Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong / Edition 1

Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong / Edition 1

by Jerry A. Fodor
     
 

The renowned philosopher Jerry Fodor, a leading figure in the study of the mind for more than twenty years, presents a strikingly original t heory on the basic constituents of thought. He suggests that the heart of cognitive science is its theory of concepts, and that cognitive sc ientists have gone badly wrong in many areas because their assumptions about concepts

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Overview

The renowned philosopher Jerry Fodor, a leading figure in the study of the mind for more than twenty years, presents a strikingly original t heory on the basic constituents of thought. He suggests that the heart of cognitive science is its theory of concepts, and that cognitive sc ientists have gone badly wrong in many areas because their assumptions about concepts have been mistaken. Fodor argues compellingly for an a tomistic theory of concepts, deals out witty and pugnacious demolition s of rival theories, and suggests that future work on human cognition should build upon new foundations.

Product Details

ISBN-13:
9780198236368
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
Publication date:
04/09/1998
Series:
Oxford Cognitive Science Series
Edition description:
New Edition
Pages:
192
Product dimensions:
9.10(w) x 6.10(h) x 0.50(d)
Lexile:
1210L (what's this?)

Meet the Author

Jerry Fodor is Professor of Philosophy at Rutgers University. He is the author of numerous books, including Psychosemantics, A Theory of Content and Other Essays, Holism: A Shopper's Guide (with Ernest Lepore), and The Elm and the Expert.

Table of Contents

1. Philosophical Introduction: The Background Theory.
2. Unphilosophical Introduction: What Concepts Have To Be.
3. The Demise of Definitions, Part I: The Linguist's Tale.
4. The Demise of Definitions, Part II: The Philosopher's Tale.
5. Prototypes and Compositionality. (Appendix 5A: Meaning Postulates. Appendix 5B: The 'Theory Theory' of Concepts.)
6. Innateness and Ontology, Part I: The Standard Argument. (Appendix 6A: Similarity.)
7. Innateness and Ontology, Part II: Intentional Laws and Natural Kinds. (Appendix 7A: Round Squares.)
Bibliography
Index

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