Confessio Philosophi: Papers Concerning the Problem of Evil, 1671-1678

by G. W. Leibniz, Robert C. Sleigh, Jr. (Translator)

Overview

This volume contains papers that represent Leibniz’s early thoughts on the problem of evil, centering on a dialogue, the Confessio philosophi, in which he formulates a general account of God’s relation to sin and evil that becomes a fixture in his thinking.

How can God be understood to be the ultimate cause, asks Leibniz, without God being considered as the author of sin, a conclusion incompatible with God’s holiness?

Leibniz’s attempts to justify the way of God to humans lead him to deep discussion of related topics: the nature of free choice, the problems of necessitarianism and fatalism, the nature of divine justice and holiness. All but one of the writings presented here are available in English for the first time.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780300089585
Publisher:	Yale University Press
Publication date:	01/24/2006
Series:	The Yale Leibniz Series
Edition description:	New Edition
Pages:	220
Product dimensions:	6.00(w) x 9.25(h) x (d)

About the Author

Robert C. Sleigh, Jr., is emeritus professor of philosophy at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, and a general editor of The Yale Leibniz series.

Read an Excerpt

Confession Philosophi

Papers Concerning the Problem of Evil, 1671-1678

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By Gottfried Wilheilm Leibniz

Yale University Press

Copyright © 2005 Yale University
All right reserved.
ISBN: 978-0-300-08958-5

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Chapter One

Confessio philosophi

Papers Concerning the Problem of Evil, 1671-1678

Leibniz an Magnus Wedderkopf AII.i

117 1671

Fatum est Decretum Dei seu necessitas eventuum. Fatalia quae necessario eventura. Bivium difficile, Deus aut non de omnibus decernit, aut si de omnibus decernit, esse absolute omnium autorem. Nam si de omnibus decernit et res dissentiunt a decreto, non erit omnipotens. Si vero non de omnibus decernit, videtur sequi non esse omniscium. Impossibile enim videtur omniscium judicium suum de aliqua re suspendere. Quod nos saepe judicia suspendimus fit ex ignorantia. Hinc sequitur Deum nunquam se posse habere pure permissive. Sequitur etiam nullum decretum Dei esse revera non absolutum. Nos enim suspendimus judicia nostra conditionibus et alternationibus, quia minime exploratas rerum circumstantias habemus. Sed dura haec? fateor. Quid ergo? Ecce Pilatus damnatur. Cur? quia caret fide. Cur caret, quia caruit voluntate attentionis. Cur hac, quia non intellexit rei necessitatem (attendendi utilitatem). Cur non intellexit, quia causaeintellectionis defuere. Omnia enim necesse est resolvi in rationem aliquam, nec subsisti potest, donec perveniatur ad primam, aut admittendum est, posse aliquid existere sine sufficiente ratione existendi, quo admisso, periit demonstratio existentiae Dei multorumque theorematum Philosophicorum. Quae ergo ultima ratio voluntatis divinae? intellectus divinus. Deus enim vult quae optima item harmonicotata intelligit eaque velut seligit ex numero omnium possibilium infinito. Quae ergo intellectus divini? harmonia rerum. Quae harmoniae rerum? nihil. Per exemplum quod ea ratio est 2 ad 4 quae 4 ad 8, eius reddi ratio nulla potest, ne ex voluntate quidem divina. Pendet hoc ex ipsa Essentia seu Idea rerum. Essentiae enim rerum sunt sicut numeri, continentque ipsam Entium possibilitatem quam Deus non facit, sed existentiam: cum potius illae ipsae possibilitates seu Ideae rerum concidant cum ipso Deo. Cum autem Deus sit mens perfectissima, impossibile est ipsum non affici harmonia perfectissima, atque ita ab ipsa rerum idealitate ad optimum necessitari. Quod nihil detrahit libertati. Summa enim libertas est ad optimum a recta ratione cogi, qui aliam libertatem desiderat stultus est. Hinc sequitur, quicquid factum est, fit aut fiet, optimum ac proinde necessarium esse, sed ut dixi necessitate nihil libertati adimente, quia nec voluntati et rationis usui.

In nullius potestate est velle quae velit, etsi interdum posse quae velit. Imo nemo optat sibi hanc libertatem volendi quae velit, sed potius volendi optima. Cur ergo quae nec ipsi optamus, Deo affingimus? Hinc patet absolutam aliquam voluntatem non a rerum bonitate dependentem esse monstrosam, 118 contra, nullam esse in omniscio voluntatem permissivam, nisi quatenus Deus ipsi se rerum idealitati seu optimitati conformat. Nihil ergo absolute malum esse putandum, alioqui Deus aut non erit summe sapiens ad deprehendendum, aut non summe potens ad eliminandum. Hanc fuisse sententiam Augustini nullus dubito. Peccata mala sunt, non absolute, non mundo, non Deo, alioqui nec permitteret, sed peccanti. Deus odit peccata, non ut nec conspectum eorum ferre possit, uti nos quae aversamur, alioquin eliminaret, sed quia punit. Peccata bona sunt, id est harmonica, sumta cum poena aut expiatione. Nulla enim nisi ex contrariis harmonia est. Sed haec ad Te: nolim enim eliminari. Nam nec rectissima a quovis intelliguntur.

Von der Allmacht und Allwissenheit Gottes und der Freiheit des Menschen A Vl.i

537 (1) Unter allen fragen, so das Menschliche Geschlecht verwirret, ist keine mit mehrer hize getrieben, öffter wiederhohlet, gefährlicher und grausamer ausgeübet worden als diese Strittigkeit: wie mit der allmacht und allwisenheit des alles-regirenden Gottes der Freye wille des Menschen, Straffe und Belohnung, stehen könne.

(2) Denn wiewohl die erste frage bey allen Volckern und Glaubens-Bekändtnüsen vorkommen kann: "wie doch bey gegenwertigen Elend der Frommen und Glück der Boshafften eine Göttliche Versehung statt habe"; so hat doch solche, zwar in den gemüthern mehr, aüserlich aber soviel wesens nicht gemacht, dieweil die feinde der Versehung Gottes sich nicht viel blicken lasen dürffen.

(3) Sobald man aber mit dieser richtig, und also einig gewesen, das solche dem ansehen nach unrichtige austheilung der Gaben und Welt-Güther dieses Lebens den allweisen Regirer nicht auffhebe, sondern alle diese Verstimmung in einem andern Leben durch behörige Gegengriffe der Straffe und Belohnung gleichsam nach Musicalischen Regeln in eine weit vollkommenere Harmony ersezet werde: Ist man auff die andre gefallen, wie denn nun solche Straffen und Belohnung der Billigkeit gemäs, und von partheyligkeit entfernet seyn können, wann ja dieser allweise Regent der Welt, durch die wunderliche austheilung seiner Gaben macht das bey einem Straffe beym andern Belohnung, aber wie es die Christen nennen, Seeligkeit und Verdammung nicht wohl anders als folgen kan.

(4) Hier haben sich die Menschen hauptsächlich getheilet: kein Comet, kein Erdbeben, keine Landplage hat mehr schaden gethan: hier hat die faulheit einen unterschleiff, die bosheit eine farbe gefunden, und Gott selbst hat ein deckmantel beyder seyn müsen. Doch mit zimlicher mäsigkeit der Heyden, so solche Frage so viel müglich in den Schuhlen und Philosophischen Gallerien verschlosen; und mit nuzen der Türcken so der eingebildeten Kette einer unvermeydtlichen nothwendigkeit sich zu einer blinden tollkühnheit bey ihrer Miliz bedienet. Wir Christen allein haben weder den Torrent auffhalten, noch als er ausgebrochen, uns zu nuz machen können, sondern nach unsern gewohnlichen bösen gebrauch alle Schulfragen auff die Canzeln zu bringen, und dem Volck zu wisen nöthig zu machen, so viele Secten erwecket, das selten ein Ris unter uns entstanden, da die Versehung und Gnadenwahl nicht eingemenget worden.

(5) Es haben sich hierfür gethan die 2 Ursprünge der Manichäer, der 538 Platonischen Christen vermischung Nichts und Etwas, schatten und Liechts, so sie durch in einander strahlung zweyer einander entgegen gesezten Triangel ercläret, Origenis barmherzigkeit gegen die Teüfel und Verdamten, der Pelagianer Stolz, der halben Pelagianer List, der Massilienser wiederspenstigkeit, der Schuhl-Lehrer ausflüchte, und endtlich die nur alzu bekandte lezte erregungen der welt, darinn gewislich, Fatum, Praedestinatio, Liberum Servumque arbitrium, Necessitas, Gratia resistibilis vel irresistibilis, praeveniens vel subsequens, Auxilia gratiae, Scientia Media, Concursus DEI cum Creaturis, Decreta ab aeterno, Voluntas antecedens et Consequens, absoluta et Hypothetica, Supra-Lapsarii et Infra-Lapsarii, und was der Nahmen mehr, so alles verwirret, die Blut-Fahnen geführet.

(6) Ich sage noch einmahl, das solche nahmen alles verwirret; das deren Misbrauch und unzahlbare verdrehungen die Christenheit in einen unendtlichen Labyrinth geführet, das in erclärung der Worthe, welches ohne schahm und erbarmung nicht zu lesen, keiner mit dem andern überein komme, das also keiner den andern Verstehe oder Verstehen wolle; das also auch hier was überall, wahr, das man erdichteten oder auff eigne art gebrauchten Nahmen der Philosophen, so sie Terminos nennen, alle finsternüs der Wisenschafften zuzuschreiben habe. Das also kein ander mittel heraus zu kommen, als das man ohne einmischung solcher Wörther so nur den streit erneüern, die gemüther verbittern, der alten zanckereyen erinnern, zu unzahlbaren Verlegenen unverständtlichen Distinctionen ursach geben; sich der aller einfältigsten, gemeinesten, cläresten red-arten, so der armeste Bauer der von der sach seine meinung sagen müste, brauchen würde, bediene, und Versuche ob nicht dergestalt müglich sey etwas zu sagen, so zu erclärung der Sach gnug, und doch von niemand wiedersprochen werden könne. Die Teütsche Sprache ist am bequemsten dazu, die an nuzlichen zu gemeinem Leben gehörigen und sichtbare oder Verständtliche dinge bedeütenden Nahmen einen überflus hat, zu den vermeint-Philosophischen Chimären aber nicht als mit Hahren gezogen und gleichsam genothzüchtiget werden kann. Dahingegen die Lateinische ihrer Jungferschafft vorlängst beraubt, und ihre töchter, die Italian- und Französische die Laster der Mutter anzunehmen alzu geneigt gewesen. Sollte dieses angehen, und Verständigen Billigen Leüten ein genüge geschehen, wird man vielleicht diesen Griff, wils Gott, zu mehrern Proben brauchen.

1. letter to Magnus Wederkopf AII.i

117 1671

Fate is the decree of God or the necessity of events. Fatal things are those that will necessarily happen. God either does not decree concerning everything or, if he does decree concerning everything, then he is the author of absolutely everything. Both alternatives involve difficulties. For if God decrees concerning everything and things are in conflict with his decree, he will not be omnipotent. However, if he does not decree concerning everything, it seems to follow that he is not omniscient. For it seems impossible that an omniscient being suspends his judgment about anything. That we often suspend judgments comes about from ignorance. For this reason it follows that God can never be considered purely permissive. Indeed, it follows that there is no decree of God that is actually not absolute. For we suspend our judgments because of conditions and alternatives, because we have insufficiently explored the circumstances. But isn't this conclusion harsh? I admit it. What then? Consider Pilate, who is damned. Why? Because he lacks faith. Why does he lack it? Because he lacked the will to pay heed. Why does he lack this? Because he did not understand the necessity of the matter (the usefulness of paying heed). Why did he not understand? Because the causes of understanding were lacking. For everything must be reduced to some reason, which process cannot stop until it reaches a primary reason, or it must be admitted that something can exist without a reason for existing; but if this were admitted, the demonstration of the existence of God and of many other philosophical theorems would be destroyed. What, therefore, is the ultimate basis of the divine will? The divine intellect. For God wills those things that he perceives to be the best and, likewise, the most harmonious; and he selects them, so to speak, from the infinite number of all the possibles. What, therefore, is the ultimate basis of the divine intellect? The harmony of things. And what is the ultimate basis of the harmony of things? Nothing. For example, no reason can be given for the fact that the ratio of 2 to 4 is that of 4 to 8, not even from the divine will. This depends on the essence itself, i.e., the idea of things. For essences of things are just like numbers, and they contain the very possibility of entities, which God does not bring about, as he does existence, since these very possibilities-or ideas of things-coincide rather with God himself. However, since God is the most perfect mind, it is impossible that he is not affected by the most perfect harmony and thus must bring about the best by the very ideality of things. But this does not detract from freedom. For it is the highest form of freedom to be forced to the best by right reason; whoever desires another form of freedom is a fool. From this it follows that whatever has happened, is happening, or will happen is the best and, accordingly, necessary. But, as I said, it has a necessity that takes nothing away from freedom because it takes nothing away from the will and the use of reason. It is in no one's power to will what he is going to will, although sometimes one can do what one wills. In fact, no one wants to have this freedom of willing what he is going to will, but rather the freedom of willing the best. Therefore, why do we attribute to God what we do not want for ourselves? From this it is evident that an absolute will, not dependent 118 on the goodness of things, is monstrous. On the contrary, there is no permissive will in an omniscient being, except insofar as God conforms himself to the ideality itself of things, i.e., to what is best. Therefore, nothing is to be considered absolutely evil, otherwise either God will not be supremely wise with respect to its comprehension or God will not be supremely powerful with respect to its elimination.9 There is no doubt that this was the opinion ofAugustine. Sins are evil, not absolutely, not with respect to the world as a whole, not with respect to God-otherwise he would not permit them-but with respect to the sinner. God hates sins, not in the sense that he cannot bear the sight of them, as we cannot bear the sight of what we detest-otherwise he would eliminate them-but because he punishes them. Taken together with punishment or atonement, sins are good, i.e., harmonious. For there is no harmony except as a result of contraries. But these remarks are for you; I do not wish them made public. For not even the most proper remarks are understood by everyone.

2. On the Omnipotence and Omniscience of God and the Freedom of Man AVI.i

[1670-71?]

537 (1) Of all the questions that bewilder the human race, none is pursued with more passion, more often repeated, more dangerously and cruelly pressed than this point of contention: "how the free will of man, punishment, and reward can exist, given the omnipotence and omniscience of an all-ruling God."

(2) For though the first question can arise for all people and all faiths, "how divine predestination can exist in conjunction with the present misery of the pious and the good fortune of the malicious," still such a question has not caused much fuss publicly, though privately somewhat more, because the enemies of God's predestination have not been allowed to show their faces much.

(3) But as soon as one understands and accepts that such an apparently unjust distribution of gifts and worldly goods in this life does not abolish the all-wise ruler, but rather that all such annoyance is replaced in another life by corresponding punishment and reward in a truly perfect harmony -as it were according to musical rules-then one comes to the other problem: how, then, such punishments and rewards can be in accordance with fairness and devoid of bias, when in fact this all-wise ruler of the world, through the wonderful distribution of gifts, brings it about that for one punishment, for another reward, or as Christians call it, salvation and damnation, cannot but follow.

(4) It is here that people have principally divided; no comet, no earthquake, no plague has done more harm. It is here that laziness has found shelter, evil has found camouflage, and God himself has had to be a pretence for both. Still, the pagans were relatively restrained and kept such questions within the schools and philosophical halls as much as possible; and, for their own benefit, the Turks made use of an imaginary chain of an unavoidable necessity to induce their army to fight with blind courage. We Christians alone have neither halted the torrent nor, when it broke loose, made use of it, but rather, because of our normal, bad custom of bringing all scholastic questions into the pulpit and of making it necessary that the people have knowledge of them, we have awakened so many sects that rarely a rift has arisen among us in which predestination and election have not had a part.

538 (5) Two principles of the Manichaeans have come into prominence: Nothing and Something, a Platonic-Christian mixture of shadow and light. These are illustrated by the intersecting rays of two opposed triangles and explained by the compassion of Origen toward the devil and the damned, the Pelagian pride, the semi-Pelagian trickery, the Massilian's willfulness, the excuses of the scholastics, and finally the only-too-well-known latest causes of excitement in the world, among which are certainly Fate, Predestination, Freedom and Servitude of the Will, Necessity, resistible and irresistible Grace, prevenient and subsequent Grace, Aids to Grace, Middle Knowledge, Concurrence of God with Creatures, Decrees from Eternity, Antecedent and Consequent Will, Absolute and Hypothetical Will, Supra-Lapsarians and Infra-Lapsarians, and whatever other labels designed to confuse everything have appeared leading the bloody banners.

(6) I say again that such labels confuse everything, that their misuse and countless changes in meaning have led Christianity into an endless labyrinth, that in explaining the words, which are not read without shame and pity, no one person agrees with another-that in sum no one understands or wants to understand another. Consequently, what is here and everywhere true is that one has to attribute all the darkness of the sciences to the manufactured or idiosyncratically used names of the philosophers, which they call terms. So, in the end, there is no other way of getting away from this problem than this: rather than invoking such words, which only renew the debate, embitter spirits, recall old squabbles, give rise to countless, embarrassing, incomprehensible distinctions, a person must use the simplest, most common, and clearest expressions, which the poorest peasant, constrained to give his opinion on the subject, would use, and a person must try to determine whether in such a way it is possible to say something that would be sufficient to explain the issue that nevertheless cannot be contradicted by anybody. The German language, which has an abundance of meaningful terms for useful things belonging to common life, for things visible or intelligible, is the most convenient for that purpose; when applied to supposed philosophical chimeras, it can only seem false-it is violated. In contrast, the Latin language was robbed a long time ago of her virginity, and her daughters, the Italian and French languages, were all too inclined to take on the vice of the mother. Should this project take root and satisfy reasonable and fair people, then people can perhaps use this approach, God willing, for more tests.

(Continues...)

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Table of Contents

Contents

Preface....................ix
List of Abbreviations....................xi
A Note on the Texts, Translations, and Methods of Citation....................xv
Introduction....................xix
1 Evil and Theodicy....................xix
2 The Confessio and Related Texts....................xix
3 Modality....................xxiv
4 The Author of Sin....................xxvii
5 Freedom, Individuation, and the Lament of the Damned....................xxxviii
Confessio philosophi: Papers Concerning the Problem of Evil, 1671-1678....................1
1 Letter to Magnus Wedderkopf (1671) A II.i....................2
2 On the Omnipotence and Omniscience of God and the Freedom of Man (1670-71?) A VI.i....................4
3 "The Confession of a Philosopher" (Fall 1672-Winter 1672-73?) A VI.iii....................26
4 The Author of Sin (1673?) A VI.iii....................110
5 "Conversation with Steno Concerning Freedom" (7 December 1677) A VI.iv....................112
6 "Middle Knowledge" (November 1677) A VI.iv....................130
7 "On Free Choice" (Between Summer 1678 and Winter 1680-81?) A VI.iv....................132
8 On the Necessity of Choosing the Best (1677?) A VI.iv....................138
9 A Demonstration That God Understands All Possibles (1677?) A VI.iv....................140
Notes....................143
Index....................175

Editorial Reviews

"As a result of the care with which this volume has been prepared, it will surely be indispensable to Leibniz scholars and an outstanding resource for historians of philosophy and philosophers of religion."—Timothy Crockett, The Review of Metaphysics

The Review of Metaphysi - Timothy Crockett