Bioviolence: Preventing Biological Terror and Crime / Edition 1

Bioviolence: Preventing Biological Terror and Crime / Edition 1

by Barry Kellman

ISBN-10: 0521709695

ISBN-13: 9780521709699

Pub. Date: 09/30/2007

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Bioviolence is the ultimate act of terror. The dangers are speedily accelerating, and too little is being done to prevent it. This book describes how diseases such as smallpox, anthrax, or ebola might be used for hostile purposes. It portrays developers of disease weapons and who may have them now, including rogue States and groups such as Al-Qaeda. It formulates a…  See more details below


Bioviolence is the ultimate act of terror. The dangers are speedily accelerating, and too little is being done to prevent it. This book describes how diseases such as smallpox, anthrax, or ebola might be used for hostile purposes. It portrays developers of disease weapons and who may have them now, including rogue States and groups such as Al-Qaeda. It formulates a strategy for law enforcers, scientists, and public health officials to prevent intentional disease. Nations and international organizations, especially the United Nations, must coordinate their efforts to improve humanity’s security. Altogether the threat of bioviolence is an acute challenge for law and governance. This book explains how to meet that challenge.

Product Details

Cambridge University Press
Publication date:
Edition description:
New Edition
Product dimensions:
6.14(w) x 9.21(h) x 0.79(d)

Table of Contents

Prologue     xiii
Foreword   Ronald K. Noble, Interpol Secretary General     xvii
Acknowledgments     xxvii
Introduction     1
The Bioviolence Policy Failure     2
Thematic Foundations     3
Three Crossroads     3
Law for Humanity     4
Terminology     5
Presentation of the Argument     7
The Bioviolence Condition and How it Came to be
Why Worry?     11
Why Bioviolence Is Different     11
Delayed Anonymity     12
Concealable Devastation     15
Contagious Panic!!!     17
Evaluating Risks     18
Methods of Bioviolence     20
Interwoven Choices     21
Smallpox     24
Eradication?     24
The Challenge: Getting the Virus     25
Influenza and Hemorrhagic Fevers     28
Influenza     28
Reasons for Concern     28
Limits of Protection     29
Hemorrhagic Fever Viruses     31
Acquiring the Agent: Initiating the Attack     31
Disseminating the Virus     32
Anthrax     33
Getting andCultivating Seed Stock     35
Disseminating the Agent     36
Botulinum in Food     38
Agroviolence     40
Motivations and Feasibility     41
Attacks of Grave Concern     42
Livestock Diseases     42
Crop Diseases     43
International Prevention Systems     44
Agents Historically Used as Bioweapons     45
Plague     45
Tularemia     46
Q Fever     47
Ricin     47
Emerging Micro-Sciences and Bioviolence     47
Molecular Biology's Emerging Risk     49
Modification of Weapons Agents     49
Improving Target Specificity     51
Synthetic Genomics     51
Re-Creation of Diseases     51
Synthetic Viruses     52
RNA Inhibitors and Bioregulators     52
Nanotechnologies     53
Who Did Bioviolence? Who Wants to Do It?     55
The Biological Weapons Experience     55
The Road to Geneva     56
Mid-20th-Century Bioweapons Programs     56
Unit 731     57
The U.S. Offensive Bioweapons Program     57
The Soviet Biological Weapons Program     59
Iraq's Biological Weapons Program     61
South Africa's Project Coast     63
Egypt     64
Israel     65
Current (Alleged) State Biological Weapons Programs     66
Questions about Military Efficacy     67
Suspected State Bioweapons Programs     68
North Korea     69
Iran     70
Syria     71
Terrorist and Fanatic Interest in Bioviolence     71
Islamic Fundamentalist Interest in Bioviolence     72
Al Qaeda's Intentions     73
Religious and "Legal" Justification     74
Acquisition of Agents and Expertise     77
Production     78
Concluding Observations     82
The Global Strategy for Preventing Bioviolence
Strategic Foundations     87
The Indictment     88
Obstacles to Policy Progress     92
Bioviolence Is a Crime!     94
Overview of the Prevention Strategy     95
Complication     96
Resistance     96
Preparedness     97
Nonproliferation     98
Guiding Principles     98
Complication: What Law Enforcers Should Stop     101
Irresponsible Gaps     102
The Logic of Complication     103
Denial + Interdiction     104
Bioscience's Anxieties     105
Registration and Census     108
Denial Tactics     109
Denying Access to Pathogens     109
Pathogen Census     111
Pathogen Marking     111
Denying Access to Laboratories     112
Denying Access to Equipment     114
Interdiction     116
Legislating the Crime     117
The Dilemma of Pre-Attack Interdiction     118
Clues of Bioviolence     119
Pattern Recognition     121
Transport Security and Counter-Smuggling     124
Packaging and Labeling     126
Shipping Security     127
Intrusive Counter-Smuggling     129
Improving Resistance through Science     132
Dual-Implication Research     133
The Challenge of Overseeing Bioresearch     134
Constraining Science?     137
Virtues and Limitations of Codes of Ethics and Self-Regulation     139
The Need for Translucency     142
Bioscientists as the First Line of Defense      144
Bioresearch Education and Training     144
Professional Certification     145
Whistleblowers     146
Development of Vaccines and Medicines     147
Financial Barriers     149
Liability Barriers     152
Patent Barriers     155
Public Health Preparedness     160
Preparedness vs. Complication - The False Debate     161
Hardening Targets     164
Protecting Air Circulation Systems     165
Protecting Water Supplies     165
Sensors     166
Response Interventions     168
Detecting and Analyzing a Bioviolence Attack     169
Law Enforcement - Public Health Cooperation     171
Biosurveillance     171
Microbial Forensics     172
Containing Contagion     173
Compulsory Vaccination for First Responders     175
Placement of Victims     178
Stockpiling and Distribution of Medical Resources     179
Compulsory Medical Interventions     181
Maintaining Public Confidence     184
Quarantines     185
Considerations of a Quarantine's Efficacy     186
Quarantines and the World Health Organization's Authority     188
International Nonproliferation     192
Defining Biological Weapons     196
The General Purpose Criterion     196
"Nonlethal" Bioagents     197
Arguments For and Against Nonlethal Bioagents     198
Types of NLBAs     200
U.S. Military Nonlethal Programs     202
Implications for the Biological Weapons Convention     204
Compliance, Verification, and Confidence Building     205
The Biodefense Dilemma     207
The Problem of Secrecy Reprised     209
Biodefense Projects of Concern     211
Strengthening Confidence     213
Disarming Soviet Bioweapons Stockpiles     215
Two Issues for Removal     219
Protecting the Free Trade in Bioscience     220
A Global BWC Organization     221
The Challenge of Global Governance     222
Governance Mission: The Global Covenant     222
Governance Agencies     226
The United Nations Commission on Bioscience and Security (Commission)     228
Promote Bioscience Research     228
Define Standards for Bioscience     230
Promote Capacity Building and Resource Mobilization      231
The Bioviolence Prevention Office (Office)     233
Information Gathering and Analysis     234
Impelling Implementation     235
United Nations Bioviolence Committee (Security Council Committee)     238
Predecessors     239
A New Inspectorate     240
A Final Note on Governance     241
Conclusion     242
Notes     247
Bibliography     285
Index     355

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