Making and Breaking Governments: Cabinets and Legislatures in Parliamentary Democracies / Edition 1by Michael Laver, Kenneth A. Shepsle, Randall Calvert
Pub. Date: 01/28/2004
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Offering a theoretical argument about how parliamentary democracy works, the authors formulate a model of how parties create new governments and either maintain them in office or, after a resignation or no-confidence vote, replace them.
- Cambridge University Press
- Publication date:
- Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions Series
- Edition description:
- New Edition
- Product dimensions:
- 5.98(w) x 8.98(h) x 0.71(d)
Table of ContentsSeries editors' preface; Acknowledgements; Part I. The Context: 1. Theory, institutions, and government formation; 2. The social context of government formation; 3. The government formation process; Part II. The Model: 4. Government equilibrium; 5. Strong parties; Part III. Empirical Investigations: 6. Two cases: Germany, 1987; Ireland, 1992–3; 7. Theoretical implications, data, and operationalization; 8. Exploring the model: a comparative perspective; 9. A multivariate investigation of portfolio allocation; Part IV. Applications, Extensions, and Conclusions: 10. Party systems and cabinet stability; 11. Making the model more realistic; 12. Party politics and administrative reform; 13. Governments and parliaments; Bibliography.
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