The purpose of this study was to examine organizational behavior from multiple levels of analysis and perspectives. The major findings of this study highlight the interaction of deterministic and voluntaristic forces within the stakeholder network of regulation in the U.S. securities industry. Both qualitative and quantitative data were used along with several levels of analysis. Results indicated that actors involved in regulating the U.S. securities industry face enormous environmental pressures from five major forces: regulatory controls; market controls; private litigation and arbitration; intermittent investigations by Congress, state regulators, and the media; and market crises. These forces compel actors to behave in certain ways. While these influences are powerful, they are not the only forces shaping behavior. The social context in which these actors deal with each other is also important. Actors can and do act strategically in this high-pressure environment. The primary way these actors exercise volition is through relationships. The size, complexity and speed with which this industry operates make it difficult for any one party to know everything. Therefore, informal relationships become critical. Using career path data, a network of relationships like those discussed in interviews was defined. Maps of relationships were created at three levels: the system level, the individual level, and the organizational level. At the system level, the analysis revealed two important findings. First, there are several overlapping subgroups at the organizational and individual level. There are two groups of organizations: regulatory organizations and industry organizations. There are also three communities of individuals: regulatory individuals, industry individuals and spanners. Second, this is a relatively closed system. Leadership in this area has limited experience outside the securities regulatory system. At the individual level there were two primary discoveries. First, the spanners are more tightly tied to the industry individuals than to the regulators. Second, the spanners and the industry overall are more central in the regulatory system than the regulators. At the organizational level, one important finding surfaced. The presence of the SEC is important despite its reliance on the SROs and firms for the majority of the routine oversight and enforcement of the securities industry.