Black Hole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory: Political Economy in General Equilibriumby Stephen P. Magee, William A. Brock, Leslie Young
Pub. Date: 08/25/1989
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
An example of special interest protection is provided by this study's general equilibrium theory that explains income distribution with goods markets, factor markets, lobbies, political parties and voters all pursuing their self interests. See more details below
An example of special interest protection is provided by this study's general equilibrium theory that explains income distribution with goods markets, factor markets, lobbies, political parties and voters all pursuing their self interests.
- Cambridge University Press
- Publication date:
- Product dimensions:
- 5.98(w) x 8.98(h) x 1.10(d)
Table of ContentsPreface; Acknowledgments; list of results; 1. A preview of the results; 2. Endogenous policy theory: a diagrammatic approach; Part I. Endogenous Policy Theory with Specific Factors: The Theory of Industry Tariffs in Partial Equilibrium: 3. The probabilistic voting model of political efficiency and powerless politicians; 4. Endogenous lobbying theory and the contribution specialization theorem; 5. Endogenous tariff theory; 6. The power function model of endogenous industry lobbying; 7. Three simple tests of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem; 8. The invisible foot and the waste of nations: lawyers as negative externalities; Part II. Endogenous Policy Theory in General Equilibrium: A Long-Run Theory of National Tariff Levels: 9. The 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 model of endogenous redistribution theory; 10. A prisoner's dilemma theory of endogenous protection: the Leontief model; 11. The compensation effect and the multiple equilibrium trap; 12. increasing returns to politics and factor endowments: economic development and Brazilian vitality versus the Indian disease; 13. Endogenous protection in the United States, 1900–88; 14. A Cobb–Douglas model; 15. Black hole tariffs; 16. The endowment effect: cross-national evidence on endogenous tariffs; Part II. Postscript: 17. The senile-industry argument for protection; 18. Optimal obfuscation and the theory of the second worst: the politically efficient policy; Mathematical appendices; References; Author index; Subject index.
and post it to your social network
Most Helpful Customer Reviews
See all customer reviews >