front that engaged the Germans fully – in France and Flanders. In his mind, the Western Front would have to come first, and the war would be long and costly. However, the Admiralty considered that it would not do much harm to carry out a purely naval attempt in the Dardanelles, a demonstration laid on primarily for benefit of the Russians. So, Winston Churchill would declare at the War Council, that: 'The Admiralty should prepare for a naval expedition in February to bombard and take the Gallipoli Peninsula with Constantinople as its objective.' There was a hint of military objectives too; in addition to ships, a naval 'Special Service Force' of two battalions of Royal Marine Light Infantry was prepared for Dardanelles service and sent out to the Island of Lemnos on 6 February 1915 'to be used as demolition parties against forts and batteries'. The scene was set for greater military engagement – and ultimately the landings at Gallipoli. Mudros would be the scene of gathering momentum in the coming weeks.
The scene in Mudros harbour on April 24th was indeed splendid and inspiring. The natural harbour is immense, and it was crowded with the huge armada assembled there. The whole of de Robeck's fleet and the vast number of transports, supply ships and small craft, provided a spectacle.
General Sir Ian Hamilton
CHAPTER 2
THE ARMIES
The Allied Forces at Gallipoli were truly multinational, with troops from the British and French Empires all serving, facing an Ottoman Army that consisted of both Turk and Arab divisions. In fact there was to be an even greater mix – the Greeks had long planned an attack on the Dardanelles and Kitchener's plan considered, long term, the meeting of the Allies in Constantinople, with Russian forces pressing from the east. With the Greek promise of troops evaporating quickly, the hopes of the Allies of pressing on past the Bulair Lines, tracking along the shores of the Sea of Marmara on to Constantinople, and of Russian assistance, faded fast.
The Ottoman Defenders
The Ottoman Empire had existed since the thirteenth century, but was contracting fast; the Balkan Wars of 1912–13 fought against Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece had seen to that. With several nations vying for control of the Dardanelles and ultimately of Constantinople, the Thracian possessions of the empire had been eroded such that there was only a small tract of land that could be counted as Europe, the remainder being that of Anatolia and farther south into Arabia and Palestine. Committed to the Central Powers from 1 August 1914 (part of the Kaiser's dream of a Berlin to Baghdad railway), the Ottoman Empire was to be pressed on three fronts: in the Caucasus against the Russians, in the Middle East from Palestine to Mesopotamia against the British and Empire troops and Arab Militias, and in the Dardanelles against the French and British.
Having received setbacks against modern European armies, the Ottoman Empire had pinned its hopes on modernising its army along the lines of the German Empire, victors in the Franco-Prussian war of 1870–71, and the most powerful in Europe. It did so through the use of so-called 'Military Missions', initially that of von der Goltz in the late nineteenth century (1886–95), and later, Liman von Sanders (1913–18). Serving as advisors on training and strategy, these small missions had an effect that was disproportionate to their size, and ensured that the Ottoman officer class was of a very high standard, particularly after Sultan Abdul Hamid II was overthrown in the Young Turk Revolution of 1909. From this point on, there would be great modernisation of the Ottoman Empire, especially following the crushing defeats of the Balkan Wars, with new modern weapons ordered from Europe, the German training of a new officer class, and the increased powers of conscription, applied to all subjects, whether Christian or Muslim.
The Ottomans' position was originally defensive, holding the Russians in the Caucasus and ensuring that the Dardanelles defences were intact and supported by the laying of minefields. With Allied pressure on both Germany and Austria-Hungary, this defensive position was itself under threat, and the Ottomans were pressed to attack the British in the Suez Canal Zone, as well as the Russians in Sarikamish in a disastrous attack in the dead of winter. Both would be setbacks for the Ottomans, and for their Minister for War, Enver Pasha, one of the three Young Turks in power. Yet von Sanders would fall from favour in opposing the Caucasus affair; he would be recalled when the Ottoman homeland was to be threatened directly by the Allies.
The Ottoman Forces were mobilised in August 1914 with initially three armies, growing to five in 1915. In 1914, the First and Second Armies were serving in Thrace to the west of Constantinople, facing the enemies of the Balkan Wars, and in 1915, defending both shores of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus (the Second Army later serving in the Caucasus); the Third Army served in north-east Anatolia throughout its existence; the Fourth Army, formed in September 1914, was sent to Syria, and took part in the expedition against the British in the Suez Canal Zone in late 1914; and, the Fifth Army, founded on 25 March 1915, was to form the main defence of the Dardanelles against the Allied attacks. Three other armies, the Sixth, Seventh (both formed in 1915) and Eighth (formed in 1917) would see service in Mesopotamia (Iraq), Palestine and Syria.
The Ottoman forces at Gallipoli were predominantly ethnic Turks, but there would be other nationalities, with at least two regiments, the 72nd and the 77th, that were derived from the Arabian Peninsula. With the Ottoman Empire in an almost perpetual state of war since 1911, its troops were battle-hardened and well-disciplined – a factor that would play in their favour during the landings. In addition to such infantry, there would also be local Gendarmerie units, battalions derived from the police force, which was run on military grounds; usually named for their place of origin, the Gendarmerie would guard coasts and other sensitive locations, but would serve as infantry when the occasion demanded.
The Ottoman Army had been subject to reorganisation since the Balkan Wars had highlighted its inadequacies. Guided by the German military mission, in part it employed German officers, which threw up some misunderstandings, not only due to the language difficulties, but also in the abrupt manner in which German officers were used to dealing with their men. This did not read across to the Ottoman way. It was usual for divisions to be commanded by colonels (identified by the honour bey; junior officers are indicated by efendi), with generals (honour title, pasha) commanding armies. Liman von Sanders Pasha would be the most prominent general in this campaign; Mustafa Kemal Bey his most celebrated divisional commander. Even given these differences, where Germans were in command they had an unerring respect for their soldiers; a respect that was repeated in the Allied ranks (though not, at first, with the High Command).
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Excerpted from Gallipoli 1915 by Peter Doyle. Copyright © 2011 The History Press. Excerpted by permission of The History Press.
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