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Competition Policy: A Game-Theoretic Perspective / Edition 1
     

Competition Policy: A Game-Theoretic Perspective / Edition 1

by Louis Phlips
 

ISBN-10: 0521498716

ISBN-13: 9780521498715

Pub. Date: 12/28/2004

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

This book uses game theory to analyze anti-competitive behavior among firms and to consider its implications for competition policy. Topics include "explicit collusion," "tacit collusion," "semicollusion," and the detection of predatory pricing. The book discusses several European antitrust decisions and empirical studies in detail.

Overview

This book uses game theory to analyze anti-competitive behavior among firms and to consider its implications for competition policy. Topics include "explicit collusion," "tacit collusion," "semicollusion," and the detection of predatory pricing. The book discusses several European antitrust decisions and empirical studies in detail.

Product Details

ISBN-13:
9780521498715
Publisher:
Cambridge University Press
Publication date:
12/28/2004
Edition description:
New Edition
Pages:
292
Product dimensions:
5.98(w) x 8.98(h) x 0.63(d)

Table of Contents

Preface; Acknowledgements; 1. Preliminaries; Part I. Explicit Collusion: 2. Four are few and six are many; 3. Cartel laws are good for business; 4. Cartel enforcement; Part II. Tacit Collusion: 5. Information sharing among oligopolists; 6. Repeated games with collusive outcomes; 7. Price leadership and conscious parallelism; 8. Collusion detection; Part III. Semicollusion: 9. Excess capacity and collusion; 10. Collusion in R & D; Part IV. Predatory Pricing: 11. Predation in theory; 12. Evidence on predation; 13. Antitrust implications.

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