Carnap, Tarski, and Quine at Harvard: Conversations on Logic, Mathematics, and Science
During the academic year 1940-1941, several giants of analytic philosophy congregated at Harvard, holding regular private meetings, with Carnap, Tarski, and Quine. Carnap, Tarski, and Quine at Harvard allows the reader to act as a fly on the wall for their conversations. Carnap took detailed notes during his year at Harvard. This book includes both a German transcription of these shorthand notes and an English translation in the appendix section. Carnap’s notes cover a wide range of topics, but surprisingly, the most prominent question is: If the number of physical items in the universe is finite, what form should scientific discourse take? This question is closely connected to an abiding philosophical problem: What is the relationship between the logico-mathematical realm and the material realm? Carnap, Tarski, and Quine’s attempts to answer this question involve issues central to philosophy today.This book focuses on three such issues: nominalism, the unity of science, and analyticity. In short, the book reconstructs the lines of argument represented in these Harvard discussions, discusses their historical significance (especially Quine’s break from Carnap), and relates them when possible to contemporary treatments of these issues.
1114335588
Carnap, Tarski, and Quine at Harvard: Conversations on Logic, Mathematics, and Science
During the academic year 1940-1941, several giants of analytic philosophy congregated at Harvard, holding regular private meetings, with Carnap, Tarski, and Quine. Carnap, Tarski, and Quine at Harvard allows the reader to act as a fly on the wall for their conversations. Carnap took detailed notes during his year at Harvard. This book includes both a German transcription of these shorthand notes and an English translation in the appendix section. Carnap’s notes cover a wide range of topics, but surprisingly, the most prominent question is: If the number of physical items in the universe is finite, what form should scientific discourse take? This question is closely connected to an abiding philosophical problem: What is the relationship between the logico-mathematical realm and the material realm? Carnap, Tarski, and Quine’s attempts to answer this question involve issues central to philosophy today.This book focuses on three such issues: nominalism, the unity of science, and analyticity. In short, the book reconstructs the lines of argument represented in these Harvard discussions, discusses their historical significance (especially Quine’s break from Carnap), and relates them when possible to contemporary treatments of these issues.
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Carnap, Tarski, and Quine at Harvard: Conversations on Logic, Mathematics, and Science

Carnap, Tarski, and Quine at Harvard: Conversations on Logic, Mathematics, and Science

by Greg Frost-Arnold
Carnap, Tarski, and Quine at Harvard: Conversations on Logic, Mathematics, and Science

Carnap, Tarski, and Quine at Harvard: Conversations on Logic, Mathematics, and Science

by Greg Frost-Arnold

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$49.95 
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Overview

During the academic year 1940-1941, several giants of analytic philosophy congregated at Harvard, holding regular private meetings, with Carnap, Tarski, and Quine. Carnap, Tarski, and Quine at Harvard allows the reader to act as a fly on the wall for their conversations. Carnap took detailed notes during his year at Harvard. This book includes both a German transcription of these shorthand notes and an English translation in the appendix section. Carnap’s notes cover a wide range of topics, but surprisingly, the most prominent question is: If the number of physical items in the universe is finite, what form should scientific discourse take? This question is closely connected to an abiding philosophical problem: What is the relationship between the logico-mathematical realm and the material realm? Carnap, Tarski, and Quine’s attempts to answer this question involve issues central to philosophy today.This book focuses on three such issues: nominalism, the unity of science, and analyticity. In short, the book reconstructs the lines of argument represented in these Harvard discussions, discusses their historical significance (especially Quine’s break from Carnap), and relates them when possible to contemporary treatments of these issues.

Product Details

ISBN-13: 9780812698305
Publisher: Open Court Publishing Company
Publication date: 08/27/2013
Series: Full Circle: Publications of the Archive of Scientific Philo
Pages: 270
Product dimensions: 6.00(w) x 8.90(h) x 0.90(d)

About the Author

Greg Frost-Arnold is assistant professor in the Philosophy Department at Hobart & William Smith Colleges. He is associate editor for the Journal of the History of Analytical Philosophy.

Table of Contents

Preface xiii

1 Overview and Historical Background 1

1.1 Introduction: Setting the Historical Stage 1

1.2 The Main Project: A ?Finitist-Nominalist' Language of Science 3

1.3 Mathematics in a Finitist-Nominalist Language 11

1.4 Pre-history of the 1941 Finitist-Nominalist Project 15

2 Justifications for the Finitist-Nominalist Conditions 27

2.1 First Justification: Verständlichkeit 27

2.2 Second Justification: Overcoming Metaphysics 37

2.3 Third Justification: Inferential Safety 43

2.4 Fourth Justification: Natural Science 45

2.5 Current Justifications for Nominalism 47

3 Objections to the Finitist-Nominalist Project 51

3.1 Why Does Carnap Participate, Given His Reservations? 51

3.2 Higher Mathematics Is Meaningful 54

3.3 Are Any Infinities Compatible with the FN Project? 61

3.4 Attacking the FN Conditions 65

3.5 An Objection Not in the Notes 71

4 The Finitist-Nominalist Project and Analyticity 73

4.1 Under a Finitist-Nominalist Regime, Arithmetic Is Synthetic 74

4.2 Radicalization of Quine's Critique of Analyticity 81

5 Direct Discussions of Analytic Truth in 1940-41 89

5.1 What Is Analyticity, circa 1940? 90

5.2 Tarski's Objections to Analyticity 94

5.3 Quine's Disagreements with Carnap circa 1940 102

6 Overcoming Metaphysics through the Unity of Science 117

6.1 Unity of Language, Not Laws 118

6.2 Overcoming Metaphysics 122

6.3 A Difficulty: What Cannot Be Incorporated into a Language of Science? 133

6.4 Conclusion: The Origin of the Term 'Unified Science' 136

Appendix A Translation 139

Appendix B German Transcription 191

References 243

Index 251

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