Concerning the Conception of the Science of Knowledge Generally
Scanned, proofed and corrected from the original edition for your reading pleasure.It is also searchable and contains hyper-links to chapters.
***
This critique of the conditions of absolute knowledge, to use a phrase which shows the connection between Kant and Fichte, regards all approaches to Reality as empirically starting with a fact of knowledge. In the earliest presentation of the work it was the knowledge of identity, while in a later exposition it was a mathematical truth which formed the starting-point for the science of knowledge. The highest form of knowledge is "the intuition of all intuitions; the absolute uniting of all intuitions into one." Knowledge of this character is above contradiction, because to contradict it we should be compelled to use some form of it. To discover the central principle of this kind of knowledge is the immediate problem which presents itself to Fichte and through which he hopes to give unity not only to the system of Kant but also to the whole problem of philosophy.
In view of this demand Fichte seeks to discover the "absolute first and undeniably unconditioned fundamental proposition" of all human knowledge, believing that if such a proposition could be found it would lie at the basis of a science of all sciences. He points out in this essay that such a ground-proposition really exists as the form or manner of uniting all the facts of all the sciences. The world of scientific knowledge, he observes, is like a building, at the foundation there is one element that supports the superstructure. The discovery of this element is the purpose of the true science of knowledge.
Every proposition that is a fact of empirical science is not itself absolutely elemental, there are always earlier propositions upon which it depends. But there is, nevertheless, one single proposition which cannot be reduced into simpler terms. It is the deed-act of assertion. One must search for knowledge before knowledge is possible. And the existence of this will-act can never be directly proved, because it is deeper than all proof. Of its existence, however, it is presupposed by every reflective process, even that of doubting its existence. "The Subject of self-conscious knowledge and the Principle of actual existence are the same." Kant had already employed this transcendental method of proof when he demonstrated that time, space, and the categories were necessary even for the possibility of experience, and Fichte used it to show that the reality of the act of a self-asserting consciousness is necessarily presupposed, not only for experience, but even for the possibility of thought.
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***
This critique of the conditions of absolute knowledge, to use a phrase which shows the connection between Kant and Fichte, regards all approaches to Reality as empirically starting with a fact of knowledge. In the earliest presentation of the work it was the knowledge of identity, while in a later exposition it was a mathematical truth which formed the starting-point for the science of knowledge. The highest form of knowledge is "the intuition of all intuitions; the absolute uniting of all intuitions into one." Knowledge of this character is above contradiction, because to contradict it we should be compelled to use some form of it. To discover the central principle of this kind of knowledge is the immediate problem which presents itself to Fichte and through which he hopes to give unity not only to the system of Kant but also to the whole problem of philosophy.
In view of this demand Fichte seeks to discover the "absolute first and undeniably unconditioned fundamental proposition" of all human knowledge, believing that if such a proposition could be found it would lie at the basis of a science of all sciences. He points out in this essay that such a ground-proposition really exists as the form or manner of uniting all the facts of all the sciences. The world of scientific knowledge, he observes, is like a building, at the foundation there is one element that supports the superstructure. The discovery of this element is the purpose of the true science of knowledge.
Every proposition that is a fact of empirical science is not itself absolutely elemental, there are always earlier propositions upon which it depends. But there is, nevertheless, one single proposition which cannot be reduced into simpler terms. It is the deed-act of assertion. One must search for knowledge before knowledge is possible. And the existence of this will-act can never be directly proved, because it is deeper than all proof. Of its existence, however, it is presupposed by every reflective process, even that of doubting its existence. "The Subject of self-conscious knowledge and the Principle of actual existence are the same." Kant had already employed this transcendental method of proof when he demonstrated that time, space, and the categories were necessary even for the possibility of experience, and Fichte used it to show that the reality of the act of a self-asserting consciousness is necessarily presupposed, not only for experience, but even for the possibility of thought.
Concerning the Conception of the Science of Knowledge Generally
Scanned, proofed and corrected from the original edition for your reading pleasure.It is also searchable and contains hyper-links to chapters.
***
This critique of the conditions of absolute knowledge, to use a phrase which shows the connection between Kant and Fichte, regards all approaches to Reality as empirically starting with a fact of knowledge. In the earliest presentation of the work it was the knowledge of identity, while in a later exposition it was a mathematical truth which formed the starting-point for the science of knowledge. The highest form of knowledge is "the intuition of all intuitions; the absolute uniting of all intuitions into one." Knowledge of this character is above contradiction, because to contradict it we should be compelled to use some form of it. To discover the central principle of this kind of knowledge is the immediate problem which presents itself to Fichte and through which he hopes to give unity not only to the system of Kant but also to the whole problem of philosophy.
In view of this demand Fichte seeks to discover the "absolute first and undeniably unconditioned fundamental proposition" of all human knowledge, believing that if such a proposition could be found it would lie at the basis of a science of all sciences. He points out in this essay that such a ground-proposition really exists as the form or manner of uniting all the facts of all the sciences. The world of scientific knowledge, he observes, is like a building, at the foundation there is one element that supports the superstructure. The discovery of this element is the purpose of the true science of knowledge.
Every proposition that is a fact of empirical science is not itself absolutely elemental, there are always earlier propositions upon which it depends. But there is, nevertheless, one single proposition which cannot be reduced into simpler terms. It is the deed-act of assertion. One must search for knowledge before knowledge is possible. And the existence of this will-act can never be directly proved, because it is deeper than all proof. Of its existence, however, it is presupposed by every reflective process, even that of doubting its existence. "The Subject of self-conscious knowledge and the Principle of actual existence are the same." Kant had already employed this transcendental method of proof when he demonstrated that time, space, and the categories were necessary even for the possibility of experience, and Fichte used it to show that the reality of the act of a self-asserting consciousness is necessarily presupposed, not only for experience, but even for the possibility of thought.
***
This critique of the conditions of absolute knowledge, to use a phrase which shows the connection between Kant and Fichte, regards all approaches to Reality as empirically starting with a fact of knowledge. In the earliest presentation of the work it was the knowledge of identity, while in a later exposition it was a mathematical truth which formed the starting-point for the science of knowledge. The highest form of knowledge is "the intuition of all intuitions; the absolute uniting of all intuitions into one." Knowledge of this character is above contradiction, because to contradict it we should be compelled to use some form of it. To discover the central principle of this kind of knowledge is the immediate problem which presents itself to Fichte and through which he hopes to give unity not only to the system of Kant but also to the whole problem of philosophy.
In view of this demand Fichte seeks to discover the "absolute first and undeniably unconditioned fundamental proposition" of all human knowledge, believing that if such a proposition could be found it would lie at the basis of a science of all sciences. He points out in this essay that such a ground-proposition really exists as the form or manner of uniting all the facts of all the sciences. The world of scientific knowledge, he observes, is like a building, at the foundation there is one element that supports the superstructure. The discovery of this element is the purpose of the true science of knowledge.
Every proposition that is a fact of empirical science is not itself absolutely elemental, there are always earlier propositions upon which it depends. But there is, nevertheless, one single proposition which cannot be reduced into simpler terms. It is the deed-act of assertion. One must search for knowledge before knowledge is possible. And the existence of this will-act can never be directly proved, because it is deeper than all proof. Of its existence, however, it is presupposed by every reflective process, even that of doubting its existence. "The Subject of self-conscious knowledge and the Principle of actual existence are the same." Kant had already employed this transcendental method of proof when he demonstrated that time, space, and the categories were necessary even for the possibility of experience, and Fichte used it to show that the reality of the act of a self-asserting consciousness is necessarily presupposed, not only for experience, but even for the possibility of thought.
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Concerning the Conception of the Science of Knowledge Generally
Concerning the Conception of the Science of Knowledge Generally
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Product Details
| BN ID: | 2940013431515 |
|---|---|
| Publisher: | Leila's Books |
| Publication date: | 09/23/2011 |
| Series: | Science of Knowledge , #1 |
| Sold by: | Barnes & Noble |
| Format: | eBook |
| File size: | 251 KB |
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