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In The Bay of Pigs, Howard Jones provides a concise, incisive, and dramatic account of the disastrous attempt to overthrow Castro in April 1961. Drawing on recently declassified CIA documents, Jones deftly examines the train of missteps and self-deceptions that led to the invasion of U.S.-trained exiles at the Bay of Pigs.
Ignoring warnings from the ambassador to Cuba, the Eisenhower administration put in motion an operation that proved nearly unstoppable even after the inauguration of John F. Kennedy. The CIA and Pentagon, meanwhile, both voiced confidence in the outcome of the invasion, especially after coordinating previous successful coups in Guatemala and Iran. And so the Kennedy administration launched the exile force toward its doom in Cochinos Bay on April 17, 1961. Jones gives a riveting account of the battle--and the confusion in the White House--before moving on to explore its implications. The Bay of Pigs, he writes, set the course of Kennedy's foreign policy. It was a humiliation for the administration that fueled fears of Communist domination and pushed Kennedy toward a hardline "cold warrior" stance. But at the same time, the failed attack left him deeply skeptical of CIA and military advisers and influenced his later actions during the Cuban missile crisis.
In this brief, standard survey, University of Alabama historian Jones (Mutiny on the Amistad) concludes that the 1961 "CIA-engineered" Bay of Pigs invasion marked "a new direction in [U.S.] foreign policy" by combining military force and assassination. When Castroa's seizure of power in 1959 led to mass executions and bellicose anti-American rhetoric, President Eisenhower authorized the CIA to draft a plan for Castroa's overthrow. The plan included Castroa's assassination and landing a brigade of Cuban exiles at the Bay of Pigs. Pressed by building Cold War anxiety in his ranks, President Kennedy approved the plan after taking office in 1961, but reduced air cover in order to conceal U.S. involvement, and an invasion "built on questionable premises and dubious assumptions" quickly foundered. While the abortive invasion "solidified" Castroa's rule, the author says, failure didna't deter Kennedy, whose administration made the overthrow of Castro its "central focus." Extensively researched and cogently reasoned, Jonesa's update of this Cold War turning point for the Pivotal Moments in American History series is a cautionary account of a disastrous foray into regime change. 30 b&w illus; maps. (Aug.)
It is sometimes hard to believe from our vantage point that in the early 1960s the U.S. government was so obsessed with Fidel Castro that it plotted various ways to get rid of him. President Kennedy inherited plans begun by Eisenhower to invade Cuba, and, after hasty consultation with his advisers (both military and civilian), he cautiously approved a nighttime invasion of the southern coast of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs. The invasion was doomed from the start: Kennedy called off air support, the invasion spot was surrounded by a dense swamp, and Castro knew all about the project beforehand (he was tipped off by his friends in the Kremlin). Kennedy ended up deeply embarrassed and never trusted his military advisers again. Khrushchev was emboldened by his belief that Kennedy was a weakling, and 18 months later the world faced the much more serious Cuban Missile Crisis. American decision makers evidently learned nothing about the dangers of invasions-witness the results of our invasion of Iraq-so history indeed seems to repeat itself. Jones (history, Univ. of Alabama; Mutiny on the Amistad) has crafted an exceedingly impressive history of this tragic event that should stand as the definitive treatment for years to come. Essential for all history collections.
—Ed Goedeken
Kirkus Reviews
A taut account of a dismal passage of the Cold War: the failed, American-sponsored attempt to invade Cuba and remove Fidel Castro from power. Fed up with Castro's anti-American rhetoric and alarmed at his growing ties to the Soviet Union, President Eisenhower approved a covert CIA plan to overthrow the Cuban government. By the time the Kennedy administration took office, the CIA had assembled a paramilitary force of Cuban dissidents in Guatemala and contemplated ways, with Mafia assistance, to assassinate the troublesome Cuban dictator. Fearful of the PR hit that would surely come by disbanding the brigade (leaving them free to tell their story), reluctant to appear complacent about Castro's machinations and relying on the advice of his more experienced advisors, JFK went ahead with the plan that ended in the death of 114 and the capture of 1,179 out of the 1,511-man force that stormed the Bay of Pigs on April 17, 1961. With remarkable efficiency, Jones (History/Univ. of Alabama; Death of a Generation: How the Assassinations of Diem and JFK Prolonged the Vietnam War, 2003, etc.) examines all aspects of the debacle that depended on a series of unlikely contingencies: the killing of Castro, an indigenous insurrection to supplement the invaders and, crucially, air support from the U.S. military. The author apportions blame among the CIA-Allen Dulles and Richard Bissell emerge as the chief villains-the Joint Chiefs who signed off on a military plan for which they bore no responsibility, and the White House, seized by seeming Cold War imperatives and seeking plausible deniability for a scheme that, from the beginning, had little hope of disguising presidential fingerprints. The disaster leftCastro more firmly in power than ever, with Kennedy privately fuming and ridiculed on the world stage, and publicly forced to assume responsibility, memorably observing that "victory has a hundred fathers and defeat is an orphan."May become the preferred single-source reference to an episode whose foreign policy and military implications continue to reverberate.
Howard Jones is the author of Mutiny on the Amistad and Death of a Generation. He is University Research Professor of History at the University of Alabama.
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Posted November 29, 2012
ALERT ALERT
MURDER AT MURDER RES 1
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A Good Read
This book was very well written. I'm a really big fan on reading about the Kennedys and this book was really exciting. I never knew how the Bay of Pigs operation fell, but this book nailed it!
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More About This Textbook
Overview
In The Bay of Pigs, Howard Jones provides a concise, incisive, and dramatic account of the disastrous attempt to overthrow Castro in April 1961. Drawing on recently declassified CIA documents, Jones deftly examines the train of missteps and self-deceptions that led to the invasion of U.S.-trained exiles at the Bay of Pigs.
Ignoring warnings from the ambassador to Cuba, the Eisenhower administration put in motion an operation that proved nearly unstoppable even after the inauguration of John F. Kennedy. The CIA and Pentagon, meanwhile, both voiced confidence in the outcome of the invasion, especially after coordinating previous successful coups in Guatemala and Iran. And so the Kennedy administration launched the exile force toward its doom in Cochinos Bay on April 17, 1961. Jones gives a riveting account of the battle--and the confusion in the White House--before moving on to explore its implications. The Bay of Pigs, he writes, set the course of Kennedy's foreign policy. It was a humiliation for the administration that fueled fears of Communist domination and pushed Kennedy toward a hardline "cold warrior" stance. But at the same time, the failed attack left him deeply skeptical of CIA and military advisers and influenced his later actions during the Cuban missile crisis.
Editorial Reviews
Publishers Weekly
In this brief, standard survey, University of Alabama historian Jones (Mutiny on the Amistad) concludes that the 1961 "CIA-engineered" Bay of Pigs invasion marked "a new direction in [U.S.] foreign policy" by combining military force and assassination. When Castroa's seizure of power in 1959 led to mass executions and bellicose anti-American rhetoric, President Eisenhower authorized the CIA to draft a plan for Castroa's overthrow. The plan included Castroa's assassination and landing a brigade of Cuban exiles at the Bay of Pigs. Pressed by building Cold War anxiety in his ranks, President Kennedy approved the plan after taking office in 1961, but reduced air cover in order to conceal U.S. involvement, and an invasion "built on questionable premises and dubious assumptions" quickly foundered. While the abortive invasion "solidified" Castroa's rule, the author says, failure didna't deter Kennedy, whose administration made the overthrow of Castro its "central focus." Extensively researched and cogently reasoned, Jonesa's update of this Cold War turning point for the Pivotal Moments in American History series is a cautionary account of a disastrous foray into regime change. 30 b&w illus; maps. (Aug.)
Copyright © Reed Business Information, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.Library Journal
It is sometimes hard to believe from our vantage point that in the early 1960s the U.S. government was so obsessed with Fidel Castro that it plotted various ways to get rid of him. President Kennedy inherited plans begun by Eisenhower to invade Cuba, and, after hasty consultation with his advisers (both military and civilian), he cautiously approved a nighttime invasion of the southern coast of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs. The invasion was doomed from the start: Kennedy called off air support, the invasion spot was surrounded by a dense swamp, and Castro knew all about the project beforehand (he was tipped off by his friends in the Kremlin). Kennedy ended up deeply embarrassed and never trusted his military advisers again. Khrushchev was emboldened by his belief that Kennedy was a weakling, and 18 months later the world faced the much more serious Cuban Missile Crisis. American decision makers evidently learned nothing about the dangers of invasions-witness the results of our invasion of Iraq-so history indeed seems to repeat itself. Jones (history, Univ. of Alabama; Mutiny on the Amistad) has crafted an exceedingly impressive history of this tragic event that should stand as the definitive treatment for years to come. Essential for all history collections.
—Ed Goedeken
Kirkus Reviews
A taut account of a dismal passage of the Cold War: the failed, American-sponsored attempt to invade Cuba and remove Fidel Castro from power. Fed up with Castro's anti-American rhetoric and alarmed at his growing ties to the Soviet Union, President Eisenhower approved a covert CIA plan to overthrow the Cuban government. By the time the Kennedy administration took office, the CIA had assembled a paramilitary force of Cuban dissidents in Guatemala and contemplated ways, with Mafia assistance, to assassinate the troublesome Cuban dictator. Fearful of the PR hit that would surely come by disbanding the brigade (leaving them free to tell their story), reluctant to appear complacent about Castro's machinations and relying on the advice of his more experienced advisors, JFK went ahead with the plan that ended in the death of 114 and the capture of 1,179 out of the 1,511-man force that stormed the Bay of Pigs on April 17, 1961. With remarkable efficiency, Jones (History/Univ. of Alabama; Death of a Generation: How the Assassinations of Diem and JFK Prolonged the Vietnam War, 2003, etc.) examines all aspects of the debacle that depended on a series of unlikely contingencies: the killing of Castro, an indigenous insurrection to supplement the invaders and, crucially, air support from the U.S. military. The author apportions blame among the CIA-Allen Dulles and Richard Bissell emerge as the chief villains-the Joint Chiefs who signed off on a military plan for which they bore no responsibility, and the White House, seized by seeming Cold War imperatives and seeking plausible deniability for a scheme that, from the beginning, had little hope of disguising presidential fingerprints. The disaster leftCastro more firmly in power than ever, with Kennedy privately fuming and ridiculed on the world stage, and publicly forced to assume responsibility, memorably observing that "victory has a hundred fathers and defeat is an orphan."May become the preferred single-source reference to an episode whose foreign policy and military implications continue to reverberate.Product Details
Related Subjects
Meet the Author
Howard Jones is the author of Mutiny on the Amistad and Death of a Generation. He is University Research Professor of History at the University of Alabama.
Table of Contents
Editor's Note xi
Acknowledgments xv
Prologue 1
Genesis 9
Trinidad 31
Zapata 45
Politics 75
D-Day 95
Requiem 113
Inquisition 131
Epilogue 153
Notes 175
Bibliography 215
Index 225