Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Conflict / Edition 1by Wesley K. Clark
Pub. Date: 07/25/2002
In Waging Modern War, General Wesley K. Clark recounts his experience leading NATO's forces to a hard-fought and ultimately successful victory in Kosovo in 1999. As the American military machine has swung into/i>
This memoir from the former NATO Supreme Allied Commander, now revised and updated, offers a unique behind-the-scenes look at how war is fought today.
In Waging Modern War, General Wesley K. Clark recounts his experience leading NATO's forces to a hard-fought and ultimately successful victory in Kosovo in 1999. As the American military machine has swung into action in the months following the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, it has become clear that the lessons of Kosovo are directly applicable to the war against terrorism and the nations that sponsor it.
The problems posed, and overcome, in the war in Kosovohow to fight an air war against unconventional forces in rough terrain and how to coordinate U.S. objectives with those of other nationsare the problems that America increasingly faces in the today's world. As the Los Angeles Times noted in late September of 2001, this book's "lessons are highly relevant now.... We need to think about exactly what steps will lessen, rather than increase, the terrorist threat. And we also need innovative commanders willing to improvise to meet a new kind of threat, more determined political leadership, a more flexible outlook in the Pentagon.... Gen. Clark has performed another service by highlighting these problems at a crucial moment in American history. "
Waging Modern War is history, memoir, guidebook, and forecast, essential reading for those who want to know how modern war is fought, and won.
Author Biography: General Wesley K. Clark, U.S.A. (Ret.), was Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, from 1997 to 2000 and is currently a military analyst for CNN. He served previously as director of strategic plans and policy for the Joint Staff at the Pentagon from 1994 to 1996 and was the lead military negotiator for the Bosnian Peace Accords at Dayton in 1995. He lives in Little Rock, Arkansas.
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I'm sorry I can't give it less than a star, because, theoretically, even 1 star means it's something. I guess you can use the paper for something. This book is one of those political readings with a bias beyond anything remotely normal. The author tried to present this war in the way it was portrayed on CNN headlines news every day. It has numerous discrepancies and this book is probably considered garbage by anyone who has some basic knowledge about the Balkans, the mentality of the people there, their relations, the political and economic situation at that time.
US General Wesley Clark, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, 1997-2000, espouses the Powell Doctrine, of swift escalation to decisive force, as opposed to 'extended campaigns that could leave democratic governments being vulnerable to their own public opinion'. That is, US doctrine aims to prevent the public having any say over the actions of NATO's 'democratic' governments. Clark writes, "In 1993, the US government proposed the so-called 'lift and strike' policy, in which the U.N. arms embargo against the former Yugoslavia would be lifted, theoretically enabling the Bosnian Muslim forces to gain the means to defend themselves, and the NATO nations would threaten to strike the Bosnian Serb forces if they continued to attack the Muslims. But to the Europeans, this looked like a recipe for the expansion of the fighting, not its termination. The principle of allowing the Bosnian Muslims in Sarajevo to acquire the arms to defend themselves was directly in conflict with the principles of remaining neutral, containing the conflict, and ameliorating its humanitarian impact." Similarly today, arming the Libyan rebels is 'a recipe for the expansion of the fighting, not its termination' and it is 'directly in conflict with the principles of remaining neutral, containing the conflict, and ameliorating its humanitarian impact'. And just as NATO powers overrode these principles then, so NATO is overriding them today. Clark wrote in the 2001 edition, "In the Pentagon in November 2001, one of the senior military staff officers had time for a chat. Yes, we were still on track for going against Iraq, he said. But there was more. This was being discussed as part of a five-year campaign plan, he said, and there were a total of seven countries, beginning with Iraq, then Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Iran, Somalia and Sudan ." (p. 130.) This revealing comment does not appear in the 2002 reprint edition. Clark, after all, always obeys orders, either to suppress the truth, or to break international law by leading NATO's illegal attack on Yugoslavia.
General Clark LED the war, and is now a local hero after having saved ethnic Muslims from genocide. Not understanding the culture? Are you kiddin? It's an amazing feat that not one US soldier died under Clark's command, and now streets and children carry the name Clark and Wesley. This book describes how this man proved that force can be combined with diplomacy to end a war, something our current administration should take into consideration.