Cognitive Phenomenology

Cognitive Phenomenology

by Tim Bayne
     
 

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It is widely agreed that there is such a thing as sensory phenomenology and imagistic phenomenology. The central concern of the cognitive phenomenology debate is whether there is a distinctive "cognitive phenomenology"—that is, a kind of phenomenology that has cognitive or conceptual character in some sense that needs to be precisely determined. This

Overview

It is widely agreed that there is such a thing as sensory phenomenology and imagistic phenomenology. The central concern of the cognitive phenomenology debate is whether there is a distinctive "cognitive phenomenology"—that is, a kind of phenomenology that has cognitive or conceptual character in some sense that needs to be precisely determined. This volume presents new work by leading philosophers in the field, and addresses the question of whether conscious thought has cognitive phenomenology. It also includes a number of essays which consider whether cognitive phenomenology is part of conscious perception and conscious emotion.

Three broad themes run through the volume. First, some authors focus on the question of how the notion of cognitive phenomenology ought to be understood. How should the notion of cognitive phenomenology be defined? Are there different kinds of cognitive phenomenology? A second theme concerns the existence of cognitive phenomenology. Some contributors defend the existence of a distinctive cognitive phenomenology, whereas others deny it. The arguments for and against the existence of cognitive phenomenology raise questions concerning the nature of first-person knowledge of thought, the relationship between consciousness and intentionality, and the scope of the explanatory gap. A third theme concerns the implications of the cognitive phenomenology debate. What are the implications of the debate for accounts of our introspective access to conscious thought and for accounts of the very nature of conscious thought? Cognitive Phenomenology brings the debate to the forefront of philosophy, and provides a state-of-the-art account of the issues at stake.

Editorial Reviews

From the Publisher
"The volume is an important contribution to the debate on cognitive phenomenology. It should be of interest to philosophers of mind working on consciousness, cognition, and their intersections." —Mind

Product Details

ISBN-13:
9780198708032
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
Publication date:
10/14/2014
Edition description:
Reprint
Pages:
388
Product dimensions:
6.10(w) x 9.10(h) x 0.90(d)

Meet the Author

Tim Bayne is Lecturer in Philosophy at St. Catherine's College, Oxford. His main research interest is the philosophy of cognitive science, and he has co-edited The Oxford Companion to Consciousness (OUP, 2009) and Delusions and Self-Deception: Affective Influences on Belief Formation (Psychology Press, 2008).

Michelle Montague lectures in philosophy at the University of Bristol. Her main interests are in the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of language and metaphysics, and she has published in these areas in philosophy journals including Nous, Philosophical Studies, and Analysis. She is currently writing a book on the notion of content, with particular reference to the relationship between phenomenology and intentionality.

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