Oligopoly Pricing: Old Ideas and New Tools / Edition 1

Oligopoly Pricing: Old Ideas and New Tools / Edition 1

by Xavier Vives
     
 

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ISBN-10: 026272040X

ISBN-13: 9780262720403

Pub. Date: 09/01/2001

Publisher: MIT Press

The "oligopoly problem"—the question of how prices are formed when the market contains only a few competitors—is one of the more persistent problems in the history of economic thought. In this book Xavier Vives applies a modern game-theoretic approach to develop a theory of oligopoly pricing.Vives begins by relating classic contributions to the field—

Overview

The "oligopoly problem"—the question of how prices are formed when the market contains only a few competitors—is one of the more persistent problems in the history of economic thought. In this book Xavier Vives applies a modern game-theoretic approach to develop a theory of oligopoly pricing.Vives begins by relating classic contributions to the field—including those of Cournot, Bertrand,Edgeworth, Chamberlin, and Robinson—to modern game theory. In his discussion of basic game-theoretic tools and equilibrium, he pays particular attention to recent developments in the theory of supermodular games. The middle section of the book, an in-depth treatment of classic static models, provides specialized existence results,characterizations of equilibria, extensions to large markets, and an analysis of comparative statics with a view toward applied work. The final chapters examine commitment issues, entry, information transmission, and collusion using a variety of tools: two-stage games, the modeling of competition under asymmetric information and mechanism design theory, and the theory of repeated and dynamic games, including Markov perfect equilibrium and differential games.

Product Details

ISBN-13:
9780262720403
Publisher:
MIT Press
Publication date:
09/01/2001
Edition description:
New Edition
Pages:
441
Product dimensions:
6.00(w) x 9.00(h) x 1.00(d)
Age Range:
18 Years

Table of Contents

Preface
1 Ideas of the Founding Fathers: Oligopoly Theory and Modern
Game Theory
2 Game Theory Tools
2.1 Games in Normal Form and Nash Equilibrium
2.2 Supermodular Games and Lattice Programming
2.3 EXistence Results for Quasiincreasing and Decreasing Best
Replies
2.4 MiXed Strategies
2.5 Uniqueness
2.6 Stability
2.7 Incomplete information and Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
Summary
EXercises
3 Foundations of Partial Equilibrium Analysis
3.1 A Canonical Partial Equilibrium Model
3.2 Small EXpenditure Shares and Small Income Effects
AppendiX: Consumer Surplus Analysis
Summary
EXercises
4 Quantity Competition: The Cournot Model
4.1 The Model and EXistence of Equilibrium
4.2 Characterization of Smooth Cournot Games
4.3 Comparative Statics and Entry
4.4 Large Markets
Summary
EXercises
5 Price Competition: The Models of Bertrand and
Edgeworth
5.1 Bertrand Competition
5.2 BertrandEdgeworth Competition
Summary
EXercises
6 Product Differentiation
6.1 Demand Systems
6.2 Quantity and Price Competition
6.3 Characterization and Comparison of Cournot and Bertrand
Equilibria
6.4 Large Markets and Monopolistic Competition
6.5 BertrandEdgeworthChamberlin Competition
6.6 Monopolisitic Competition and Entry
AppendiX: Product Selection and Complementary Products
Summary
EXercises
7 Conjectures, Reactions, and Commitment
7.1 Conjectural Variations
7.2 Supply Functions
7.3 Collusion and Facilitating Practices
7.4 Commitment and Pricing
Summary
EXercises
8 Competition with Asymmetric Information
8.1 Static Competition with Incomplete Information
8.2 MonopolisticCompetition with Private Information
8.3 Information Sharing
8.4 Information EXchange, Collusion, and Mechanism
8.5 Commitment under Uncertainty and Information
Summary
EXercises
9 Repeated Interaction and Dynamics
9.1 Repeated Interaction and Collusion
9.2 Dynamic Pricing and Commitment
Summary
EXercises
10 Epilogue
Notes
References
IndeX

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