Chain of Command: The Road from 9/11 to Abu Ghraibby Seymour M. Hersh
Since September 11, 2001, Seymour M. Hersh has riveted readers and outraged the Bush Administration with his stories in The New Yorker, including his breakthrough pieces on the Abu Ghraib prison scandal. Now, in Chain of Command, he brings together this reporting, along with new revelations, to answer the critical question of the last/b>/b>
Since September 11, 2001, Seymour M. Hersh has riveted readers and outraged the Bush Administration with his stories in The New Yorker, including his breakthrough pieces on the Abu Ghraib prison scandal. Now, in Chain of Command, he brings together this reporting, along with new revelations, to answer the critical question of the last three years: how did America get from the clear morning when hijackers crashed airplanes into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon to a divisive and dirty war in Iraq?
Hersh established himself at the forefront of investigative journalism thirty-five years ago when he broke the news of the massacre at My Lai, Vietnam, for which he won a Pulitzer Prize. Ever since, he's challenged America's power elite by publishing the stories that others can't, or won't, tell. In exposés on subjects ranging from Saudi corruption to nuclear black marketeers and months ahead of other journalists the White House's false claims about weapons of mass destruction, Hersh has cemented his reputation as the indispensable reporter of our time.
In Chain of Command, Hersh takes an unflinching look behind the public story of President Bush's "war on terror" and into the lies and obsessions that led America into Iraq. He reveals the connections between early missteps in the hunt for Al Qaeda and disasters on the ground in Iraq. The book includes a new account of Hersh's pursuit of the Abu Ghraib story and of where, he believes, responsibility for the scandal ultimately lies. Hersh draws on sources at the highest levels of the American government and intelligence community, in foreign capitals, and on the battlefield for an unparalleled view of a crucial chapter in America's recent history. With an introduction by The New Yorker's editor, David Remnick, Chain of Command is a devastating portrait of an Administration blinded by ideology and of a President whose decisions have made the world a more dangerous place for America.
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Chain of CommandThe Road from 9/11 to Abu Ghraib
By Seymour Hersh
Chapter OneIn May 2004, at the height of the Abu Ghraib prison abuse scandal, a senior political Republican Party operative was given the reassuring word that Vice President Dick Cheney had taken charge, with his usual directness. The operative learned that Cheney had telephoned Donald Rumsfeld with a simple message: No resignations. We're going to hunker down and tough it out.
Cheney's concern was not national security. This was a political call-a reminder that the White House would seize control of every crisis that could affect the re-election of George Bush. The Abu Ghraib revelations, if left unchecked, could provoke more public doubt about the wisdom of the war in Iraq, and about the sometimes brutal intelligence operations that were used to wage it. The White House and Pentagon also would have to work together to prevent Congress and the press from unraveling an incendiary secret - that undercover members of an intelligence unit that operated in secret in the name of every American had been at Abu Ghraib. The senior leadership in the White House has been aware since January of the mess at Abu Ghraib, and, more importantly, of the fact that photographs and videotapes existed, and might someday reach the public. As we have seen, the military chain of command had ignored the possibility of higherup involvement and moved quickly to prosecute the military police who had committed the acts - "the kids at the end of the food chain," as a former senior intelligence official put it: "We've got some hillbilly kids out of control." The perception persists that this was Rumsfeld's war, and that it was his assertiveness and his toughness that sometimes led to the bombing of the wrong target or the arrest of innocents. But Cheney's involvement in trying to conceal the import of Abu Ghraib was not unusual; it was a sign of the teamwork at the top. George Bush talked about "smoking them out of their holes" and wanting them "dead or alive," and Rumsfeld was the one who set up the mechanism to get it done. The defense secretary would hold the difficult news conferences and take the heat in public, as he did about Abu Ghraib, but the President and Vice President had been in it, and with him, all the way. Rumsfeld handled the dirty work and kept the secrets, but he and the two White House leaders were a team.
There is so much about this presidency that we don't know, and may never learn. Some of the most important questions are not even being asked. How did they do it? How did eight or nine neoconservatives who believed that a war in Iraq was the answer to international terrorism get their way? How did they redirect the government and rearrange long-standing American priorities and policies with so much ease? How did they overcome the bureaucracy, intimidate the press, mislead the Congress, and dominate the military? Is our democracy that fragile? I have tried, in this book, to describe some of the mechanisms used by the White House - the stovepiping of intelligence, the reliance on Ahmad Chalabi, the refusal to hear dissenting opinions, the difficulty of getting straight talk about military operations gone bad, and the inability - or unwillingness - of the President and his senior aides to distinguish between Muslims who supported terrorism and those who abhorred it. A complete understanding of these last few years will be a challenge for journalists, political scientists, and historians.
Many of the failings, however, were in plain sight. The Administration's manipulation and distortion of the intelligence about Iraq's ties to Al Qaeda and its national security threat to the United States was anything but a secret in Washington, as the pages of this book make clear. And yet the Republican-led Senate Intelligence Committee, after a year-long investigation, published a report, in July 2004, stating that the critical mistakes were made not in the White House, but at the C.I.A., whose analysts essentially missed the story. There was an astonishing postscript that told much about the disarray in Washington. Three Democrats, John D. Rockefeller IV of West Virginia, the vice chairman of the committee, Carl Levin of Michigan, who is also the ranking Democrat on the Armed Services Committee, and Richard Durbin of Illinois, signed a separate statement disavowing the report's central findings. "Regrettably, the report paints an incomplete picture of what occurred during this period of time," they wrote, noting that the "central issue" of how intelligence was misused by the Administration and the pre-war role of Ahmad Chalabi would be included in a second report-one that was not to be made public until after the presidential election. "As a result," they wrote, "the Committee's phase one report fails to fully explain the environment of intense pressure in which Intelligence Community officials were asked to render judgments on matters relating to Iraq, when policy officials had already forcefully stated their own conclusions in public."
And yet, Rockefeller, Levin, and Durbin put their names on the report, helping to make it appear unanimous and bipartisan. There are, once again, unanswered questions. Why didn't the Democrats take a stronger stand? How much influence did the White House exert on the Republican members of the committee? Why didn't the press go beyond the immediate facts? The inner workings of the committee were in many ways a more important story than its findings.
Excerpted from Chain of Command by Seymour Hersh Excerpted by permission.
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Meet the Author
Seymour M. Hersh has been awarded the Pulitzer Prize, four George Polk Awards, and more than a dozen other prizes, many of them for his work at the New York Times. In 2004, he won a National Magazine Award for public interest for his pieces on intelligence and the Iraq war. He lives in Washington, D.C. Chain of Command is his eighth book.
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If you have taken the time to do your homework on all that is happening you will see that the book 'follows the money' so to speak. No matter what the Bush administration says, not everyone can be lying. This could not happen without the upper ranks knowing, even fostering, this behavior. We know that beginning with the now-current Attorney General the line has been blurred from the top. This information fits and it will stick to the history of this President for a long time. I hope this is required reading for future generations.
I felt this book started out great, his analysis and exposure of TORTURE at Abu-Ghraib and Guantanamo, how these were being carried out sometimes in secret- sometimes not, how the green lights were clearly given to carry this all out from the highest levels of the US government, the rendering to other US allies who could torture suspects more easily --all that was done exceptionally well in his account. After that he seems to drift off into every direction, exposing some of the crimes that are being committed by the US in Iraq or Afghanistan (while leaving out completely lists of others) but still sort of defending this whole war without end and without borders. I still think its a good book overall, especially the beginnings, but its not the best on the whole 'war thing'.
In this unusually useful book, the American investigative journalist Seymour Hersh presents some vital new information on the US and British states¿ current wars. Torture, which is invariably counterproductive, is of course illegal, under the Geneva Convention, US federal anti-torture statutes and the UN Convention Against Torture, ratified by the USA in 1994. Yet in 2001 President Bush secretly ruled, ¿I ¿ determine that none of the provisions of Geneva apply to our conflict with Al Qaeda in Afghanistan or elsewhere throughout the world.¿ This contempt for law resulted directly in systematic abuse, torture and murders in US prisons. Abu Ghraib was unusual only because it became notorious. The US state organises torture tourism: it kidnaps suspects then takes them to Egypt for intensive torture, or to the many secret CIA prisons in Pakistan, Thailand, Singapore, etc. In November 2001, Bush approved a Pakistani airlift out of northern Afghanistan. 5000 people escaped, Pakistani army officers and intelligence agents, and an unknown number of Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters. Since 1997, the Labour government has consistently spread false information about Iraq. A member of the UN inspection team passed dozens of unverified intelligence `reports¿ to MI6, who passed these dodgy tips discreetly to the press. Ehud Barak, an ex-Prime Minister of Israel, told Vice-President Dick Cheney late last year that the USA had lost in Iraq. He said that Israel `had learned that there¿s no way to win an occupation¿. The only issue now was `choosing the size of your humiliation¿. The Israeli government has also concluded that the occupation cannot bring stability or democracy to Iraq. As a former Israeli military intelligence officer said, ¿it doesn¿t add up. It¿s over. Not militarily ¿ but politically.¿ So Israel is not depending on the USA. It is further destabilising the Middle East by training Kurdish commando units in northern Iraq and running covert operations in Kurdish areas of Iran and Syria. This has provoked a new alliance against Israel, of Iran, Syria and Turkey.
No matter where you stand politically (if you stand anywhere), the information in this book is critical for everyone to be aware of. It achieved widespread success, especially in the couple months after its release, but the conversation cannot stop. Spread the word about this. Read it twice. Discuss it. Get angry about it. The stakes are so high. Informing ourselves and out friends is the first step, of several, neccesary to ensuring that this sort of tragedy isn't STILL happening.
I had to read this text for a graduate class in deviance. Unfortunately, the author is so blinded with his partisanship, he fails to accurately portray the events that led up to the War in Iraq. The author fails to even recognize the very real danger of terrorism in America. Furthermore, the author seems to be advocating that Americans wait to engage the enemy at home versus opening a front to fight terrorists abroad. If you are looking for a non-partisan explanation of the events surrounding 9/11 and the Iraq War, this is not the book for you. However, if you are liberal in thought and hate the current administration, this is a nice fictional partisan potrayal of twisted facts meant to make the reader feel good.