This book examines the experiences of a range of countries in the conflict in Afghanistan, with particular focus on the demands of operating within a diverse coalition of states. After laying out the challenges of the Afghan conflict in terms of objectives, strategy, and mission, case studies of 15 coalition members—each written by a country expert—discuss each country's motivation for joining the coalition and explore the impact of more than 10 years of combat on each country's military, domestic government, and populace.
The book dissects the changes in the coalition over the decade, driven by both external factors—such as the Bonn Conferences of 2001 and 2011, the contiguous Iraq War, and politics and economics at home—and internal factors such as command structures, interoperability, emerging technologies, the surge, the introduction of counterinsurgency doctrine, Green on Blue attacks, escalating civilian casualties, and the impact of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams and NGOs.
In their conclusion, the editors review the commonality and uniqueness evident in the country cases, lay out the lessons learned by NATO, and assess the potential for their application in future alliance warfare in the new global order.
This book examines the experiences of a range of countries in the conflict in Afghanistan, with particular focus on the demands of operating within a diverse coalition of states. After laying out the challenges of the Afghan conflict in terms of objectives, strategy, and mission, case studies of 15 coalition members—each written by a country expert—discuss each country's motivation for joining the coalition and explore the impact of more than 10 years of combat on each country's military, domestic government, and populace.
The book dissects the changes in the coalition over the decade, driven by both external factors—such as the Bonn Conferences of 2001 and 2011, the contiguous Iraq War, and politics and economics at home—and internal factors such as command structures, interoperability, emerging technologies, the surge, the introduction of counterinsurgency doctrine, Green on Blue attacks, escalating civilian casualties, and the impact of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams and NGOs.
In their conclusion, the editors review the commonality and uniqueness evident in the country cases, lay out the lessons learned by NATO, and assess the potential for their application in future alliance warfare in the new global order.
Coalition Challenges in Afghanistan: The Politics of Alliance
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Overview
This book examines the experiences of a range of countries in the conflict in Afghanistan, with particular focus on the demands of operating within a diverse coalition of states. After laying out the challenges of the Afghan conflict in terms of objectives, strategy, and mission, case studies of 15 coalition members—each written by a country expert—discuss each country's motivation for joining the coalition and explore the impact of more than 10 years of combat on each country's military, domestic government, and populace.
The book dissects the changes in the coalition over the decade, driven by both external factors—such as the Bonn Conferences of 2001 and 2011, the contiguous Iraq War, and politics and economics at home—and internal factors such as command structures, interoperability, emerging technologies, the surge, the introduction of counterinsurgency doctrine, Green on Blue attacks, escalating civilian casualties, and the impact of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams and NGOs.
In their conclusion, the editors review the commonality and uniqueness evident in the country cases, lay out the lessons learned by NATO, and assess the potential for their application in future alliance warfare in the new global order.
Product Details
| ISBN-13: | 9780804796293 |
|---|---|
| Publisher: | Stanford Security Studies |
| Publication date: | 12/02/2015 |
| Sold by: | Barnes & Noble |
| Format: | eBook |
| Pages: | 352 |
| File size: | 2 MB |
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Read an Excerpt
Coalition Challenges in Afghanistan
The Politics of Alliance
By Gale A. Mattox, Stephen M. Grenier
STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
Copyright © 2015 Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior UniversityAll rights reserved.
ISBN: 978-0-8047-9629-3
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Framing the War in Afghanistan
Stephen M. Grenier
FEW RECENT INTERNATIONAL events have proven more challenging than the coalition's effort to secure and stabilize Afghanistan. As of October 2014, the US and forty-nine international coalition partners have suffered almost 3,500 troops killed and more than 23,000 wounded and have spent almost $900 billion trying to establish Afghan security forces, build government ministries, and promote economic development in the troubled Asian nation. More than 12,000 Afghan troops have been killed and over 37,000 wounded during that same period. The coalition has invested considerable resources embracing the notion that a stable Afghanistan, with a government that can provide essential services, foster economic opportunities, and protect its citizens from organized violence, will be an inhospitable locale for terrorists. This volume, which examines events in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2014, sets out to answer two questions. First, what motivated a country to join the coalition's campaign to stabilize Afghanistan? For many nations, the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks that killed almost 3,000 people from ninety countries served as the catalyst to take action. Whether it was to demonstrate solidarity with the US or to avenge the deaths of their citizens, several countries joined the coalition to defeat al Qaeda and bring Osama bin Laden to justice. Regional security concerns, domestic politics, or the opportunity to rehabilitate international reputations also prompted states to deploy military forces or support coalition efforts in other ways.
Second, this book assesses the coalition's performance by examining how well each country employed its military, diplomatic, or economic capabilities. Some contributing nations conducted a wide range of air, ground, and naval combat operations while others focused on delivering a distinctive capability that addressed a specific operational gap or need. As the war progressed — especially after insurgent activity increased in 2006 — several nations were forced to significantly augment the number of deployed troops to stabilize their assigned area of operations. When the interests of contributing members did not align, the coalition often failed to achieve its political and military objectives. For example, some governments placed limitations — commonly referred to as caveats — on their forces. Legal constraints, political considerations, and limited military capabilities prompted many leaders to restrict what type of operations their military forces could conduct. Some countries restricted their troops to performing humanitarian assistance and reconstruction efforts. Others permitted — and even encouraged — their forces to conduct combat operations, but only in areas that were generally free of insurgent activity. These types of decisions often strained bilateral relations between coalition partners and within alliances such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
WHY THEY FOUGHT: MOTIVATIONS FOR GOING TO WAR
"We are all Americans" was the famous September 12, 2001, Le Monde newspaper headline that captured the international community's resolve as the magnitude of the terrorist attacks emerged. The 9/11 strikes represented a dramatic increase in the scale of terrorist activity, and many countries determined that they had a moral responsibility to address this amplified terrorist threat. Jack Porter recounts that less than twenty-four hours after the attacks, NATO invoked Article 5, the collective defense principle of the Washington Treaty, for the first time in the alliance's history. The US government soon confirmed that members of al Qaeda, a terrorist group led by Osama bin Laden, conducted the attacks. Bin Laden and his lieutenants planned the 9/11 attacks in Afghanistan under the protection of the Taliban, the Islamist organization governing the remote Asian nation. When Taliban leader Mullah Omar refused to turn bin Laden over to American authorities, the US and the UK planned the opening salvo of the campaign that would soon drive the Taliban from power and force bin Laden and his al Qaeda lieutenants into hiding.
The primary motivation for the UK to fight in Afghanistan was to reinforce already strong defense ties with the US. Decades of close bilateral defense and intelligence cooperation was made possible by a common language, shared culture, interconnected economic systems, and collective view of the international system. Andrew Dorman argues that exceptionally strong Anglo-Americanties — commonly referred to as the "special relationship" — prompted London to immediately join the international coalition, but he also notes that London was motivated for other reasons. The UK sought to influence the conduct of the US-led war in Afghanistan, and it felt that it had a moral obligation to address the al Qaeda and Taliban threat emanating from Afghanistan with robust military force. The UK's resolve to the Afghan campaign was periodically tested, most notably in the months following the July 7, 2005, London terrorist bombings, but the UK has remained Washington's most steadfast and capable partner in Afghanistan.
Australia's motivations for deploying troops to Afghanistan also went beyond Canberra's desire to strengthen its defense ties with Washington. Maryanne Kelton and Aaron Jackson state that Australia viewed the Afghan security challenge from a regional as well as a global perspective. Canberra was concerned that al Qaeda could undermine regional stability by disrupting the tenuous peace between Pakistan and India and by financing extremist organizations in Indonesia and the Philippines. The terrorist groups operating in these island nations already possessed the ability to launch attacks that could destabilize national governments, disrupt trade, dissuade tourism, and encourage refugee movements. Additional financial support from al Qaeda could embolden them and make them even more dangerous.
Regional security considerations also prompted Jordan and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to join the coalition despite strong domestic anti-US sentiment. Dan Brown and Ariel Ahram posit that both countries decided to address the multifaceted threat of radical Islam by deepening already strong ties with Washington. Jordan's primary security concern was countering the internal factions in Afghanistan that were being influenced by al Qaeda and other radical elements. In contrast, the UAE identified Iran and its strategy to export Islamic revolutionary ideas to the Middle East as the most dangerous threat. Both Jordan and the UAE viewed their participation in Afghanistan as an opportunity to solidify their status as moderate Islamic countries, and as a way of encouraging America's continued involvement in the Middle East.
While the horrors of the 9/11 attacks provided a legal and moral justification for action, contributing countries were also motivated by other factors. The Afghanistan mission provided Canada, the Netherlands, and Japan an opportunity to rehabilitate tarnished reputations. Canada's defense system is anchored in its close relationship with the US, and Howard Coombs argues that Canada considered the war in Afghanistan as a chance to rebuild its security credentials with the US in the wake of Canada's performance in Somalia, Rwanda, and the former Yugoslavia during the early 1990s. Canada's participation also provided an occasion to reinforce its commitment to NATO and increase its ability to influence the future of the alliance after the hostilities ended. Rem Korteweg notes that the Netherlands also wanted to rebuild its international standing and highlight the political and defense reforms it instituted after Dutch peace-keepers failed to prevent the 1995 murder of refugees in Srebrenica, a United Nations–declared "safe area" in Bosnia. Since the Netherlands was dependent on the NATO collective security umbrella, the mission in Afghanistan provided an opportunity to increase its credibility within the alliance and to strengthen the Dutch-American defense relationship. Japan also joined the coalition, in part, to repair its credibility and maintain strong ties to the US. Takamichi Takahashi states that Tokyo supported coalition naval operations in the Indian Ocean to restore its credibility after the international community criticized Japan for exercising "checkbook diplomacy" during the 1991 Persian Gulf War when it contributed $13 billion to offset coalition expenses instead of deploying military forces to the region.
Domestic politics influenced officials in Germany, El Salvador, and New Zealand to contribute forces to the coalition. Gale Mattox argues that Germany deployed troops outside Europe for the first time since World War II to fulfill its NATO commitments and to demonstrate solidarity with the US following the 9/11 attacks. In addition to military forces, Germany made significant contributions to the coalition on the diplomatic front. A large Afghan population residing in Germany coupled with a strong public support for Afghan humanitarian aid and development efforts prompted Germany to host two major international conferences on Afghanistan — Bonn I in 2001 and Bonn II a decade later. Discussion topics at both conferences included economic and social development, governance, and regional and security cooperation — areas that had strong German domestic political support and aligned perfectly with Berlin's overseas goals.
El Salvador's seemingly unlikely contribution to the coalition was due to a complex civil-military relationship in the small Western Hemisphere nation. Rebecca Bill Chavez asserts that El Salvador's President Mauricio Funes sought to improve his relationship with the Armed Forces of El Salvador (ESAF) by strengthening his country's ties with the US. The steady flow of illegal narcotics and weapons through the Central American isthmus caused an epidemic of gang-related violence, which contributed to El Salvador's having one of the highest homicide rates in the world. Funes needed the military's support to fight the gangs, but distrust between his leftist administration and the ESAF stood in the way of a coordinated response. He stunned political observers when he dismissed his own political party's concerns and joined with conservative legislators to approve the deployment of El Salvadoran troops to Afghanistan. The US responded by providing the troops with advanced training and equipment for use in Afghanistan, and against transnational criminal organizations operating in El Salvador. This strengthened El Salvadoran–American relations, improved Funes' standing with the ESAF, and helped San Salvador develop a better-coordinated government response against criminal entities.
Robert Ayson notes that New Zealand joined the international coalition to destroy al Qaeda and deny it a sanctuary to plan future attacks, not to strengthen defense ties with the US. Prime Minister Helen Clark expressed outrage and quickly condemned the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks, but she did not commit New Zealand's military forces to joining the coalition until the military campaign was legitimized by the passage of a United Nations Security Council Resolution. New Zealand's participation in the coalition eventually contributed to stronger defense ties between Wellington and Washington, but it was an unintended consequence of the mission.
Marybeth Ulrich states that Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, and the Czech Republic viewed their contributions to the coalition through the lens of NATO and their bilateral relationship with the US. All four countries, labeled "new Europe" by former US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, were more concerned about conventional military threats than their "Western" European counterparts. This prompted each of them to align closely with the US on a variety of defense and economic issues and to maintain a strong commitment to the collective defense principle of the NATO Washington Treaty. Poland and the Czech Republic considered al Qaeda to be a global security threat and determined that stabilizing Afghanistan and destroying the terrorist camps operating there was in their national interest. In contrast, Slovakia and Hungary deployed forces primarily to demonstrate solidarity with other NATO contributing nations.
Despite often tenuous relationships with the US and coalition forces, Pakistan and Russia provided critical support throughout the campaign. Timothy Hoyt argues that Pakistan accepted Washington's invitation to support the coalition in the days following the 9/11 attacks. US-Pakistan relations were strained in September 2001 because of ongoing disagreements overPakistan's nuclear program, its role in the 1999 Kargil War, the military coup that put General Musharraf in power, and Islamabad's decision to recognize the legitimacy of the Taliban regime. Islamabad viewed Washington's outreach as an opportunity to reset the US-Pakistan relationship, end economic sanctions, and restore American military assistance.
President Vladimir Putin was one of the first international leaders to call President Bush after the 9/11 attacks. Renanah Miles posits that Russia shared the coalition's goal of creating a stable Afghanistan to reduce the flow of illegal narcotics and the spread of Islamist extremism, but Moscow also embraced the contradictory policy of calling for US and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) troops to depart Afghanistan.
HOW THEY FOUGHT: SUCCESS AND FAILURE IN AFGHANISTAN
In October 2001, US, British, and Northern Alliance (NA) forces launched the campaign to destroy al Qaeda and liberate Afghanistan from Taliban rule. The combination of ground troops and air-delivered precision-guided munitions overwhelmed the Taliban. Less than three months later, all major Afghan cities were under NA control. Those quick victories prompted other nations to join the coalition to stabilize Afghanistan and prevent al Qaeda from reestablishing safe havens west of the Durand Line. Some contributing nations conducted full-spectrum combat operations while others focused on delivering a specific, more limited capability.
Since 2001, the US deployed a staggering amount of military hardware and supplies to Afghanistan. It provided the bulk of coalition ground forces, strategic and tactical airlift, medical treatment and evacuation, cyber and communications infrastructure, and close air support to coalition troops. While each contributing country was responsible for supplying its own forces, the US actually provided most of the logistical support for the coalition. US forces conducted combat operations in every province and participated in every major operation, but they rarely fought alone. Several coalition partners also made significant contributions, which often came at a heavy cost. The UK, Australia, Canada, and the Netherlands fielded highly capable conventional and special operations forces that conducted combat and stabilization operations throughout Afghanistan. All four countries fielded Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), managed large-scale development projects, trained and advised Afghan security forces, and made substantial financial contributions at Afghanistan international donor conferences. The UK and Canada executed a series of campaigns against insurgents occupying major population areas in Helmand and Kandahar provinces respectively. The Netherlands, followed by Australia in 2010, led the coalition's effort in Uruzgan province and fought several demanding battles against insurgent forces operating there.
Others contributing nations focused on delivering a distinct capability that addressed a specific operational gap. Nicolas Fescharek notes that France deployed combat aircraft, trained three of the first six Afghan National Army (ANA) battalions, staffed the Regional Command–Capital (RC[C]) headquarters, and taught basic police skills to thousands of Afghan National Police (ANP) officers. When the security situation in eastern Afghanistan deteriorated, French troops conducted counterinsurgency operations in the volatile mountainous area surrounding Kabul and disrupted Taliban attempts to attack Afghan government ministries and assassinate senior officials. Ariel Ahram and Dan Brown state that Jordan and UAE special operations troops developed positive relationships with nearby Afghan security forces and local citizens, partly because of their shared religious beliefs. Since US law prohibited appropriated funds from being spent on religious buildings, the UAE built mosques at dozens of ANA bases. Jordanian soldiers staffed field hospitals, trained ANA Commandos, and conducted limited combat operations in Zabul province.
(Continues...)
Excerpted from Coalition Challenges in Afghanistan by Gale A. Mattox, Stephen M. Grenier. Copyright © 2015 Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University. Excerpted by permission of STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS.
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Table of Contents
Contents and Abstracts1Introduction: Framing the War in Afghanistan chapter abstractThis chapter outlines the motivations that influenced a country's decision to join the coalition's campaign to stabilize Afghanistan. In addition, the chapter assesses the coalition's performance since 2001 by examining how well each country employed its military, diplomatic, or economic capabilities. Whether it was to demonstrate solidarity with the US or to avenge the deaths of their citizens during the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, several countries joined the coalition to defeat al Qaeda and bring Osama bin Laden to justice. Contributing nations conducted a wide-range of air, ground, and naval combat operations while others focused on delivering a distinctive capability that addressed a specific operational gap. When the interests of contributing members did not align, the coalition often failed to achieve its political and military objectives.
2Afghanistan: The Reluctant Partner, Building a State in a Time of War chapter abstractThis chapter examines the role of the Afghan state in the country's war effort. Kabul is often treated as a non-entity – a set of institutions acted upon by outsiders. The Afghan government is often seen by international actors as no more than traditional networks of patronage, yet there is also an elusive Afghan state attempting to exert itself. The conflicts inside the Afghan government are many-layered and opaque. Outcomes in Afghanistan are products of the interaction of these competing influences. International actors undermined state-building efforts in favor of parochial war aims, and traditional networks have subverted governance through corruption and modernization efforts has often flouted the culture and will of rural Afghans, focusing disproportionately on desires of the urban citizenry.
3Warlords and the Coalition in Afghanistan chapter abstractThis chapter focuses on the relationships between ISAF contributing nations and Afghan warlords between 2001 and 2014. It shows how the latter have instrumentalized the cross-cutting agendas of the former to maximize their autonomy and shape the state-building process. It focuses on two typical warlords, General Dostum, the Uzbek leader of Northern Afghanistan, and Ismail Khan, the self-proclaimed "Amir of Western Afghanistan," and their ability to adapt to new environments, shape shift, and eventually survive, both physically and politically. It explains how these non-state armed actors have developed their own kind of diplomacy and taken advantage of the heterogeneity of the international community to resist Kabul's homogenizing pressure and remain relevant after 2001. Overall, this chapter demonstrates how warlords keep wielding influence in the midst of a state-building project that promotes the construction of bureaucratic institutions.
4United States: Examining America's Longest War chapter abstractThis chapter argues that the United States military, through a series of intentional and unintentional actions, hindered the creation of an effective Afghan National Army (ANA). The absence of an effective ANA was a key reason the security situation steadily deteriorated, eventually becoming so dire that in 2009, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates relieved General David McKiernan, the commander of all US and coalition troops in Afghanistan, and President Obama ordered a "top-to-bottom" policy review. American military officials put parochial interests ahead of Afghanistan's security needs and harmed the nascent ANA by working with local militia forces, using US Army National Guard units to train the ANA, and creating specialized units within the ANA. These actions undermined the ANA's combat effectiveness, harmed the legitimacy of the fledgling Afghan government, and served as a catalyst for corruption and patronage.
5Canada: The Evolution of a New Canadian Way of War chapter abstractCanada's Afghanistan war experience differed from previous conflicts in one very significant fashion – national implementation of an integrated governmental approach to military operations. This "whole of government" (WoG) approach defined Canada's involvement in Afghanistan, particularly between 2006 and 2011 in the southern province of Kandahar. This chapter examines the development of this WoG methodology and provides a perspective on evolving Canadian approaches to the use of its instruments of national power in the twenty-first century.
6El Salvador: Exporting Security in the National Interest chapter abstractThis chapter argues El Salvador's President Mauricio Funes sought to improve his relationship with the El Salvador Armed Forces by strengthening his country's ties with the US. The steady flow of illegal narcotics and weapons through the Central American isthmus caused an epidemic of gang-related violence. Funes needed the military's support to fight the gangs, but distrust between his leftist administration and the ESAF stood in the way of a coordinated response. He stunned political observers when he dismissed his own political party's concerns and joined with conservative legislators to approve the deployment of El Salvadoran troops to Afghanistan. The US responded by providing the troops with advanced training and equipment for use in Afghanistan, and against transnational criminal organizations operating in El Salvador. This strengthened El Salvadoran-American relations, improved Funes' standing with the ESAF, and helped San Salvador develop a better-coordinated government response against criminal entities.
7Federal Republic of Germany: The Legacy of the War in Afghanistan chapter abstractA member of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), Germany has been the third largest contributor to the Afghan mission for over a decade and has committed the largest force second only to the United States for the Resolute Support post-2014 phase. For Germany this commitment by the Bundeswehr has reflected its commitment to Afghan development and has marked significant milestone in German responsibilities as an alliance member. Given its past decisions with respect to participation in conflict, the longer- implications of this role are less clear. There is no doubt that the leadership, training, and operational experience during the Afghanistan mission have been unprecedented for the country and its readiness for future deployments has significantly increased. But while its role in Afghanistan has given the Bundeswehr operational experience, it remains unclear if the country is ready for a more forward leaning international role for Germany in the future.
8The United Kingdom: Innocence lost in the War in Afghanistan chapter abstractThis chapter examines why a military campaign for which the British government had such high hopes, and which domestic public opinion initially supported, has led to major divisions within the UK and questions over its worth. The first part examines the first phase of Britain's Afghan War. It looks at the reasoning behind the government's decision to engage in combat in Afghanistan and then analyzes the initial campaign from 2001-2005. The second part reviews the second phase of the war. It considers the government's decision to make the case for NATO to escalate its involvement to Southern and Eastern Afghanistan and the subsequent deployment of British forces principally to Helmand. The third part reflects on the wider impact of the Afghan War for and on the UK.
9France: "Friend, ally but not aligned": vigilant pragmatism in Afghanistan chapter abstractGiven that the Afghan campaign has often put great strain on US-European relations, it is of particular interest to consider the French example, traditionally the most unruly European NATO ally. After a historical overview, and looking at French contributions to ANA training, COIN and "civ-mil" policies, this article examines how the relationship between France and NATO has changed as a result of its 13 years-long engagement in Afghanistan. It argues that instead of driving France and the US further apart (as might have been expected during the crises in 2006/07), the campaign has actually reinforced many ties and contributed to a normalization of sorts, even though a great deal of ambiguity still characterizes the relationship.
10The Netherlands: To Fight, or not to Fight chapter abstractThis chapter highlights how a smaller power struggled with the political, military and financial pressures of sustained expeditionary operations and the dissonance that emerges as domestic political considerations clash with the military-operational reality. The Netherlands joined the coalition to rebuild its international standing and highlight the political and defense reforms it instituted after Dutch peacekeepers failed to prevent the 1995 murder of refugees in Srebrenica, a United Nations declared "safe area" in Bosnia. Since the Netherlands was dependent on the NATO collective security umbrella, the mission in Afghanistan provided an opportunity to increase its credibility within the Alliance and to strengthen the Dutch-American defense relationship. Dutch counterinsurgency operations in Uruzgan province proved politically contentious due to the combat involved, which ultimately became the pretext for the collapse of the government in 2010.
11The Visegrad Four: Achieving Long Term Security through Alliance Support chapter abstractThis chapter focuses on the participation and contribution of the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Poland to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan. The Visegrad Four's participation in ISAF, first and foremost, was rooted in the perception that it was NATO's key military operation. Each regarded ISAF's success as a key strategic interest critical to their goal of the continued viability of NATO, the cornerstone of their security. ISAF participation solidified the reputations of each as solid NATO "security providers." The chapter also examines how ISAF participation affected each state's military capabilities and ongoing efforts for military modernization and reform in the post-communist era. Perhaps, most importantly for all, NATO carried out the ISAF mission and remains intact to carry on its newfound global character.
12Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan: The British, Dutch, German and French Cases chapter abstractThis chapter examines how European allies of the United States applied COIN in Afghanistan by examining the experiences of the United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands and France. For several years after NATO assumed command of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (ISAF) in 2003, the United Kingdom struggled to relearn its forgotten COIN doctrine and strategy, while the Germans and French disputed how much NATO should engage in civilian reconstruction work. The Dutch kept a low-profile in this dispute while pursuing their own 'Dutch approach' in their area of responsibility. These divergences meant that ISAF was hobbled by an ad hoc patchwork of objectives without a clear consensus on a common strategy when confronted with the dual missions of nation-building and counterinsurgency.
13North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Transformation Under Fire chapter abstractThe events of September 11, 2001 prompted NATO into action when it invoked Article V (collective defense) for the first time and subsequently led to the formation of the International Security Assistance Force - Afghanistan (ISAF). The following chapter provides a chronological analysis of the Alliance's thirteen-year involvement in the war in Afghanistan and examines the various strategic and political adjustments made by the now 28-member alliance. After its initially low profile, NATO expanded its activities throughout Afghanistan and assumed more and more combat missions. At first conceived of as primarily stabilization operations, ISAF's mission would eventually involve kinetic operations associated with counterinsurgency and counter terrorism. Although the Alliance made tremendous progress in adapting its strategy and tactics to an increasingly dangerous and challenging environment, the mission also exposed serious divisions and weaknesses as Brussels struggled with coordinating the national preferences and divergent capabilities of its member states.
14Jordan and the United Arab Emirates: Arab Partners in Afghanistan chapter abstractMost accounts of the campaign in Afghanistan overlook the role of Jordan or the UAE. In official tallies and military terms their contributions have been miniscule and symbolic at best. Unlike others, neither has historically significant strategic interests in Afghanistan, and it would have been logical to free-ride on the already powerful coalition. But the fact that these countries publically joined the coalition highlights the complex reasons countries contributed to the campaign and illustrates remarkable flexibility in the form and substance of coalition burden sharing. We argue that their role must be considered in the context of their security environment, their relationship with the United States, and the larger pursuit of securing their interests against the threat of radical Islam, bolstering a national identity premised on more moderate interpretations of Islam, providing important diplomatic and strategic assets to the coalition.
15Japan: A New Self-Defense Force Roleor Not? chapter abstractThis chapter examines Japan's contribution to the international coalition in Afghanistan. Tokyo supported coalition naval operations in the Indian Ocean to restore its credibility after the international community criticized Japan for exercising "checkbook diplomacy" during the 1991 Persian Gulf War when it contributed $13 billion to offset coalition expenses instead of deploying military forces to the region. If Japan had again assisted with only financial assistance, the Japan-United States alliance could have been undermined and Japanese national security threatened.
16Australia: Terrorism, Regional Security and the US Alliance chapter abstractThis chapter argues that Australia joined the international coalition to remove al Qaeda from their bases in Afghanistan; foster regional stability; and bolster the strength of Australia's US alliance by supporting the US in its pursuit of al-Qaeda. Australia supported action in Afghanistan to remove the al Qaeda threat and to deny that transnational organization and affiliated networks sanctuary to plan, arm and train in Afghanistan. Australian government was also concerned about al-Qaeda's impact on Australia's regional security. Lastly, Australian policy makers have sought to maintain US regional presence, bolster Australia's alliance stocks, and enhance the possibility of reciprocity from the larger power in alliance relations.
17New Zealand: Fostering the U.S.-New Zealand Relationship chapter abstractNever large in a quantitative sense, New Zealand's military deployment to Afghanistan is notable for its length and diplomatic significance. New Zealand's experience of casualties was the reverse of most, with the majority of New Zealand combat deaths coming in the last years of the Provincial Reconstruction Team's deployment to Bamiyan. The most domestically controversial part of New Zealand's commitment to Afghanistan, the Special Forces, was ironically often the most welcomed by its coalition partners. New Zealand's long commitment in Afghanistan formed a crucial element in the improving US-NZ security relationship, elements of which had been largely suspended since the mid-1980s. Afghanistan also provided the temporary glue for closer New Zealand-NATO links.
18Pakistan: A Tale of Two Allies chapter abstractThe role of Pakistan as an ally in the war on terror is unique. Unlike other allies discussed in this volume, Pakistan has not contributed military forces or other resources to support Coalition operations inside Afghanistan. This chapter argues that the Pakistani military forces play roles that affect Coalition operation in Afghanistan in several ways, both positive and negative. First, Pakistani military and paramilitary forces man the border outposts on the Durand Line, monitoring and at least theoretically constraining movement by militants across the border. Second, Pakistan's intelligence services have monitored and arrested members of certain militant groups that threaten the Coalition in Afghanistan, and that potentially threaten the homelands of Coalition partners. Third, and much more controversially, Pakistan's military and intelligence agencies provide sanctuary, shelter, and support for militant groups that actively fight the Coalition.
19Russia: Friend or Foe on Afghanistan? chapter abstractThis chapter argues that Russia shared the coalition's goal of creating a stable Afghanistan to reduce the flow of illegal narcotics and the spread of Islamist extremism, but Moscow also embraced the contradictory policy of calling for US and International Security Assistance Force troops to depart Afghanistan. Russia provided coalition forces with detailed intelligence gained during Soviet military operations in the 1980s, and it worked with several Central Asian nations to permit coalition non-lethal supplies to be transported through their countries along three supply routes that collectively formed the Northern Distribution Network.
20Going Forward.Lessons Learned chapter abstractThe chapter reviews similarities and differences in the Afghanistan conflict 2001-2014 drawn from the experiences of 13 selected country case studies involved in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), 2 neighboring countries, and Afghanistan. It concludes that addressing identified challenges in NATO's first role outside Europe has strengthened the alliance in many respects. Less certain is the alliance preparedness for future conflicts. The cooperation and collaboration of 50 diverse nations (NATO members as well as non-members) that evolved during the Afghanistan operations – at times bumpy, at times surprisingly smooth – set a new standard for future operations from which much can be learned. However, the road ahead will be difficult for Afghanistan and incorporating lessons learned for NATO and its coalition allies will be challenging.