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|Ch. 1||From Abraham to Allenby||19|
|Ch. 2||The Arab revolt and the great betrayal||41|
|Ch. 3||How two men in London changed the world||63|
|Ch. 4||Churchill and his forty thieves||95|
|Ch. 5||Changing the map : the Cairo Conference of 1921||127|
|Ch. 6||Winston's bridge||161|
|Ch. 7||From Feisal to Saddam||215|
Posted February 28, 2005
Christopher Catherwood rightly reminds his audience that the course of history results from the decisions and whims of outstanding individuals as well as impersonal forces and inevitable economic factors (pg. 13). In March 1921, Winston Churchill, the newly appointed Secretary of State for the colonies and his advisers re-mapped the Middle East at the Cairo conference to primarily advance British interests in the region from the ruins of the disintegrated Ottoman Empire (pg. 125). The imperial, pan-Arabic ambitions of the Hashemite family, bone fide senior descendants of Prophet Mohammed, also played a key role in modeling the region (pg. 47, 50-51, 102, 123, 129, 143, 156). The ill-fated Sykes-Pico Agreement made in 1916 between France and Britain to contain Tsarist Russia in the region became meaningless after the fall of the Russian imperial government in 1917 (pg. 56, 64). However, this agreement was not far from the minds of conference participants. The Sykes-Pico Agreement has been perceived in some quarters as both a self-inflicted curse on the British and a betrayal to the Arab Revolt against Ottoman rule (pg. 42-43, 53, 61-62, 78-79, 122). In addition, events outside the direct control of conference participants were shaping the outcome of this conference. The war-weary and very battered British Empire faced severe budgetary constraints following the ruinous Great War. Furthermore, the war between Greece and Turkey waged after the end of WWI represented an additional constraint placed on conference participants, and especially on Churchill whose position in the cabinet depended solely on the goodwill of Lloyd George, his political boss (pg. 107-108, 161). Churchill strongly opposed the disastrous pan-Hellenism of Prime Minister Lloyd George that ultimately resulted in the fall of the government by the end of 1922 (pg. 38-39, 60-61, 80, 198). Churchill sensibly believed in the appeasement of Turkey to avoid a widespread Muslim rebellion in some British colonies, one of the many ironies of his long political life (pg. 70, 82, 98). One of the legacies of the Cairo conference was the creation of Iraq, the result of the amalgamation of the Ottoman provinces of Basra, Baghdad and Mosul. This creation had disastrous consequences for the Kurds until the instauration of the no-fly zones in 1991 and for the Shia Muslims until the toppling of former President Saddam Hussein in 2003 (pg. 26, 92, 106-107, 125, 135-136, 150, 221-224). At the insistence of Feisal, a Sunni Arab and the first King of Iraq, the British integrated the predominantly Sunny Kurds into Iraq to better balance the Shia Muslim majority in Southern Iraq with the Sunni Arabs in the center (pg. 26). The British wrongly assumed that nationalism was stronger than religion (pg. 229-230). As Catherwood correctly points out, the real problem was ultimately how to square imperial designs of France and Britain in the region with President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points, and especially with the policy of self-determination described in the fifth point (pg. 66, 112, 172-173). Britain had to do as if the Iraqi people had acclaimed overwhelmingly Feisal, while pulling the strings behind the scene to get the desired result (pg. 96, 124, 131, 151-152, 163, 170, 188). However, the British wrongly underestimated Feisal's determination to become his own man in the eyes of his new subjects (pg. 153, 171, 176, 185-190, 197). Unlike the French, the British did not, however, use force to get rid of Feisal but left him on his throne as the best deal available to them to preserve their interests in the region (pg. 142-144, 174-175). To the British, having an Arab King in Iraq and having some form of indirect British rule there were not incompatible objectives. The British Empire was largely built on indirect rule that turned out to be a cheap way to run an empire (pg. 58, 142, 212). Surprisingly from the vintage of 21st century observers, oil was the missingWas this review helpful? Yes NoThank you for your feedback. Report this reviewThank you, this review has been flagged.
Posted December 27, 2004
By contrast, I enjoyed this book as it makes clear why we are in the present mess in Iraq, based upon a detailed study of Churchill's own archive. As a present day explanation for past events, you could not improve upon this bookWas this review helpful? Yes NoThank you for your feedback. Report this reviewThank you, this review has been flagged.
Posted December 3, 2004
A moderately interesting read, that did add some good historical context to the current situation that should be understood. Overall a disappointment in that the writing was poorly organized and written in a less than riveting fashion. Basically this is an analysis of Churchill's correspondence of the time, it could have been so much more.Was this review helpful? Yes NoThank you for your feedback. Report this reviewThank you, this review has been flagged.
Posted June 14, 2004
One of the best history books on this troubled region in many years, made more interesting by the close involvement in the process of no less than the great Winston Churchill himself. A must read for those interested in history.Was this review helpful? Yes NoThank you for your feedback. Report this reviewThank you, this review has been flagged.